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Statement of Disclaimer
This project report is a result of a class assignment; it has been graded and accepted as
fulfillment of the course requirements. Acceptance of this report in fulfillment of the course
requirements does not imply technical accuracy or reliability. Any use of information in
this report is done at the risk of the user. These risks may include, but may not be limited
to, catastrophic failure of the device or infringement of patent or copyright laws. California
Polytechnic State University at San Luis Obispo and its staff cannot be held liable for any
use or misuse of the project.
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Executive Summary
A Fire Protection & Life Safety Analysis was conducted in order to fulfill the requirements
for the degree of Master of Science in Fire Protection Engineering. The Fire Protection &
Life Safety Analysis consisted of a prescriptive and performance-based analysis of the Eric
W. Rood Administration Center (Rood Center).
The prescriptive based analysis was conducted to determine if the Rood Center adhered to
the applicable codes and standards. It utilized the 2013 California Building and Fire Codes
and the 2012 Life Safety Code (NFPA 101). Other NFPA codes that were referenced
included the 2013 edition of NFPA 13, Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems,
the 2013 edition of NFPA 72, National Fire Alarm Signaling Code, and the 2015 edition of
NFPA 2001, Standard on Clean Agent Fire Extinguishing systems.
The prescriptive based analysis examined four portions of the building’s fire protection
system:
• Egress Analysis & Design
• Fire Detection & Alarm Notification
• Water-based Fire Suppression
• Structural Fire Protection
Deficiencies were found in the building’s fire detection and notification systems, as well as
the inspection, testing, and maintenance of said systems. The building’s primary fire alarm
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system has photoelectric smoke detectors installed in only portions of the building. The
bulk of the detectors are installed in the exit corridors with typically only one detector per
department. While the number of smoke detectors in most departments is lacking, some
departments don’t have any at all. The first floor has only 23 smoke detectors, while the
second floor has only 16. Based on coverage-area-per-detector calculations alone, the first
floor should have a minimum of 56 detectors and the second floor should have a minimum
of 58. One of the departments in the building that does have smoke detectors, has only local
detectors (they are not connected to the building’s fire alarm control panel (FACP)). Two of
the fire scenarios in the performance based analysis indicated the fires were detected
within 10 seconds of ignition. In the other two fire scenarios, the fires were not detected
until 73 seconds and 107 seconds into the simulations respectively. Examining the
building’s notification systems revealed several issues as well. Three of the notification
devices types currently in use in the building are listed in the FACP’s manual as not
compatible. Similar to the detection system, there are not enough notification appliances
(audio or visual) throughout the building to ensure proper coverage. Inspections and tests
are not done to confirm proper audible and/or visual levels in the building during an active
alarm.
The performance based analysis examined how the building’s fire protection system would
react to a fire, and whether occupants would have enough time to escape to safety. A
computational fluid dynamics modeling program, Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS), was used
to estimate the available safe egress times (ASET) for four different fire scenarios
throughout the building. Those values were then compared with the required safe egress
times (RSET) calculated in the prescriptive based analysis for each fire scenario.
The original RSET values were calculated for the departments affected by the fire
scenarios. The fire models were analyzed and the ASET values were determined when
conditions either first became untenable, or when all the occupants had exited the building;
whichever came first. The conditions in the building became untenable before people could
evacuate the building in all four fire scenarios (RSET > ASET). In some situations,
conditions became untenable seconds after the fire alarm was activated, and several
minutes before evacuations were complete.
The performance based analysis determine that the arrangement of the dead end hallway
off the second floor lobby was especially problematic as it could cause the occupants to be
trapped in the event of a fire. Two fire scenarios were examined, one with the fire in the
dead end hallway, and another with the fire in the main lobby. In both cases, the conditions
in the building became untenable long before the occupants would have been able to
escape the hallway, let alone the building.
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Building Information
The Eric W. Rood Administration Center (Rood Center) has been operated and maintained
by the government of Nevada County since it was built in 1985-86. It is a two story building
with both stories above grade. The building faces south-by-southeast and is rectangular in
shape, 360 feet wide by 144 feet long. Due to the presence of chamfered corners on the first
story (as seen in Figure 1), the perimeter of the second story is slightly larger than that of
the first. However, the square footage of the second story is smaller due to a two-story
lobby and a one-and-a-half story Board of Supervisors chambers. The first floor is 52,138
square feet while the second story is 51,262 square feet for a total of 103,400 square feet.

Figure 1: Chamfered corner at the southwest corner of the building
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The exterior walls are filled-concrete while the interior walls consist primarily of gypsum
wall board over metal studs. The building has a flat roof and a parapet wall encircling the
top of the second story. Each floor has 9-foot-tall T-bar drop ceilings. Most of the main
hallways and corridors vary in width along their lengths, from 8 feet to 16 feet wide.
There are three exit stairwells from the second floor; one open-air stairwell in the lobby,
and two enclosed cement-lined stairwells at the west and east ends of the building. The
tops of the stairwells at either end of the building were designed as areas of refuge.
Building staff enter the building through the west and east stairwells. Electronic locks on
the doors provide a log of entry. Near the stairwell in the lobby is the only elevator in the
building providing handicap access to the second floor. At the front of the building is a twostory wall constructed of tempered glass inside of a metal framework with an atrium-style
lobby directly behind it. Located on either side of the glass wall are glass double-doors
which are the main public entry points into the building.
The building is classified as mixed occupancy per the 2012 Life Safety Code (6.1.14.3), and
a light-hazard occupancy by the Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ). The AHJ is the Nevada
City Fire Department. The Rood Center is primarily a Group-B Business occupancy with
some areas classified as a Group-A Assembly occupancy (with both A-2 and A-3
subclasses). It contains many of the county government’s offices, as well as a number of
conference rooms, a computer data center, a Board of Supervisors meeting chamber (with
fixed seating), and a small cafeteria. The building’s hours of operation are Monday through
Friday, 8:00am – 5:00pm for both general staff and public access.
The building is protected by two types of sprinkler systems. The lobby and the exterior
parapet walls are protected by a dry-pipe system. The internal occupied space of the
building and the attic are protected by a wet-pipe system.
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Figure 2: Google Maps view of Eric W. Rood Administration Center (Top of the page is north)
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Prescriptive Based Analysis
Structural
Type of Construction
When the building was built, all design requirements were based upon the 1979
Uniform Building Code (UBC). The building was originally classified as type V-N
construction, which is the equivalent of type V-B construction today; however, the
building today would actually be classified as type III-B construction (non-combustible
walls with an unprotected wooden roof structure). The building has two stories above
grade, and is approximately 35-40 feet tall.

Building Heights & Allowable Areas
Table 503 lists the allowable building heights and areas per floor (see Table 1). According
to the table, under type III-B construction, Group B occupancies are allowed to be a
maximum of 55 feet tall. According to this table, the building can have a maximum of threestories with an area per floor of 19,000 ft2.
Table 1: Allowable Building Height and Areas
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Exceptions
Several sections in Chapter 5 of the 2013 CBC provide general exceptions for the data in
Table 1. The first is section 504.2 which states that if a building is equipped throughout
with an approved automatic sprinkler system, then the values for maximum building height
can be increased by 20 feet, and the maximum number of stories can be increased by one,
to new values of 75 feet tall and 4 stories.
Section 506.3 includes an exception for the allowable area per floor if the building is
equipped throughout with an approved automatic sprinkler system. The maximum area
per floor is permitted to be increased by an additional 200% for buildings with more than
one story above grade plane. This increase brings the maximum area per floor of the
building to 57,000 ft2, which is above the actual square footage of either floor.
Section 507.4 states that the area of a Group B building no more than two stories above
grade plane shall not be limited where the building is equipped throughout with an
approved automatic sprinkler system and is surrounded by public ways not less than 60
feet in width. As the building is surrounded on all four sides by parking lots over 60 feet in
length, is only two stories tall, and is fully sprinklered, the maximum area per floor would
be unlimited. However, the AHJ would have to agree to classify the building throughout as
Group B and not Mixed Occupancy.
Table 2: Actual vs. Allowed Values for Building Height and Floor Areas
Maximum Allowed
Actual
Stories Above Grade Plane
3
2
Building Height
75
35-40
2
Area Per Floor
57,000 ft
52,138 ft2
There are additional allowances for area per floor based on frontage (CBC – Section 506.2),
but as the allowances have already exceeded the actual size, those increases were not
needed and therefore won’t be discussed further in this report.

Fire Resistance Ratings
Table 601 of the 2013 CBC lists the minimum fire resistance rating requirements for
building elements (see Table 3). As shown in Table 3 below, for type III-B construction, the
only minimum fire resistance rating requirements for the building is exterior load bearing
walls.
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Table 3: Fire-Resistance Rating Requirements for Building Elements

Table 4 below lists a comparison of the interior finish requirements of exit corridors and
stairways between the Life Safety Code and the California Building Code.
Table 4: Fire-Resistance Rating Requirements for Interior Finishes
Occupancies

LSC (Table A.10.2.2)

CBC (Table 803.9 – Sprinklered)

Exits

Corridors

Exits

Corridors

Assembly
(>300 existing)

A

A or B

B

B

Business
(existing)

A or B

A or B

B

C

Class A interior wall and ceiling finish — flame spread index, 0–25
Class B interior wall and ceiling finish — flame spread index, 26–75
Class C interior wall and ceiling finish — flame spread index, 76–200
As the LSC doesn’t list values for a sprinklered building, a note is included at the bottom of
the table and it reads:
“Automatic sprinklers — where a complete standard system of automatic sprinklers is
installed, interior wall and ceiling finish with a flame spread rating not exceeding
Class C is permitted to be used in any location where Class B is required, and Class B
interior wall and ceiling finish is permitted to be used in any location where Class A is
required.”

Fire Protection & Life Safety Analysis – Eric W. Rood Administration Center

15

The second floor main corridors of the building have a small, dense pile carpet with
acoustic ceiling tiles in the drop ceiling above (see Figure 3 below). The walls are metal
stud with gypsum wall board. The wall coverings consist of two types of decorative wall
paper. At the time of this report, the flammability of these types of wall paper is unknown.
With a sprinklered building, finish rating requirement of Class C or below, the wall paper
would most likely be approved under the code.

Figure 3: Second Floor East Corridor looking west
The main lobby and CDA waiting areas have tile floors. The ceiling in the main lobby is
composed of gypsum wall board, acoustic ceiling tiles, and T-111 tongue-and-groove
siding. The wall materials in the main lobby are primarily gypsum wall board, with T-111
tongue-and-groove siding in the front seating area near the windows. The CDA waiting
areas has acoustic ceiling tiles and the same type of wall paper as the previously mentioned
corridors.
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Figure 4: Main lobby looking east
The two stairwells at either end of the building are cement-lined with cement floors and
steps. The ceiling and walls of the stairwell are cement with gypsum wall board coverings.

Exterior Walls:
The exterior walls of the building have concrete columns stretching from ground level to
the underside of the mansard roof. The columns are spaced approximately 18 feet apart.
The beams and bracing for the floors attach to the interior side of the columns.
The sections of the first floor exterior walls in between the concrete columns are 9 feet tall
and made of 3’x3’ glass sections in metal frames. The second floor walls have a solid section
at the base, with two rows of 3’x3’ glass sections in metal frames at the top. The wall
between the first and second floors is concrete. The fascia around the front of the building,
the exterior of the stairwells, and the mansard is T-111 tongue-and-groove wood siding.
The only portion of the exterior walls that could potentially fail the 2-hour require fire
resistance rating would be the windows. The windows are not protected by glazing or by
an automatic sprinkler water curtain. However, Table 705.8 of the CBC states that if the
building’s fire separation distance is greater than 30 feet, and the building is protected by
an automatic sprinkler system, then there is no requirement for opening protection.
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Figure 5: South exterior wall, west side of the building

Interior Walls:
The interior walls are constructed with steel studs spaced 16” on center, with the cavities
filled with batts of fiberglass insulation. The walls are covered on both sides with 5/8”
gypsum wallboard. While the building’s primary interior wall furnishings appeared to meet
the code requirements, some of the decorations that are displayed in the exit corridors do
not. That would include paper art projects by local students, and large 8’x8’ quilts hung on
the walls.

Floors:
The floors are constructed with 2-1/2” of poured hardrock concrete over ASC Pacific Type
“B” hi-form composite 20 gage galvanized steel decking over engineered metal trusses. The
concrete is reinforced with welded wire fabric (WWF). The second story floor used the
same construction but used 1-1/2” of lightweight concrete, reinforced in the same manner.
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Roof:
The building has a roof that is flat in the center with a mansard encircling the top of the
second story. The roof material at the front of the building is 26 gage galvanized steel metal
which slopes up from the exterior of the mansard towards the center of the building
creating a parapet wall around the flat roof (see Figure 6 below). The roof structure is
supported by wooden glulam beams (~36 inches tall) which attach to metal columns.
Wooden trusses attach to the glulam beams and occupy the upper 1/3 of the attic. The
bottom 2/3 of this attic space is occupied HVAC lines, sprinkler lines, power, phone and
cable lines (see Figure 7 below). Metal cross bars are mounted between the T-bar ceilings
and the wooden trusses above. The wooden trusses vary in both size and width. They’re
built with either 2”x6” or 2”x8” boards, and have two to three wood members sistered
together. There are fire walls in place in the attic that separate the open spaces above the
offices from the spaces above the fire rated corridors. The fire walls are built with 5/8”
gypsum wallboard and metal stud framing. These fire walls are supposed to have their
openings sealed but several large openings around pass-throughs were noted. Draft stops
are per the 1982 Uniform Building Code (UBC), Section 3205, and are spaced 100 feet on
center.
The construction, layout of the building (including the surrounding public ways and the
automatic sprinkler system) exceed the structural fire protection requirements set forth in
the 2013 CBC.

Figure 6: South portion of the roof at the front of the building
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Figure 7: Second floor attic, north side of the building, looking west
An inspection of the second floor’s attic revealed fiberglass insulation batts installed on the
underside of the roof with the Kraft paper side exposed (see Figure 7 above). Section 720.3
of the 2013 CBC states that exposed insulating materials shall have a flame spread index of
not more than 25. The Kraft paper’s flame spread index is greater than 25. This material is
easily ignited and could allow very rapid fire spread across the underside of the roof above
the sprinklers.

Summary:
The Rood Center’s structural fire protection analysis determined that the building’s height
and allowable areas per floor are acceptable under the code with the use of a couple
exceptions granted because of the presence of an automatic sprinkler system. Because the
building is type III-B construction, the only requirements for fire resistance ratings concern
load-bearing exterior walls. As mentioned above, the building’s separation distance is
greater than 30 feet so there is no opening protection required for the glass windows. The
primary coverings on the interior walls appears to meet the code’s requirements, but the
decorations that are hung in the corridors do not. Issues in the attic consist of penetrations
in the fire wall, and the Kraft paper side of the insulation batts exposed. The structural fire
protection system is designed to help contain the spread of fire and provide the occupants
more time to escape. An analysis of the egress systems in the next section shows how much
the issues with the structural fire protection system would impact evacuation times.
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Egress
Building Occupant Load
As the Rood Center is a mixed occupancy building, the occupant load was calculated based
on the individual departments/spaces within the building. To complete these calculations,
the 2012 version of the LSC and the 2013 version of the CBC were used. Color-coded
diagrams (Figure 2 & Figure 3) are included at the end of this section which illustrate the
occupancy classification of each department/space. A spreadsheet was used to track and
calculate the occupant loads of each space within the building. It is included in APPENDIX
B.
Table 5: Occupant Load Totals
Based on the 2013 CBC
Based on the 2012 LSC
First Floor
706
707
Second Floor
651
656
Total Occupancy
1,357
1,363
While these occupancy values represent maximum occupancy, the actual occupancy during
normal day-to-day operations is approximately 500 people (35-40% of maximum values).
If a meeting is occurring in the BOS chambers, the occupancy would increase to
approximately 550-600 people.
First Floor:
The first floor was divided into its various departments and common areas. The
departments are Social Services, Child Support Services, Public Works, Planning, EH, CDA,
Building, I&G, Sheriff’s, and the Mail Room. All of these departments have Group B –
Business (Office) occupancies. Within each of these areas are various conference rooms
and storage areas.
Some conference rooms are simply labeled “Conference Room”, and are not accessible by
the general public, while other conference rooms have official names like “Reward Room”,
“Coyote Room”, or “Omega Room”; all of which are accessible to the public.
Under both the CBC (303.1.2) and the LSC (6.1.2.1), if a space has an occupancy of less than
50 people (or is smaller than 750 ft2 per the CBC), then the space is not an Assembly
occupancy, but instead changes to a Business occupancy or the occupancy classification of
the space around it (which in this case, is still Business).
The AHJ classified the generic conference rooms not available to the public as Business
occupancies, but classified the occupancies of the named conference rooms as Assembly (AFire Protection & Life Safety Analysis – Eric W. Rood Administration Center
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3). Therefore, the named conference rooms have an OLF of 15 ft2/person, while the generic
ones have with an OLF of 100 ft2/person.
Each department also had storage areas within, both as closed rooms (with a door) and as
open areas. According to the AHJ, the only areas that could be classified as storage areas
were those in closed rooms. If the storage areas were open, it would fall under the
occupancy of the space around it. Many of these closed rooms had paper and files stored in
them, so they were classified as S-1 Storage occupancies which had an OLF of 300
ft2/person. As most of these storage spaces were quite small (less than 300 ft2), it was
assumed that each space could have 1 person occupying it.
The cafeteria (903 ft2) is more of a lunchroom or eating area, as it doesn’t have cooking
equipment. It has a salad bar, a sandwich prep area, racks of small food items, several
vending machines, and tables and chairs. As the room was above the “small assembly” rule,
it was classified as an Assembly (A-2) occupancy with an OLF of 15 ft2/person.
The Board of Supervisors (BOS) Chambers is a large room with fixed theater-like seating in
the center, and standing space at the rear. The floor slopes gradually downwards towards
the front of the room. The grade drops 15 inches in a span of 22 feet. At the front of the
fixed seats are two desks which face the supervisors. The supervisors sit on a raised area in
an arc around the northwest corner (front) of the room. There are 121 fixed seats, and then
an area of ~70 ft2 at the rear of the room for standing room. According to the CBC, this
standing area has an OLF of 5 ft2/person while the LSC lists an OLF of 7 ft2/person.
The CDA waiting area in front of the Public Works, Planning, Building, CDA & EH
departments, has several chairs, and a small 4’x4’ kids play area. This area as well as the
Main Lobby at the front of the building are classified as a Business (Group B) with an OLF of
100 ft2/person.
The first floor contained four sets of public restrooms scattered throughout the building.
One pair is located off the main lobby, another off the exit corridor on the east end of the
building, another off the exit corridor on the west end of the building, and the last set inside
the department of Social Services. As these spaces were not listed in either code, they were
classified as “Utility” (CBC) with an OLF of 300 ft2/person, or “Industrial” (LSC), which has
an OLF of 100 ft2/person. The largest pair of restrooms was only 409 ft2. With an OLF of
300 ft2/person, that would only allow for 1 occupant total to be present in the men and
women’s rooms at any given time. As that was not realistic, the occupancy values were
increased to 1 person in each restroom, giving a total of 2 per pair of restrooms. With an
OLF of 100 ft2/person (LSC) some of the restrooms had an occupancy value of 4 people.
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Throughout the first floor, there were four mechanical rooms that were classified at Utility
(CBC) or Industrial (LSC). Again the Utility classification has an OLF of 300 ft2/person and
the Industrial classification has an OLF of 100 ft2/person. However, due to the fact that the
two closets labeled “Fire Alarm” and “Intergen Fire System for IS” were of such a small area
and contained large amounts of equipment, there wasn’t any space viable for occupancy.
Therefore, neither of these closets were given an occupancy value.
The corridors and exit stairwells were treated as areas where people would only occupy
them for the amount of time that it would take to travel through them. Therefore, they
weren’t given an occupancy value.
Second Floor:
As with the first floor, the second floor was divided up into various departments with
storage and conference rooms inside. These departments are Assessor, Auditor-Controller,
Board of Supervisors, Clerk Recorder, CEO, County Counsel, HR, LAFCo, Sheriff’s, Tax
Collector-Treasurer, OES, and Elections. These departments all had a Group B – Business
occupancy classification with an OLF of 100 ft2/person. Each department had conference
rooms that were for office staff only, and others that were named and were accessible for
the public. The “small assembly” rule applies to most of these named conference rooms, but
after checking with the AHJ, they were all classified as Assembly (A-3) occupancy with an
OLF of 15 ft2/person. The storage rooms are classified as S-1 Storage with an OLF of 300
ft2/person (CBC) or 500 ft2/person (LSC). Each room was assumed to have at least 1
person occupying it.
The Grand Jury room is small enough where it could fall under the “Small assembly spaces”
section of the code (CBC - 303.1.2 and LSC - 6.1.2.1) but was classified as Assembly (A-3) by
the AHJ with an OLF of 15 ft2/person.
The Sheriff’s office has its own locker room with men and women’s restrooms attached.
These restrooms were not open to the public so they were treated as part of the locker
room. In the 2013 CBC and the 2012 LSC there was no mention of Locker Room spaces.
However, in the 2010 CBC and the 2009 LSC, there was a section devoted to Locker Rooms
which had an OLF of 50 ft2/person.
The two sets of restrooms available to the public were located in the main corridors at the
west and east ends of the building. Like mentioned above, as the CBC has an OLF of 300
ft2/person, each restroom was assumed to have 1 person occupying it. With an OLF of 100
ft2/person from the LSC, more people were able to occupy the spaces.

Fire Protection & Life Safety Analysis – Eric W. Rood Administration Center

23

Two rooms used for Utility/Industrial purposes could potentially have 1 person occupying
each space so they were given an occupancy value of 1 person each.
The space above the BOS Chambers (indicated on Figure 3) was unusable as it was
interstitial attic space and therefore didn’t receive an occupancy value.
Like the first floor, the corridors and exit stairwells were treated as areas where people
would only occupy them for the amount of time that it would take to travel through them.
Therefore, they weren’t assigned occupancy values.

Table 6: Building Use Color Chart
Business (Office Space)
Assembly (A-3) (Tables/Chairs)
Assembly (A-3) (Standing) - BOS
Assembly (A-2) (Cafeteria Seating)
Storage (S-1)
Restrooms
Utility
Exits
Exit Corridors
Exit Stairs
Stairwell space
Interstitial space

Regarding the building floorplans seen below in Figure 8 and Figure 9, large
departments that were connected to each other and of the same occupancy
classification had the walls that separated departments colored red. If the department
separation crossed an area where there were no walls, a wall was drawn in and colored
yellow to indicate the separation.
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Figure 8: First Floor diagram with building use colors
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Figure 9: Second Floor diagram with building use colors
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Required Number of Exits:
The building has a total occupancy of 1,363 (assuming the higher value). According to both
the CBC (Section 1021, Table 1021.3(1)) and the LSC (Section 7.4.1.2), the building has a
requirement of 4 exits. The first floor has 6 exits and the second story had access to 3 of
those exits. Therefore, there are an adequate number of exits in the building.

Arrangement of Exits & Exit Access:
Section 7.5.1.2 of the LSC states, “7.5.1.2 Corridors shall provide exit access without passing
through any intervening rooms other than corridors, lobbies, and other spaces permitted to
be open to the corridor...”. Section 1014 of the CBC states a similar concept.
One location where this might be an issue is on the first floor in the cafeteria. A small,
hallway that is not marked as an exit, leads from the west corridor, south into the northeast
corner of the cafeteria. Both ends of the hallway are serviced via a single-doorway. Once in
the cafeteria, the path of egress would then lead south through the east end of the cafeteria
and out into the lobby, again, through a single-doorway. This hallway is frequented by staff
during day-to-day operations, but it isn’t marked as an exit, therefore it is not clear if this
arrangement is against the code.
Located on the second floor of each exit stairwell at either end of the building are areas of
“rescue assistance” for handicap people. The areas are approximately 40-50 ft2 and have an
evacuation stair-chair mounted in a holder on the wall, along with an intercom/paging
system with instructions for use (in English and Brail). The instructions say to press a large
red button which notifies a dispatch center of the occupant’s location (who in turn notifies
the fire department), and continuously pages an intercom located in the west end of the
main lobby near the cafeteria until someone answers.

Remoteness of Exits:
By taking into account the occupancy values of each space and the floors as a whole; then
taking into account the required number of exits of each space, it appears as if the
requirements in Sections 7.5.1.3.1 and 7.5.1.3.3 of the LSC are met throughout the building.
7.5.1.3.1 Where more than one exit…is required from a building or portion thereof,
such exits…shall be remotely located from each other and be arranged to minimize the
possibility that more than one has the potential to be blocked by any one fire or other
emergency condition.
7.5.1.3.3 In buildings protected throughout by an approved, supervised automatic
sprinkler system in accordance with Section 9.7, the minimum separation distance
between two exits, exit accesses, or exit discharges, measured in accordance with
7.5.1.3.2, shall be not less than one-third the length of the maximum overall diagonal
dimension of the building or area to be served.
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Figure 10: First floor diagram showing locations and remoteness of the exits

Dead Ends:
Section 1018.4 (2) of the CBC and Table A.7.6 of the LSC state that in a building that is
sprinklered with a Business occupancy, the length of dead end hallways/corridors has to
be less than 50 feet in length. As this building is classified as Mixed Occupancy, to obtain
that exception would require the AHJ to again classify the building as Group B – Business. If
not, the maximum length of the dead end corridor shall not exceed more than 20 feet.
There is only one “dead end” in the building. It is a corridor located on the second story
leading north out of the open-air walkway towards the Grand Jury, two named conference
rooms and the LAFCo offices. This corridor was measured and found to be 48 feet in length
which is compliant with the code assuming a Group B occupancy.
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Figure 11: Close-up view of the dead end hallway on the second floor

Travel Distances:
Table 1016.2 in the CBC and Table A.7.6 in the LSC give values for exit travel distance
limits. Both tables state that for Assembly occupancies, the maximum travel distance in a
sprinklered building is 250 feet, and for Business occupancies, the maximum travel
distance in a sprinklered building is 300 feet.
The longest distance anyone would have to travel in a single corridor (assuming other exits
were blocked) is only 198 feet, which is well below the two limits.
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Exit Discharge:
All exits on the first floor discharge directly out of the building into public areas. These
public areas are all handicap accessible and provide people with means to move away from
the building safely. The building is surrounded by parking lots on all sides allowing for
ample space for people to fill as they exit the building.

Exit Signs:
Every exit within the building has an illuminated exit sign posted above the doorway with
the exception of the two front exits in the lobby (which are exceptions according to Section
1011.1 of the CBC and section 7.10.2.1 of the LSC). The signs are white with the letters
“EXIT” illuminated in neon green color. The signs have a battery backup installed within.
Throughout the corridors, exit signs are posted so that no sign is further than 100 feet from
another, complying with Section 1011.1 of the CBC and section 7.10.1.5.2 of the LSC.
In some instances, the exit signs would have a directional indicator on them that would also
be illuminated. The directional indicator looked like “>” or “<”. In one location, the
directional arrow did in fact point to an exit, but did not point to the nearest exit. This could
potentially be a problem for those not familiar with the building and would rely on the
signs for direction. The sign is posted on the first floor just outside of the “File Storage”
room in the Community Development Agency (CDA); just west of the eastern exit corridor.
The sign’s directional indicator pointed to the waiting area of the CDA (west) where
someone could then exit via the west corridor (then through the north corridor) or through
the main lobby. The shortest path of travel to an exit in that direction was ~200 feet.
However, the nearest exit (80 feet away) was in the opposite direction via the eastern
stairwell. An image of the sign can be seen in Figure 12 below.
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Figure 12: The exit sign’s directional arrow in the CDA pointing away from the nearest exit

Occupants and Pre-Movement Times
Types of Occupants:
This building is a government building with public access during normal business hours
(M-F, 8am – 5pm). The building can only be accessed by the public via the two doubledoorways at the front of the building. The staff of the building carry identification cards
on them at all times which act as their electronic key cards (with exceptions of the
Sheriff’s department, who know the electronic lock codes for the exterior stairwell
doors). The staff are asked to enter the building via the two exit stairwell doors, or the
exit on the north side of the building so the electronic lock system can track who is in
the building. This also leaves the main entrance more available for the public.
The temporary occupants or guests in the building could range in age from young kids
(with their parents) to senior citizens. Most of the people visiting the building are there
with a purpose. They head directly to the department they need to visit, conduct their
business and then leave the building. Not many people hang out in the building for
extended periods of time.
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The staff of the building range in age from mid-to-late twenties, to seventies/eighties.
The types of mobility could range from complete mobility to handicapped. In case of the
latter, handicap access to each exit on the first floor is provided. On the second floor
(accessed by an elevator which shuts down in an emergency and returns to ground),
areas of rescue assistance (mentioned above) are present in the two exit stairwells.

Figure 13: Staff’s cubicle workspaces

Pre-Movement Times/Activities:
The building has its own risk management department which creates emergency
evacuation plans. An incident commander (IC) and an alternate are chosen to represent
the entire building. Each department has a safety officer and an alternate to represent
the staff in the department. Each department has a checklist to follow regarding their
procedures in an emergency.
For example, the following is from a checklist in Child Support Services that the safety
officer for that department will use to train the other staff in the department:
Emergency Evacuation Checklist
1. Grab cell, glasses, wallet/purse and clip board. (which this checklist is posted on)
2. Grab bullhorn and briefcase on cabinet behind Ryan.
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3. Knock and notify investigators across the hall (who may have head phones on for
interviews) during the evacuation process.
4. Evacuate to the Demonstration Garden and take roll call.
5. Report team roll call to safety officer.
6. Stay and wait with team (do not leave the campus or return to the building
unless notified to do so). You may be directed to do other duties.
**Remember the safety officer (or other designated individual) is reporting to the
Emergency Facilitator. DO NOT take action until the safety officer returns with
further instructions.
Each department is trained to grab their personal belongings (cell/purse/glasses, etc.)
off their desks and then head out their designated evacuation route. If that route is
blocked they use a secondary, then a tertiary route. The safety officer grabs a bright
vest, a flag color-coded to their department, a bullhorn and the clipboard. Each
clipboard has a full roster of every person in that department, along with two phone
numbers for each person, email address, and vehicle information. Once out of the
building, the safety officers conduct a roll call, then report to the IC who would be at the
front of the building. The IC can assign people to direct traffic and prevent the public
from entering the building at the time of the emergency. Once the IC has all of the role
calls, they report to the fire department personnel on site.

Figure 14: Safety Officer’s Gear & Checklist
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While everyone is exiting the building, someone from Facilities Maintenance (usually
the supervisor) has the responsibility to check the restrooms, ramps and stairwells.
This person is often in the building, as they’re in charge of all maintenance in the
building. But if they’re off-site in their office, they are located in the next building down
the street (half a block away) and they’re notified immediately by any alarms that are
triggered in the building and respond immediately.
Full-occupancy fire drills are conducted twice a year. Additional tests of the fire alarm
systems are performed by Facilities Maintenance Staff 4-5 times a year, after hours
when the building is empty.
This level of training suggests that the pre-movement time of the employees would be
fairly low for those people who work daily in an office environment. Once an alarm
sounds, occupants would take some time to determine what was happening, then time
to grab their belongings, and then to begin evacuation.
As the public are generally in contact with building staff while inside the building, it is
assumed that they’d be notified by the staff (who are familiar with the alarms) what the
alarm means and be instructed where to exit. That would help lower their premovement times.
In the BOS chambers, the majority of the people in the room would most likely be
guests (the public). There would also be building staff present which could announce to
people once they hear an alarm that they all need to leave. People in this room who
aren’t standing, are in a row of fixed chairs similar to a theater with row-exits on each
side of the row (10 rows total, 5 deep). In an emergency, they’d have to grab their
personal belongings from around their chairs, then wait in a queue to get out of their
rows before exiting through one of the two main exits provided with double-doors at
the back of the room (or the single door exit at the front of the room).
Overall, the pre-movement times for the building’s occupants would be fairly low due to
training of the staff and constant interactions of the public with the staff whenever
they’re in the building.

Required Safe Egress Times (RSET)
The Required Safe Egress Time (RSET) is a measurement of how long it will take the
building’s occupants to evacuate. To determine the RSET values, the occupancies were
divided into departments. The highest occupancy load for each department was used. Table
7 and Table 8 below list the movement times calculated from each department,
assuming usage of the primary evacuation route. These hand calculations can be seen in
APPENDIX C. These values do not include detection or pre-movement delays:
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Table 7: First Floor Movement Times
First Floor Location
Time (seconds)
Main Lobby
34
BOS Chambers
62
Cafeteria
122
Waiting Area (CDA)
51
Public Works
115
Planning
148
Environmental Health
145
Community Development Agency
114
Building
80
Child Support Services
170
Dept. of Social Services
147
Information & General Services
204
Sheriff’s
60
Mail Room & Offices in North Corridor
88

Table 8: Second Floor Movement Times
Second Floor Location
Time (seconds)
BOS Offices
109
CEO Offices
146
Clerk Recorder
69
Auditor/Controller
89
Elections
192
Human Resources
174
County Counsel
137
LAFCo, Grand Jury & Conference Rooms
293
Office of Emergency Services
271
Tax Collector – Treasurer
169
Sheriff’s
182
Assessor’s
137
Located throughout every main exit corridor in the building are trash cans, recycle
containers, vending machines, and miscellaneous temporary storage items (benches, racks
of computer towers, etc.). These items are most likely placed in the hallways to provide
people convenient locations for disposing of their trash and remembering to recycle. These
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items pose a fire hazard which could potentially block the main exit corridors, and they
reduce the width of the corridors which could also cause egress issues.

Summary:
In general, the egress system met code requirements with regards to how many exits the
building has, where those exits are located, how far people have to travel to get to them and
exit discharge, but it still has some issues with dead ends and exit signs. The exit sign issue
is easily fixed by swapping the indicator on a sign to point in a different direction.
While the dead end hallway on the second floor is acceptable to the requirements of the
code (assuming a Group B building), the arrangement of the hallway and exit did have
issues in the performance based analysis in multiple fire scenarios. These issues are
discussed in more depth in Scenarios #2 and #4 as well as in the Comments &
Recommendations section.
Overall, there are several different components that make up the building’s egress system
and ultimately determine what the RSET values will be. One item outside of the egress
system that could potentially further lower the RSET values would be the building’s alarm
system. If the alarm system’s detection times can be improved upon, then that would
provide the occupants even more time to evacuate as they’ll be notified of the fire earlier.
The alarm system is discussed thoroughly in the next section.

Alarms
Requirements for the Fire Alarm System:
The 2013 version of NFPA 72 – National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code doesn’t have any
requirements regarding whether or not a fire alarm system is required.
The 2013 California Building Code requires a Group-B Business occupancy to have a
manual fire alarm system installed only if certain conditions exist.
2013 CBC – Chapter 9 – Fire Protection Systems
907.2.2 Group B. A manual fire alarm system shall be installed in Group B
occupancies where one of the following conditions exists:
1. The combined Group B occupant load of all floors is 500 or more.
2. The Group B occupant load is more than 100 persons above or below the
lowest level of exit discharge.
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3. The fire area contains an ambulatory care facility.
4. Group B occupancies containing educational facilities, see Section 907.2.2.2.
The maximum occupancy of the building (~1360 people) was calculated regarding the
egress analysis of the building. While this value is considered the maximum occupancy, the
actual occupancy is much lower on a day-to-day basis. Therefore, the first condition might
be met, but the second condition would certainly be met, thereby making a manual fire
alarm system a requirement in the building.
The 2012 Life Safety Code (NFPA 101) requires a fire alarm system to be installed if
conditions, similar to what was listed in the CBC, exist. However, unlike the CBC, in the LSC,
there is no indication of what type of fire alarm system is to be installed.
2012 Life Safety Code – NFPA 101
39.3.4.1 General. A fire alarm system in accordance with Section 9.6 shall be
provided in all business occupancies where any one of the following conditions
exists:
(1) The building is three or more stories in height.
(2) The occupancy is subject to 100 or more occupants above or below the
level of exit discharge.
(3) The occupancy is subject to 1000 or more total occupants.
“A required fire alarm system must have initiation means per 38/39.3.4.2.” – NFPA 101
Handbook
Since the building is only two stories, the first condition does not apply. However, like
mentioned above, on a day-to-day basis, the occupancy of the second floor is subject to 100
or more occupants. Therefore, the second condition does apply which makes the fire alarm
system a requirement. Since the system in place was upgraded to a fire alarm system in
2002, the 2000 version of NFPA 101 states roughly the same thing with a change to the first
condition stating, “The building is two or more stories in height above the level of exit
discharge.” So before the system was installed, the first two conditions would have
required the installation of a fire alarm system.
According to the NFPA 101 Handbook, if the fire alarm system is required, then the fire
alarm system must be initiated in accordance with section 39.3.4.2.
39.3.4.2 Initiation. Initiation of the required fire alarm system shall be by one of
the following means:
(1) Manual means in accordance with 9.6.2.1(1)
(2) Means of an approved automatic fire detection system that complies with
9.6.2.1(2) and provides protection throughout the building
(3) Means of an approved automatic sprinkler system that complies with
9.6.2.1(3) and provides protection throughout the building
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9.6.2.1 Where required by other sections of this Code, actuation of the complete fire
alarm system shall be initiated by, but shall not be limited to, any or all of the
following means:
(1) Manual fire alarm initiation
(2) Automatic detection
(3) Extinguishing system operation
According to the NFPA 101 Handbook, “When the required fire alarm system is initiated by
one of the means specified in 38/39.3.4.2, the system must automatically sound a general
alarm throughout the building.” Therefore, audible notification appliances are required
throughout the building and must be installed in accordance with NFPA 72 – Chapter 18.4.
While NFPA 72 does not require visible notification appliances, NFPA 101 does for new
systems (not existing systems). Section 9.6.3.6 of the 2000 version of NFPA 101 states,
“Notification signals for occupants to evacuate shall be by audible and visible signals in
accordance with NFPA 72, National Fire Alarm Code, and CABO/ANSI A117.1, American
National Standard for Accessible and Usable Buildings and Facilities, or other means of
notification acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction shall be provided.” Therefore,
when the fire alarm system was installed sometime in 2002, it would have been required to
install visible notification appliances in accordance with Chapter 18.5 of NFPA 72.

Overview of Fire Alarm Systems:
When the building was originally built, there wasn’t a fire alarm system installed. Without
the proper records or documentation available, the exact dates of when the first system
was installed are unknown. Through interviews of the Facilities Management staff, it was
discovered that sometime before 1996 a manually activated system was installed in the
building with the intent of only being an “evacuation system.” The system had a few pull
stations installed in various office departments (near the corridors), and some horns
spread throughout the building to notify the occupants of the need to evacuate.
Sometime after the current Facilities Manager started working for the county in 1996, they
began to make upgrades to the fire alarm system and contracted with Gray Electric. Again,
due to a lack of records or documentation, it’s not clear exactly when the items were
installed but it is believed to have occurred in March/April of 2002. During the upgrade
process, pull stations were added at the exits, additional horns were added along with
strobes, horn strobes, photoelectric smoke detectors, and self-closers on the hallway
corridor doors. A secondary system was installed in April/May of 2002 to protect the
buildings’ servers located in the data center on the first floor.
Currently the building is protected by two fire detection and notification alarm systems.
The main fire alarm system covers all of the second floor and a majority of the first floor;
while a secondary system covers only the data rooms on the first floor.
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Both fire alarm systems have their own Fire Alarm Control Panels (FACP). The FACP for the
main fire alarm system is located in a locked closet on the first floor, along the south side of
the west corridor. A remote annunciator panel for the main system is located on the first
floor in the lobby, near the entrance to the cafeteria.

Figure 15: The main FACP, the remote annunciator, and the building’s intercom system
The Secondary FACP is located inside one of the server rooms on the first floor. The
Secondary FACP reports directly to the Main FACP. The second fire alarm system is linked
to an ANSUL/Inergen clean agent dispersal system in the data center and has a completely
separate automatic and manual detection system.

Figure 16: The secondary FACP located inside on of the server rooms
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The main fire alarm system is a Supervising Station Alarm that is connected by two
dedicated phone lines to a monitoring company’s central station (located in Cypress, CA).
The company that monitors this alarm system is Criticom Monitoring Services (CMS). CMS
was contracted to monitor the fire alarm system by Gray Electric, the company that
inspects, tests, and maintains the system.
For further detail regarding the layout of the alarm system, please see APPENDIX D.

Fire Alarm System Components:
The FACP connected to the main fire alarm system is an IntelliKnight Model 5820XL
Addressable Fire Alarm Control System by Silent Knight (see Figure 15 above). The
previous panel (unknown make/model) was upgraded in December of 2008 after there
were communication errors between the previous Main and Secondary FACP’s. Inside the
Main FACP cabinet are two FIAMM FG20722 12V 7.2Ah back-up batteries and two
dedicated phone lines. The panel receives all of the alarm, supervisory, and trouble signals
from throughout the building and notifies the monitoring company (CMS) via the two
dedicated phone lines.
The main fire alarm system also has a Silent Knight 5860 Remote Annunciator connected in
the lobby for remote access to the system (see Figure 15 above).
The FACP connected to the secondary fire alarm system in the data center is an Autopulse
ANSUL IQ-301R Analog Addressable Control Unit installed in 2002 (see Figure 16 above).
Inside the panel are two National (SigmasTek) NB-12 12V 7.5Ah back-up batteries. This
FACP has a disable switch located next to it with a key lock designed to temporarily disable
the system (for maintenance purposes). The disable switch is monitored by a module
connected to the Secondary FACP which will send a trouble alarm to the Main FACP when
the switch is turned and the system is disabled.

Fire Alarm Detection Devices:
Main System
The building’s main fire alarm system utilizes two different types of automatic fire
detection.
The first type of automatic detection that is used is smoke detection. On the first floor of the
building there are 16 ceiling-mounted addressable photoelectric smoke detectors (Silent
Knight SD 505-APS) tied into the main system (see Figure 17 below). Nine of the smoke
detectors are in the two main corridors, with two additional detectors located in the CDA
waiting area. The remaining five smoke detectors are located in five different departments
(Building, Community Development Agency, Environmental Health, Planning, and Public
Works). That leaves three other departments (Child Support Services, Social Services, and
Information & General Services) and the Board of Supervisors Chambers with no smoke
detectors.
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Figure 17: Photoelectric smoke detector connected to the main fire alarm system
On the second floor of the building there are 23 ceiling-mounted addressable photoelectric
smoke detectors (Silent Knight SD 505-APS) (see Figure 17 above). Twelve of the smoke
detectors are in the three main corridors. The remaining eleven detectors are in most of the
office departments, just inside the doors from the corridor. Though, the Elections and TaxCollector/Treasurer departments do not have any smoke detectors installed. Two of the
previously mentioned smoke detectors are in the public area entrance and small waiting
area at the front of the Sheriff’s department. The rear of the Sheriff’s department is
monitored by 4 older smoke detectors. It is unclear what make/model/type of smoke
detectors these are, but they are local detectors, and are not monitored by or connected to
the FACP. When asked, nobody had an answer as to why these smoke detectors were
present, weren’t monitored, and were different from the detectors in the rest of the
building. One possibility was that they were installed for additional protection at a lower
cost, but that was not confirmed.
The second type of automatic detection that is used in the building is heat detection. While
there aren’t any actual heat detectors in the building, the building is fully sprinklered and
the sprinkler heads act as heat detectors in a way. There are three types of pendant
sprinkler heads installed covering the occupied spaces, and one type of upright sprinkler
head that is used in the attic spaces. For details on the sprinkler heads, please see the
sprinkler section of the report below.
The wet-pipe system has a Notifier WFD-3 water-flow detection alarm installed. The drypipe system has two alarms installed; a Potter PS40-2A High/Low pressure switch to
monitor the water pressure, and a Potter PS10-2 pressure switch to monitor the air
pressure. The water pressure switch trips when there is a rise or decrease in water
pressure of 10psi. The air pressure switch trips when the air pressure drops below 25 psig.
All three alarms are connected to the Main FACP and will trigger the building’s alarm
system.
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Secondary System
The building’s secondary fire alarm system utilizes only one type of automatic fire
detection, smoke detection.
While there are no heat detectors in the data center, there are two types of smoke
detectors. The rest of the building used primarily photoelectric detectors, but this system
includes both photoelectric (Autopulse SDX-551 Analog Addressable Photoelectric
Detector) and ionization (Autopulse CPX-551 Analog Addressable Ionization Detector)
smoke detectors (see Figure 18 below). They’re located on the ceiling, and underneath the
raised floor. Unfortunately, cut sheets for these exact smoke detectors weren’t found,
however cut sheets for newer models (SDX-751 & CPX-751) were found and included in
APPENDIX H.
In order for the clean agent system to be activated by automatic detection, at least two
detectors in the data center need to activate, then a 30 second delay will follow before the
clean agent will be released into the room. During the 30 second delay, the dispersal can be
aborted by pressing an abort button/switch (Autopulse Abort Switch) located near the data
center’s entry door (see Figure 19 below). If need be, the system can be manually activated
by using a pull station (Autopulse Electric Manual Standard Pull Station IQ-318), located
near the data center’s entry door (see Figure 19 below). The manual activation of the
system will bypass any delay and immediately disperse the fire suppressant.

Figure 18: Photoelectric smoke detector on the left, Ionization smoke detector on the right
connected to the secondary fire alarm system
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Figure 19: Emergency intercom system, manual pull station, abort switch in server room
For the layout of the secondary alarm system, see APPENDIX D. For the catalog cut sheets,
see APPENDIX H.

Location, Spacing, & Placement of Fire Alarm Detection Devices:
In the previous section it was noted that the detection devices installed in the building are
sprinkler heads and smoke detectors (photoelectric and ionization). The requirements
regarding the sprinkler heads are listed in NFPA 13 and are covered in the section
regarding the building’s sprinkler system.
While both the 2013 CBC and the 2012 LSC require a fire alarm system to be installed in
the building, both state that a manually-activated system is sufficient. The LSC goes further
and states that the fire alarm system can be activated automatically (separately from the
sprinkler system) but is not required. Therefore, neither the CBC, nor the LSC require
smoke detectors to be installed throughout the building in Group-B occupancies.
In the 2013 version of NFPA 72, there is no general requirement for smoke detectors in the
building. Although there is a section that indicates that automatic smoke detection is
required at the location of the FACP.
10.4.4* In areas that are not continuously occupied, automatic smoke detection
shall be provided at the location of each fire alarm control unit(s), notification
appliance circuit power extenders, and supervising station transmitting equipment
to provide notification of fire at that location.
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This requirement was also present in earlier versions of NFPA 72 with the exception of the
2007 version. That version of the code stated there was an exception if the building was
fully sprinklered as seen below:
4.4.5* Protection of Fire Alarm System. In areas that are not continuously
occupied, automatic smoke detection shall be provided at the location of each fire
alarm control unit(s), notification appliance circuit power extenders, and
supervising station transmitting equipment to provide notification of fire at that
location.
Exception No. 1: Where ambient conditions prohibit installation of automatic smoke
detection, automatic heat detection shall be permitted.
Exception No. 2: Fully sprinklered buildings shall not require protection in accordance
with 4.4.5.
When the Main FACP was originally installed in 2002, a smoke detector would have been
required in the same room. However, when the panel was updated in 2008, a smoke
detector would not have been required in the same room. After checking with the AHJ, they
did not have any records of inspecting the installation or update of the FACP in 2008, nor
any indication as to whether or not they would have required the smoke detector near the
FACP.
With regards to the spacing of the smoke detectors, in Chapter 17.5.3.3 of NFPA 72 (2013)
regarding “Nonrequired Coverage”, there is a section that states:
17.5.3.3.1 Detection installed for reasons of achieving specific fire safety objectives,
but not required by any laws, codes, or standards, shall meet all of the requirements
of this Code, with the exception of the prescriptive spacing criteria of Chapter 17.
This section was interpreted to mean there wasn’t a smoke detector spacing (or quantity)
requirement because smoke detectors weren’t required throughout the building. However,
directly above that section in the NFPA 72 Handbook is a commentary section that states:
“Where the building owner or system designer elects to install fire detection
systems or components that are not required by the relevant building codes, the
systems still must be installed in accordance with the minimum-compliance criteria
of this Code.”
That statement appears to indicate that because the smoke detectors were installed, they
need to be installed properly and need to meet all the requirements of NFPA 72.
As mentioned in a previous section, on the first floor (not counting the data center) there
are only 16 smoke detectors protecting ~52,000 ft2 of office space. That leaves a coverage
area of ~3,250ft2 per detector.
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17.7.3.2.3.1* In the absence of specific performance-based design criteria, one of
the following requirements shall apply:
(1) The distance between smoke detectors shall not exceed a nominal
spacing of 30 ft. (9.1 m) and there shall be detectors within a distance of onehalf the nominal spacing, measured at right angles from all walls or partitions
extending upward to within the top 15 percent of the ceiling height.
(2) All points on the ceiling shall have a detector within a distance equal to or
less than 0.7 times the nominal 30 ft. (9.1m) spacing (0.7S).
If the maximum distance between smoke detectors is 30 feet, that would be a maximum
coverage area of 900ft2 per detector, much lower than the 3,250ft2 previously calculated.
Without taking into consideration the requirements of having to verify that each spot on
the ceiling has a detector within 21 feet of it, that would mean that the 52,000ft2 first floor,
divided by 900ft2 coverage area per detector, would need at least 58 smoke detectors for
adequate coverage. Since we didn’t take into consideration the rule of having a detector
within 21 feet of every spot on the ceiling, 58 smoke detectors would be a low estimate.
The second floor is about the same size (~51,000ft2) as the first but has 23 smoke detectors
spread throughout it (not counting the 4 local smoke detectors). That means each detector
has a coverage area of ~2,200ft2. Like above, if we calculate how many smoke detectors we
need base on the maximum coverage area per detector of 900ft2, then we would need at
least 56 smoke detectors for adequate coverage on the second floor.

Analysis of Fire Detector Response:
To determine the expected response characteristics of the fire detection devices, a fire
scenario was designed.
Throughout the building, the corridors vary in width from 8 feet wide in the narrower
sections, to 16 feet wide in the wider sections (see Figure 3 above). In a majority of these
wider sections, there are several large (~64 gallon) trash and recycling cans for the
building occupants/office staff to use. Sometimes as many as 7-8 cans are side-by-side (see
Figure 20 below). One of the cans is usually a plastic lined trash can without a lid, with light
combustible material inside. The growth rate of the fire was estimated to be similar to that
of a fast t2 growth rate. For comparison purposes, calculations were also done for a medium
t2 growth rate.
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Figure 20: Trash and recycle containers in the second floor west corridor
The smoke detectors were treated as quick response detectors to negate any delay travel
lag of the smoke particles entering the detector. To do so, a RTI value of 2 was assumed.
The ceiling height is 9 feet (108 inches). The height of the top of the trash cans is 42 inches.
The detector would be 66 inches above the fire.
Table B.4.7.5.3 from NFPA 72 (2013) was used to estimate the average temperature rise
before detection. As the trash cans are plastic, both the value of PVC and Polyurethane were
used. The temperature rise for both was 7.2°C. With an ambient temperature of 25°C, that
would mean the detectors should activate around 32.2°C.
The medium fire growth coefficient is α=0.012 kW/s2
The fast fire growth coefficient is α=0.047 kW/s2
A DETACT spreadsheet was used to do the calculations. Those calculations can be seen in
APPENDIX F.
Table 9: DETACT spreadsheet results
Fire Growth Rate Time to Detector Activation Heat Release Rate
Medium
38 seconds
17.3 kW
Fast
20 seconds
18.8 kW
Elsewhere in the building (where smoke detectors are lacking), the first automatic
detection might come from the sprinkler system rather than a smoke detector.
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Fire Alarm Notification Appliances:
Main System
The building’s main fire alarm system utilizes various types of bells, horns, strobes, and
horn strobes.
Over the years that the system has been in the building, individual items have been added
or replaced, and they often don’t match previous items that were installed. At the time of
this report, there are at least 4 different types of horns, 3 different types of strobes, 4
different types of horn strobes, and 1 bell. Some of the items were fairly new, and some
appeared to be over 20 years old.
Table 10: Types of Alarm Notification Devices on the main system
Horn
Strobe
Horn Strobe
Wheelock
Amseco 10”
Faraday 6120
RSS-241575W
Faraday AS-MC-R
MBA Series
Wall Mounted
System Sensor SCR
–
System Sensor HR
Gentex GES3-24
Ceiling Mounted
System Sensor
Gentex
Gentex GEC-24–
H12/24
GES24-15/75WR
15/75
System Sensor
–
–
System Sensor P2R
MA12/24D
Bell

Figure 22: Four types of horns used

Figure 23: Three types of strobes used
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Figure 24: Four types of horn strobes used
Secondary System
The fire alarm system in the data center doesn’t have as many discrepancies with
notification appliances as the main system does. Inside the data center are a single bell, and
a single type of horn strobe used to indicate the activation of the clean agent system. The
other horn strobes in the data center are connected to the main fire alarm system and don’t
activate with the secondary system.
Table 11: Types of Alarm Notification Devices on the secondary system
Bell
Horn Strobe
System Sensor 6”
System Sensor
SSM24-6
P2475
Compatible Appliances
A problem that can arise with using various types of notification appliances is that they
may not be compatible with the FACP. Inside the manual for the IntelliKnight 5820XL FACP
is a list of compatible notification appliances. Table 12 below lists the notification
appliances that are found in the building and connected to the main fire alarm system. If
the devices are not compatible, the device may not work at the designed capacity, or at all.
Table 12: Compatible and Incompatible Devices
Compatible
Incompatible
Faraday 6120 Horn
Gentex GES3-24 Horn Strobe
Faraday AS-MC-R Horn Strobe
Gentex GEC-24-15/75 Horn Strobe
System Sensor H12/24 Horn
System Sensor SCR Strobe
System Sensor SS24M Horn
System Sensor HR Horn
System Sensor P2R Horn Strobe
Wheelock RSS-241575W Strobe
There can also be a problem resulting from using older (pre-2000) notification appliances.
Notification appliances designed before the year 2000 could have been designed for a
different minimum voltage than if they were designed after the year 2000 due to changes in
UL 1971. An older notification appliance may require a minimum voltage of 18V, but a
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newer appliance might only need 16V. If an older appliance is connected to a newer FACP,
it may not receive the 18V it requires. That might cause the appliance to work in a
diminished capacity, or not work at all. Without knowing the results of the system’s
electrical tests, and what each appliance requires, it is unclear if this is an issue.

Location, Spacing, & Placement of Fire Alarm Notification
Appliances:
Vertical Placement of Appliances on Walls
There are two sections in NFPA 72 (2013) that dictate the vertical placement of the
notification appliances on a wall, section 18.4 for audible appliances and section 18.5 for
visible appliances in public mode. Audible appliances (horns, bells) shall be mounted so the
top of the appliances is between 6” below the finished ceiling (BFC), and 90” above the
finished floor (AFF). In this building with a 9ft (108 inch) tall ceiling, the area that is
acceptable is between 90” and 102” AFF, or 18” to 6” BFC.
18.4.8.1 If ceiling heights allow, and unless otherwise permitted by 18.4.8.2 through
18.4.8.5, wall-mounted appliances shall have their tops above the finished floors at
heights of not less than 90 in. (2.29 m) and below the finished ceilings at distances
of not less than 6 in. (150 mm).
18.4.8.2 Ceiling-mounted or recessed appliances shall be permitted.
The locations for visible appliances are a little bit different. Instead of being measured by
the top of the appliance, the code requires that the whole lens is within a certain height
range. The whole lens can’t be below 80” AFF, or more than 96” AFF. In relation to the
ceiling, those values are 28” BFC to 12” BFC.
18.5.5.1* Wall-mounted appliances shall be mounted such that the entire lens is not
less than 80 in. (2.03 m) and not greater than 96 in. (2.44 m) above the finished
floor or at the mounting height specified using the performance-based alternative of
18.5.5.6.
However, when the visual and audible appliances are combined in a horn strobe, the
acceptable range is smaller. If for example the appliance is 4” tall, in this building the top of
the appliance could be located between 18” and 6” BFC for the audible requirements, and
between ~27” to 11” BFC for the visible requirements. Now combining those two
requirements, and the acceptable range shrinks to the top of the appliance can be located
between 18” and 11” BFC.
By applying these rules to appliances present in the building, it is apparent that there are
multiple code violations throughout the building. Several appliances are too close to the
ceiling, while others are too low. For example, a horn strobe on the main fire alarm system
located in the data center is mounted such that the top of the appliances is only 4.5” below
the ceiling. That is too close to the ceiling for both audible and visible requirements.
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Figure 25: Notification devices installed too low, and too high in the building
Visible Appliances in Corridors
When visible appliances are required in a corridor, an appliance needs to be located no
more than 15 feet from each end of the corridor, and they can’t be spaced more than 100
feet apart:
18.5.5.5.5* Visible notification appliances shall be located not more than 15 ft. (4.57
m) from the end of the corridor with a separation not greater than 100 ft. (30.5 m)
between appliances.
In the building there are only two horn strobes in corridors. One located in the center of the
northern corridor on the first floor, and one near the entrance in the northern corridor on
the second floor. The corridor on the first floor is 66 feet in length and would require two
strobes; one within 15 feet of each end of the corridor. That placement would leave 36 feet
between the two which is acceptable. As there is only one horn strobe in the hallway, it
does not satisfy the code. The corridor on the second floor is 48 feet in length and requires
two strobes; one within 15 feet of each end of the corridor. That placement would leave 18
feet between the two which is acceptable. While the appliance is within 15 feet of one end
of the corridor, there would need to be a second one at the other end of the corridor to
satisfy the code.
The other much larger corridors are all less than 200 feet in length and require three
strobes per corridor. One within 15 feet of each end of the corridor, and one in the center.
That would leave at maximum, 85 feet between the appliances, which is acceptable under
the code. However, none of the other corridors have any strobes, just one horn per corridor
which is a violation of the code.
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Number of Audible Appliances
According to NFPA 72, the number of audible appliances in a space is dependent on the size
and arrangement of that space. The reason for that is because, according to section
A.18.4.3:
Sound levels can be significantly reduced due to distance and losses through
building elements. Every time the distance from the source doubles, the sound level
decreases by about 6 decibels (dB).
And according to section 18.4.3.1:
To ensure that audible public mode signals are clearly heard, unless otherwise
permitted by 18.4.3.2 through 18.4.3.5, they shall have a sound level at least 15 dB
above the average ambient sound level or 5 dB above the maximum sound level
having a duration of at least 60 seconds, whichever is greater, measured 5 ft. (1.5 m)
above the floor in the area required to be served by the system using the A-weighted
scale (dBA).
For a Group-B business occupancy, Table A.18.4.3 lists the average ambient sound level at
55 dBA. Therefore, a horn strobe would need to put out a minimum of 70dBA anywhere in
the room. The bigger the room, the more decibels the horn has to put out, or the more
horns that are required.
While attempting to verify the decibel ratings of the horns in the building, it was
determined that none of the horns were labeled with their decibel rating on the exterior of
the appliance.
While walking through the building with the alarm technician (from Gray Electric) during a
semi-annual test of the system, it was discovered by Mr. Carman that the sound of the
alarm is very quiet in several areas of the building. As the building was empty at the time, it
was apparent that those areas did not have the audible coverage necessary to satisfy NFPA
72.
To verify the sound levels in each department one would simply need to know the size and
shape of the room, and how many horns are planned to go into the room. Since the decibel
level decreases by 6 dBA every time the distance from the appliance is doubled, then a
quick calculation can determine what decibel rating is required to have at least 70 dBA
anywhere in the room.
For example, according to one of the catalog cut sheets, the System Sensor horn in the
Planning Department has a decibel rating between 75 dBA and 85 dBA depending on the
supplied voltage. If a calculation is done based on the size of the Planning Department, the
minimum acceptable decibel rating for the horn can be determined. The room is ~60 feet
wide (E/W) and ~40 feet long (N/S) with the horn located in the southwest corner. Since
the horn isn’t in the center of the west wall, the calculation for the decibel rating would be
the same as if the horn was in the center of a wall in a room that was twice the size (N/S).
With the longest distance in the room being 60 feet, the math can be worked backwards to
see what decibel rating will produce a sound of 70 dBA at 60 feet from the appliance. A
horn with a dBA rating of 85 decibels would read 85 dBA at 10 feet from the appliance.
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Double that distance and the sound level would be 79 dBA at 20 feet. Double the distance
again and it would be 73 dBA at 40 feet. If the distance is doubled again, it would reach 80
feet and another 6 dBA would be lost thus dropping the decibel level to 67 dBA. Since 60
feet is in the middle between 40 and 80 feet, the sound level at that distance would be
exactly 70 dBA, thereby satisfying the minimum requirement. Since the System Sensor
horn can produce a sound of 85 dBA, the audible coverage in this room would be sufficient.
However, if the horn was not able to produce a decibel level at its maximum level of 85
dBA, the sound level at the other end of the room would be too quiet thus violating the
code.
While the audible notification coverage is potentially acceptable in the Planning
Department, in some locations like the Building department, there isn’t a single horn or a
horn strobe present which is a violation of the code.
Number of Visible Appliances
According to section 18.5.5.4.1 of NFPA 72:
Spacing shall be in accordance with either Table 18.5.5.4.1(a) and Figure 18.5.5.4.1,
or Table 18.5.5.4.1(b)
Table 18.5.5.4.1(a) lists room spacing for wall-mounted visible appliances, for both onelight or four-light options. The information in the table reads that if there is a 20’ x 20’
room, only one 15cd strobe is required. However, if there is a 40’ x 40’ room, four 15cd
strobes, or one 60cd strobe would be needed.
The building’s cafeteria is ~33’ wide (E/W) x 20’ long (N/S). To satisfy the number of
strobes required in the cafeteria, the number and size of strobes can be varied. If only one
strobe was desired, it would need to cover 40’ x 40’ to cover the length and the width, so a
60cd strobe would be required. If two strobes were desired, the area could be divided into
two 20’ x 20’ sections, both of which could be covered by one 15cd strobe. Inside the
cafeteria is a single Faraday AS-MC-R Horn Strobe on the east wall. The horn has a field
selectable setting of either 15, 30, 75, or 110cd. Since there is only one strobe in the room,
it would need to be at a rating of 75cd or above. In this case, the appliance was set to 110cd,
far above the minimum.
While the visible notification coverage is acceptable in the cafeteria, there are some areas
of the building that don’t have any strobes and violate the requirements of the code. Those
areas lacking visual notification coverage are the building, planning, environmental health,
and social services departments.
In total there are only 11 horn strobes on the first floor, and 6 strobes (one in each
bathroom). The second floor has only 13 horn strobes, and 6 strobes in the bathrooms.
That means there are not enough strobes to ensure that every portion the building has at
least the minimum level of visual notification coverage.
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Data Center
The data center consists of three rooms, totaling just over 1000ft2 in size. Inside the data
center are two horn strobes (15/75cd rating) connected to the main system, one horn
strobe (15/75cd rating) connected to the secondary system, and a 6” bell connected to the
secondary system. The bell is located in the center of the first room and has an audible
rating of 82dBA. By itself, the bell has just enough sound output capacity to cover the
minimum requirements based on the room size. However, the bell is also paired with a
horn strobe that can output between 75-85dBA, which when combined is more than
enough audible notification coverage for the data center. The two horn strobes connected
to the main system are located in different rooms within the data center. Each horn strobe
is capable of putting out 70-82dBA. Combined, they have enough output capacity to meet
the minimum requirements of the code.
The data center’s visual notification comes from the same three horn strobes mentioned
above. Each 15/75cd horn strobe can only cover an area of 20’ x 20’. As the two horn
strobes connected to the main system are located in different rooms, the visual notification
coverage is different for each. The main room is smaller than 20’ x 20’ so the coverage
provided by one horn strobe is sufficient. The second room is larger at ~21’ x 24’, therefore
a horn strobe larger than 15/75cd would be required to satisfy the code. The third room
doesn’t have any visual notification in it at all. Even though the light from the first horn
strobe would bounce into this room, it wouldn’t satisfy the code requirements. The
secondary alarm system only has the one horn strobe located in the first room. Since the
room is smaller than 20’ x 20’, the coverage in that room is sufficient; but the coverage in
the other two rooms doesn’t meet the code requirements.

Emergency Communication System:
While the building doesn’t have a typical mass notification system, there is an area of
rescue with two-way communication at the top of each stairwell (East/West) (see Figure
26 below). In each area of rescue is an intercom (AIPHONE NEM-NE-NVP-RA) with a
speaker and push button. When the button is pushed for 5 seconds, a signal is sent to the
master station (AIPHONE NEM-10) in the lobby and a dispatch center (see Figure 15
above). The dispatch center immediately contacts the fire department and notifies them of
the caller’s location. The master station in the lobby beeps until someone answers the call.
This system meets the standards for an emergency communication system set out in
Section 24.5.3 of NFPA 72.
-

24.5.3.1* Where required by the building code in force, an area of rescue assistance
two-way emergency communications system shall be installed in accordance with
24.5.3.
24.5.3.2 The area of refuge (rescue assistance) emergency communications system
shall be comprised of remotely located area of refuge stations and a central control
point.
24.5.3.3 The remote area of refuge stations and the central control point shall
communicate with each other.
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-

24.5.3.4* If the central control point is not constantly attended, it shall have a timed
automatic communications capability to connect with a constantly attended
monitoring location acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction where
responsible personnel can initiate the appropriate response.

Figure 26: Emergency intercom system located at the top of the east stairwell
Another emergency communications system is located in the data center. A Viking E-1600a
Emergency Phone system is located next to the pull station and abort button for the ANSUL
system (see Figure 19 below). When the button on the phone is pressed it begins dialing a
sequence of numbers. First three numbers are dialed people associated with the
Information & General Services Department (which manages the data center and is directly
outside of the sever rooms). If there is no answer after three rings, it calls the Sheriff’s
Dispatch. If again there is no answer after three rings, it calls 911. Whomever answer hears
a recorded message with the caller’s location. If they person answering presses the asterisk
key (*), they are connected with the person in the data center. This system also meets the
code requirements.

Secondary Power Requirements:
Each FACP in the building is required by NFPA 72 to have backup power sources to
maintain the fire alarm systems in the event of a power outage. The Main FACP has two 7.2amp hour (Ah) batteries, while the Secondary FACP has two 7.5 Ah batteries. Section
10.6.7.2.1 of NFPA 72 (2013) states, "The secondary power supply shall have sufficient
capacity to operate the system under quiescent load (system operating in a nonalarm
condition) for a minimum of 24 hours and, at the end of that period, shall be capable of
operating all alarm notification appliances used for evacuation or to direct aid to the
location of an emergency for 5 minutes…”Some of the notification appliances cut sheets
didn’t have complete data, or exact catalog cut sheet were not available. In those cases,
either cut sheets from similar devices were used, or values were estimated based on
similar devices.
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Table 13: Voltage Loss Calculations Main Fire Alarm System – Floor 1
Standby
Alarm
Total
Current
Current
Item
Standby
Type of Device
Device
Quantity
Per
Per
#
Current
Appliance
Appliance
(Amps)
(Amps)
(Amps)
Pull Station - 16
1
Silent Knight SD500-PS
16
0.00055
0.0088
0.00055
Smoke Detector – 16
2
Silent Knight SD505-APS
16
0.00055
0.0088
0.00055
Strobe - 6
3
RSS-241575W
4
None
None
0.09
4
Gentex GES24 15/75
2
None
None
0.063
Horn - 8
5
System Sensor HR
4
None
None
0.058
6
System Sensor H12/24
2
None
None
0.038
7
System Sensor MA12/24D
1
None
None
0.075
8
Faraday 6120 Horn
1
None
None
0.35
Horn Strobe - 11
9
Gentex GEC 15/75
3
None
None
0.063
10
Faraday AS-MC-R
3
None
None
0.8
11
System Sensor P2475
2
None
None
0.164
12
System Sensor P2R
3
None
None
0.08
Bell - 1
13
Amseco MBA Series
1
None
None
0.023
Total= 0.0176
Total=
*These values are estimations/approximations based on information from catalog cut sheets

Total
Alarm
Current
(Amps)
0.0088
0.0088
0.36
0.126
0.232
0.076
0.075
0.35
0.189
2.4
0.328
0.24
0.023
4.4166

5 minutes = 0.0833 hours
4.4166 amps X 0.0833 hours alarm = 0.37 Amp Hours
0.0176 amps X 24 hours standby = 0.42 Amp Hours
Table 14: Voltage Loss Calculations Main Fire Alarm System – Floor 2
Standby
Alarm
Total
Current
Current
Item
Standby
Type of Device
Device
Quantity
Per
Per
#
Current
Appliance
Appliance
(Amps)
(Amps)
(Amps)
Pull Station - 10
1
Silent Knight SD500-PS
9
0.00055
0.00495
0.00055
2
Faraday F1GT
1
None
None
0.0006
Smoke Detector - 23
3
Silent Knight SD505-APS
23
0.00055
0.01265
0.00055
Strobe - 6
4
RSS-241575W
6
None
None
0.09
Horn - 8
5
System Sensor HR
5
None
None
0.058
6
System Sensor H12/24
1
None
None
0.038
7
System Sensor MA12/24D
1
None
None
0.075
8
Faraday 6120 Horn
1
None
None
0.35
Horn Strobe - 13
9
Gentex GEC 15/75
3
None
None
0.063
10
Faraday AS-MC-R
3
None
None
0.8
11
System Sensor P2475
2
None
None
0.164
12
System Sensor P2R
5
None
None
0.08
Total= 0.0176
Total=
*These values are estimations/approximations based on information from catalog cut sheets
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Total
Alarm
Current
(Amps)
0.00495
0.0006
0.01265
0.54
0.29
0.038
0.075
0.35
0.189
2.4
0.328
0.4
4.6282

5 minutes = 0.0833 hours
4.6282 amps X 0.0833 hours alarm = 0.39 Amp Hours
0.0176 amps X 24 hours standby = 0.42 Amp Hours
In total, both floors have a combined alarm requirement of 0.76Ah and a combined standby
requirement of 0.84Ah. There are two 7.2Ah batteries in the panel which have more than
enough power to cover the requirements.

Inspection, Testing and Maintenance:
Chapter 14 of NFPA 72 (2013) details the requirements for inspection, testing, and
maintenance of the fire alarm systems in the building. The Facilities Department of the
Nevada County Government contracted with two companies to perform all of the
inspection, testing, and maintenance of the fire alarm systems in the building which is
allowed under section 14.2.3.3 of NFPA 72. Gray Electric is contracted with regards to the
main fire alarm system, while Sentinel Fire Equipment Company is contracted with regards
to the secondary fire alarm system (ANSUL/Inergen).
According to the requirements of Chapter 14 of NFPA 72, the contracted companies are
required to have a plan for inspection, testing, and maintenance of the fire alarm system
and to carry out that plan.
Inspections
Section 14.3 of NFPA 72 pertains to the Inspection of the fire alarm systems. Section 14.3.1
states that “…visual inspections shall be performed in accordance with the schedules in
Table 14.3.1 or more often if required by the AHJ.” The portions of “Table 14.3.1 Visual
Inspection” that apply to the Rood Center can be found in the table below:
Table 15: Visual Inspection Schedule
Component(s)
Frequency of Visual Inspection
All equipment
Annually
Control equipment (Systems monitored for alarm,
supervisory and trouble signals like Fuses,
Annually
Interfaced Equipment, Lamps and LED’s, and the
(Trouble Signals are Semi-Annually)
Main Power Supply)
Batteries (Lead Acid)
Monthly
Remote Annunciators
Semi-Annually
Manual Fire Alarm Pull Stations
Semi-Annually
Smoke Detectors
Semi-Annually
Supervisory Signal Devices
Quarterly
Waterflow Devices
Quarterly
Audible Appliances
Semi-Annually
Visible Appliances
Semi-Annually
Area of Rescue Two-Way Communication System
Annually
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Testing
Section 14.4 of NFPA 72 pertains to the Testing of the fire alarm systems. Section 14.4.3.2
states “Systems and associated equipment shall be tested according to Table 14.4.3.2.” The
portions of “Table 14.4.3.2 Testing” that apply to the Rood Center can be found in the table
below:
Table 16: Testing Schedule
Component(s)
Frequency of Visual Inspection
All equipment
See Table 14.3.1 (Annually)
Control equipment (Fuses, Interfaced Equipment,
Annually
Lamps and LED’s, and the Main Power Supply)
Fire Alarm Control Unit Trouble Signals
Annually
Transmission Equipment
Annually
Emergency Communications Equipment
Annually
Secondary Power Supply
Annually
Lead Acid Batteries Replacement
Annually
Lead Acid Batteries Charger/Discharge
Annually
Lead Acid Batteries Load Voltage
Semi-Annually
Lead Acid Batteries Specific Gravity
Semi-Annually
Remote Annunciators
Annually
System’s Conductors
Annually
Electromechanical Releasing Device
Annually
(Fusible Links)
Fire Suppression Systems
Annually
Manual Fire Alarm Pull Stations
Annually
Smoke Detectors Functional Test
Annually
Supervisory Signal Devices
Annually
(High-low air pressure switch)
Waterflow Devices
Semi-Annually
Abort Switch
Annually
Audible Appliances
Annually
Visible Appliances
Annually
Area of Rescue Two-Way Communication System
Annually
Maintenance
Section 14.5 of NFPA 72 pertains to the Maintenance of the fire alarm systems. Section
14.5.1 states “System equipment shall be maintained in accordance with the
manufacturer’s published instructions.” The frequency of the maintenance is also referred
back to the manufacturer’s published instructions in Section 14.5.2.
Records
The building owner or contracted companies are required to maintain all records in
accordance with Chapter 7 and Section 14.6.
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7.7.1.1 A complete record of the tests and operations of each system shall be kept
until the next test and for 1 year thereafter unless more stringent requirements are
required elsewhere in this Code.
7.7.1.4 Required documents regarding system design and function shall be
maintained for the life of the system.
7.7.1.5 Revisions and alterations to systems shall be recorded and records
maintained with the original system design documents.
14.6.1.1 A set of reproducible as-built installation drawings, operation and
maintenance manuals, and a written sequence of operation shall be provided to the
building owner or the owner’s designated representative.
14.6.2.1 Records shall be retained until the next test and for 1 year thereafter.
14.6.2.4* A record of all inspections, testing, and maintenance shall be provided in
accordance with 7.8.2.
When asked, the Facilities Department staff stated that they didn’t have copies of the asbuilt installation diagrams or any paperwork/records associated with the inspection,
testing or maintenance of the systems. They recommended following up with both Gray
Electric and Sentinel Fire Equipment Company.
Follow-up with Gray Electric determined that they don’t have copies of the as-built
installation diagrams for the main portion of the fire alarm system. They also didn’t have
any records regarding the upgrades done to the system (Main FACP, notification
appliances, or detection devices). The only records they had indicated when one of their
technicians visited the building for a semi-annual inspection, but not what the details of
that inspection included, nor the results of the inspection.
Sentinel Fire Equipment Company had copies of the as-built installation diagrams for the
secondary alarm system, Inergen Clean Agent flow calculations, as well as the battery and
notification line loss calculations stored on site in the building. They also had records
regarding their semi-annual inspections of the secondary fire alarm system. Please see
APPENDIX E for the installation diagrams and documents for the secondary system.
The Nevada City Fire Department (AHJ) was also contacted and asked what, if any, records
they had regarding the fire alarm system. They stated that they didn’t have any copies of
the as-built diagrams or any other installation documents. Nor did they have any copies of
any inspection, testing, maintenance or repair work done on the fire alarm system. When
asked what information they did have, the AHJ stated that the work was done before their
time, they really don’t know much about the fire alarm system, and that they don’t have any
information pertaining to it.

Summary:
Overall the alarm system was pieced together over the years starting as just a manual
system with a few pull stations and a few notification devices. Additional notification
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devices were added along with detection devices transforming the system into an
automatic alarm system. The building’s water suppression system also acts as an automatic
detection device with the use of water flow alarms which will be discussed in the next
section. As the alarm system was added onto, it doesn’t appear that checks were done to
ensure compatibility between devices, or if there were enough devices installed, or if the
devices that were installed were in the correct locations. There are multiple issues with the
primary alarm system on all fronts. The secondary system located in the data center is on
the other end of the spectrum as it meets all of the requirements of the code. Further
discussion of the issues associated with the alarm system can be found in the Comments &
Recommendations section.

Sprinklers
System Overview
An automatic sprinkler system was installed when the building was built in 1985-1986.
The applicable code at the time regarding the sprinkler systems would have been the 1983
edition of NFPA 13. The building is protected by both a wet-pipe and a dry-pipe system.
The wet-pipe system protects the building’s internal occupied spaces as well as the second
floor’s attic. The dry-pipe system protects the mansard roof, the lobby, and the exterior
eaves. The riser room is a cement-lined room located on the first floor, east side of the
building and contains the risers for both the wet and dry-pipe sprinkler systems. The pump
room is separate from the main building located across the east side of the parking lot. It is
a cement-lined room with a ceiling mounted space heater and contains a fire pump, pump
controller, jockey pump, and a water booster system for the potable water.

Water Supply
The water supply for the building is supplied via a large storage tank located on a hill above
the building to the northeast. The cylindrical tank is 99 feet in diameter by 22 feet tall and
holds 1,380,000 gallons of water. The tank is supplied by the Nevada City water mains. The
water is gravity fed through 14” then 10” Ductile Iron pipes into the pump room.
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Figure 27: Google Maps overview of the Rood Center. To the top right of the photo is the water
supply tank, to the right is the public library, and to the left is the county jail. The pump house
is located across the parking lot from the right side of the rood center.
Once in the pump room, the water enters a split case, motor driven, centrifugal fire pump:
Patterson Fire Pump
Model # 8x6 MI
GPM: 1500
PISG: 70
The water pressure coming out of the fire pump is maintained at 100 psi by a Jockey Pump:
Grundfos
Model #CP3-40KU
GPM: 24
PSIG: 65
The fire pump provides water pressure to hydrants and several buildings on the property;
including the Rood Center, the Nevada County Jail, and the Nevada County Public Library
(see Figure 27 above).
On the exterior of the pump room, the water pipe for the Rood Center runs through a
backflow preventer (two gate valves, two check valves), and a post indicator valve (PIV).
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Then runs underneath the parking lot (towards the west) where it comes up through the 4”
concrete slab in the riser room.
According to the original hydraulic calculations (APPENDIX O), dated 4/26/1986:
Static Pressure
=
122.00 psi
Residual Pressure =
74.00 psi
Flow
=
1500 gpm
*A hydrant flow test was done by the Nevada City Fire Department in 1993 which
showed slightly lower numbers, but as the system was designed using the above
numbers, those are the ones that will be referenced in this report.
There is a fire department connection located in the parking lot on the north side of the
building near a fire hydrant. The FDC is a 4” diameter stand-alone pipe with two connection
ports, 2 ½” in diameter. A secondary fire department connection is located on the exterior
of the pump room’s west wall. This FDC is approximately 10” in diameter and sticks out of
the wall with 8 separate connection ports on it (octopus), 2 of which were plugged. The
remaining 6 ports are 2 ½” in diameter with a single globe valve controlling each port.
Refer to APPENDIX I for the Underground Water Supply Drawing.

Automatic Sprinkler System Design
The sprinkler system design criteria for the wet pipe and dry pipe systems are as
follows:
Wet Pipe
Occupancy Hazard Classification = Light Hazard
Density = 0.10 gpm/ft2
Area of Operation: 1500 ft2
Number of Sprinklers: 14 most remote/demanding
Sprinkler Protection Coverage Area: Max coverage area is 130ft2/sprinkler
K-Value: 5.6
Hose Stream Allowance: 100 gpm
Water Supply Duration: 30 minutes
The sprinkler system on the first floor is primarily a gridded system with some tree
system components. The sprinkler system on the second floor is a tree system. The 14
most hydraulically remote sprinklers were located on the west end of the second floor.
Dry Pipe
Occupancy Hazard Classification = Light Hazard
Density = 0.10 gpm/ft2
Area of Operation: 1950 ft2 (30% increase due to inherent delays in response times)
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Number of Sprinklers: 14 most remote/demanding
Sprinkler Protection Coverage Area: Max coverage area is 130ft2/sprinkler
K-Value: 5.6
Hose Stream Allowance: 100 gpm
Water Supply Duration: 30 minutes
The dry pipe sprinkler system in the lobby and mansard is a loop system. The 14 most
hydraulically remote sprinklers were located on the south end of the building, above
the center and western portions of the lobby.

Sprinkler System Components
The water enters the building in a 4” ductile iron pipe as it comes up through the slab in the
riser room on the east side of the building. The water travels up through a 4” T-valve where
it splits to the wet pipe and dry pipe systems.
Wet Pipe
Once in the riser room, the wet pipe system rises up through a butterfly valve and water
flow alarm valve. The water continues up through the ceiling, through the second story
electrical room, and then up into the attic above the second story. In the attic, the top of the
riser meets the feed main which travels west through the building. The feed main has six
cross mains (3 on each side) and approximately eight branch lines (4 on each side) coming
off of it.
The westernmost cross main (on the south side of the feed main) has twelve branch lines
(6 on each side). Between the second and third branch line, the cross main is redirected
around an air handler before returning to its original path.
Each branch line is connected to the cross main via a riser nipple with a one-foot rise. The
branch lines have T-valves in them with a sprig going up to an upright sprinkler. At the
base of the sprig is a second T-valve that feeds a drop to a pendant sprinkler. The upright
sprinklers cover the attic, while the drop sprinklers penetrate the drop ceilings and cover
the office spaces below. Each branch line has eight upright and eight pendant sprinklers on
it.
The southernmost branch lines have 6 additional sprinklers on each line. These additional
sprinklers are connected to the branch line via T-valves, and a sprig. The pipe travels
vertically, then horizontally through the exterior wall into the mansard. The sprinkler plans
indicate that the additional sprinklers are upright, but that was not visually confirmed. Due
to these additional sprinklers being located in the mansard, they would be less likely to be
involved in a fire; therefore, they were left out of the hydraulic calculations which
determined the most remote sprinklers.
Riser:
Feed Main:

3” SCH 10 black steel C=120
3” SCH 10 black steel C=120
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Cross Main:
Riser Nipple:
Branch Line:
Sprigs:
Drops:

2.5” SCH 10 black steel C=120
1.5” SCH 40 black steel C=120
1” – 1.5” SCH 40 black steel C=120
1” – 1.5” SCH 40 black steel C=120
1” – 1.5” SCH 40 black steel C=120

Dry Pipe
Once in the riser room, the dry pipe system rises up through a butterfly valve and into the
dry pipe valve. The dry pipe valve has an air compressor hooked up to keep a pressure of
32 psi inside the valve. The dry pipe valve is also equipped with low pressure alarm (25
psi) and an accelerator which is designed to trip at 18 psi. Above the dry pipe valve is a
water flow alarm valve. From there the water rises through the first and second stories into
the attic above. At that location the feed main travels west across one intersection and tees
into another. The feed main branches off at those two intersections and travels around the
length of the building in the mansard roof as two loops. On the opposite end of the loop, the
two feed main loops are connected by 2” diameter pipe. On the south side of the building,
above the lobby, there are two cross mains and two branch lines which come off the
outermost loop. The most remote sprinklers are located above the lobby on the southwest
side.
Dry Pipe Valve:
Riser:
Feed Main:
Outer Loop:
Inner Loop:
Cross Main:
Branch Line:

4”
3” SCH 10 black steel C=120
2” SCH 40 black steel C=100
1.5” SCH 40 black steel C=100
1.25” – 1.5” SCH 40 black steel C=100
1” – 1.25” SCH 40 black steel C=100

Three types of sprinklers were installed with the original system; two different types of
pendant sprinklers protecting the occupied spaces, and one type of upright sprinkler head
that is used in the attic spaces.
Upright:
GEM Automatic Sprinkler
Model F950 Fusible Solder Type (1986)
458a SSU-3
Orifice = ½”
K = 5.6
Temperature Rating = 212°F / 100°C
Pendant:
1)

GEM Automatic Sprinkler
Model F950 Fusible Solder Type (1986)
458a SSP-3
Orifice = ½”
K = 5.6
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Temperature Rating = 212°F / 100°C
2)

Central Sprinkler Corporation
Model “H” Fusible Center Strut (1986)
804a SSP-52
Orifice = ½”
K = 5.6
Temperature Rating = 165°F / 73°C

Starting in 1990, and continuing throughout the years, tenant improvements were done
and a third type of pendant sprinkler was added.
Pendant:
3)

Viking Micromatic Sprinkler
Model M – Glass Bulb
589a
Orifice = ½”
K = 5.6
Temperature Rating = 155°F / 68°C
See APPENDIX L for data sheets of the system components and APPENDIX J for the original
sprinkler system layouts.

Hydraulic Calculations
When the system was first designed, the sprinkler contractors did hydraulic calculations
for the first floor, the second floor, and the mansard. Their results are as follows:
Table 17: Original Hydraulic Calculation Results
System Location
Total Flow (No HSA)
Total Pressure
First Floor
189.77 gpm
95.97 psi
Second Floor
291.76 gpm
101.71 psi
Mansard
262.87 gpm
109.07 psi
The most demanding flow was located on the second floor, while the most demanding
pressure was located in the mansard. The most likely location where a fire might
potentially overwhelm the system would be inside the occupied space of the building and
not in the mansard. Therefore, hand calculations were done for the second floor back to the
base of the riser, then back to the fire pump.
The 14 most remote sprinklers were labeled 101 – 114 on the original sprinkler plans and
calculation sheets, so that is how they’ll be referred to in this report. The layout of the most
remote sprinklers can be seen in Figure 6 below.
The required area of coverage was 1500 ft2 with a maximum protection coverage area of
130 ft2 per sprinkler. The actual coverage area (indicated by the dashed line) is 1624 ft2.
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Figure 28: Basic Layout of the Most Remote Sprinklers
The sprinklers in the above diagram are numbered as follows:
#101 #104
#102 #105 #107 #109 #111 #113
#103 #106 #108 #110 #112 #114

Figure 29: Layout of the most Remote Sprinklers with pipe diameters and distances
The blue numbers indicate pipe diameters in inches, the green numbers indicate distances
in feet.
The maximum protection coverage area was calculated for each individual sprinkler
indicated in the diagrams above. The calculations were done based on the formula from
section 8.5.2.1.1 of NFPA 13 (2013):
𝐴" = 𝐿×𝑆
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Where L is the distance between branch lines, and S is the distance between the sprinklers
along the branch lines.
Table 18: Maximum Protection Coverage Area for Individual Sprinklers
Sprinkler
L
S
As
Density
Flow (Q)
(feet)
(feet)
(ft2)
(gpm/ft2)
(gpm)
101
12
10
120
0.10
12.0
102
13
10
130
0.10
13.0
103
13
10
130
0.10
13.0
104
12
10
120
0.10
12.0
105
13
10
130
0.10
13.0
106
13
10
130
0.10
13.0
107
13
10
130
0.10
13.0
108
13
10
130
0.10
13.0
109
13
9.33
121.3
0.10
12.1
110
13
9.33
121.3
0.10
12.1
111
13
9.33
121.3
0.10
12.1
112
13
9.33
121.3
0.10
12.1
113
13
9.33
121.3
0.10
12.1
114
13
9.33
121.3
0.10
12.1
Total
1,748
The required coverage area was 1500 ft2, the actual coverage area was 1624 ft2, while the
calculated coverage area for all the sprinklers was 1,748 ft2. The maximum spacing
between sprinklers was 130 ft2, and the average spacing is only 124.8 ft2.
Table 19: Hand Calculations vs. Original Calculations
Hand Calculations
Original Calculations
Sprinkler Demand Location

Flow (gpm)

Pressure (psi)

Flow (gpm)

Pressure (psi)

Most Remote Sprinkler (#114)

12.1

4.7

14.7

7.0

Base of Riser (BOR)

313.5

123.8

291.8

94.7

Fire Pump

313.5

131.8

291.8

101.7

See APPENDIX M for the hydraulic calculations done by hand, and APPENDIX O for the
original hydraulic calculations.
There are a few things that could account for the differences in the calculations. One of
which is that there have been tenant improvements since the original installation. For
example, a section of the Cross Main feeding the most remote sprinklers was moved and
rerouted to accommodate an air handler, which would increase the calculated demand.
Also, when following the calculations from the most remote sprinkler back to the pump,
several of the equivalent lengths for fittings didn’t match up to what was seen on site. That
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could be due to the system having been changed since it was originally designed, or the
individuals doing the calculations somehow over looked those items.
Based on the hydraulic graph (see Figure 30 below), the water supply, in conjunction with
the fire pump, is more than adequate for this system and the hose stream allowance. If the
demands of the other buildings on the property are ignored, the combined supply has an
extra ~1,224 gpm available at 131.8 psi beyond the HSA.
The static pressure from the combined graph can reach 220psi (at 140% capacity), which is
far above the 170 psi working pressure rating of the sprinkler heads. However, as the
pump also supplies water pressure to the hydrants, the Jail, and the County Library, the
actual maximum static pressure would be much lower. Further calculations would need to
be done for those systems to see what the exact values would be. At the pump’s rating of
1500 gpm, the combined supply would reach a pressure of 144 psi, well within the working
limits of the sprinkler heads.
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Figure 30: Hydraulic Graph
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Clean Agent System
The server rooms are protected by an Inergen-ANSUL clean agent system. The system
protects three server rooms that act as one data room located on the first floor, west side of
the building. The three rooms and the underfloor space comprise 2,011ft2 and 8,945ft3.
Smoke detectors and spray nozzles are located both at the ceiling and underneath the
raised floors.
The system is comprised of 10 cylinders located in a closet off the first floor western
corridor adjacent to the data room (see Figure 31 below). The cylinders supply 4,390ft3 of
Inergen agent at 195 psi. The system can complete a 90% discharge in 46 seconds at an
estimated flow rate of 5,153ft3/min.
In order for the system to activate automatically, two smoke detectors need to activate,
followed by a 30 second activation delay. If needed, an abort button can be pressed to
deactivate the process during the 30 second delay. The system can also be activated
manually with a pull station located next to the abort button near the entrance to the room
(see Figure 19 above).

Figure 31: Inergen cylinders and clean agent spray nozzle
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Inspection, Testing and Maintenance
The responsibility for the maintenance and inspections of the system belong to the
Facilities Department that oversees the building. The maintenance staff observe the system
regularly during their routine work throughout the building and perform the weekly and
monthly inspections. The quarterly and annual system maintenance and inspections are
contracted out to a private sprinkler contractor. All inspections, testing and maintenance
are done according to the guidelines of NFPA 25.
For a table showing the requirements for inspections, testing, and maintenance, please see
APPENDIX P.

Summary
The water suppression system consisting of both wet pipe and dry pipe sprinkler systems
met the code requirements set forth in NFPA 13. It is still unclear why the designer decided
to use a dry pipe sprinkler system to protect the front of the lobby. In the next section the
performance based analysis will exam four fire scenarios that examine how the building’s
systems will react to a fire. The fourth scenario discusses the dry pipe system in the front of
the lobby in more detail and how it could potentially affect a fire.

Performance Based Analysis
Prescriptive based analyses examine how the existing building or new design compare with
what is required in various codes and standards. These codes and standards are designed
to ensure that the way in which a building is constructed will provide its occupants (who
are not intimate with the initial fire) enough time to escape to safety. Unfortunately, there
are situations where there may be no direct comparison between the building/design and
the code(s). In those situations, the AHJ may allow a performance based analysis to be
completed instead to determine if the building’s fire protection systems will provide
enough time to exit the building safely.
This performance based analysis utilized a computational fluid dynamics model, Fire
Dynamics Simulator (FDS), to estimate how long occupants would have to get out of the
Rood Center safely. Four different fire scenarios were considered in which the simulation
would reflect a worst-case scenario for a given area. Once the simulations were complete,
they were analyzed to determine if the conditions in the building remained tenable long
enough for the occupants to escape to safety.
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Tenability Criteria
The Required Safe Egress Time (RSET) estimates how long it will take people to evacuate a
building. In the event of a fire, the building’s fire protection systems need to be able to
contain the fire and keep conditions tenable long enough for people to escape the building.
That amount of time is known as the Available Safe Egress Time (ASET). The ASET begins
when the fire is discovered and ends when either conditions become untenable, or
everyone has escaped. If the ASET is greater than the RSET, then there is enough time
available to get the people out of the building. If the ASET is less than the RSET, then the
conditions will become untenable prior to everyone exiting the building.
To specify when conditions become untenable, criteria must be established to determine
what thresholds for various factors affecting tenability. According to the Handbook of
Smoke Control Engineering (2012 edition, the factors which affect tenability the most are
reduced visibility, exposure to toxic gases like carbon monoxide (CO), and heat exposure
(high temperatures and thermal radiation).
Visibility
Several factors need to be considered to determine proper values for determining visibility
thresholds in smoky conditions. Dr. Tadahisa Jin proposes that these factors should include
how familiar the occupants are with the building, how large are the rooms, how large is the
building, and how complex is the layout of the building. If the layout is simple, the rooms
and building are smaller (so one could see their target destination), and the occupants are
familiar with the building, then the minimum criterion for visibility would be quite low.
However, if the occupants aren’t familiar with the building, the layout is complex, and the
rooms are large, then the minimum criterion for visibility would need to be higher.
According to Dr. Jin, the minimum distance an occupant would need to be able to see to exit
a building they’re familiar with is 13 feet (4 meters). Whereas, if the occupant was
unfamiliar with the building, the minimum distance they would need to be able to see
would be 43 feet (13 meters).
As the occupants in the Rood Center would be primarily made up of staff who are familiar
with the building, and the egress paths are fairly simple (and well-marked), the minimum
visibility criterion for these simulations was 26 feet (8 meters).
Carbon Monoxide Exposure
While there are several chemicals in smoke that pose a health risk (including a lack of
oxygen), exposure to CO accounts for the majority of fatalities in fires. Exposure to CO can
result in carboxyhemoglobin (COHb) uptake in the blood which can decrease the capacity
of the blood to carry oxygen to the brain. In the SFPE Handbook (4th edition), research by
Dr. David Purser is presented which states that a dose of 27,000 parts per million per min
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(ppm-min) will cause incapacitation. Therefore, a dose of 2,700 ppm-min would cause
incapacitation in 10 minutes.
The movement times calculated in APPENDIX C, state how long it would take people to
escape from the building once they’ve started moving, but does not take into account the
time from ignition to detection, pre-movement time delays, or a safety factor. The longest
movement time from a department calculated was 4 minutes, 53 seconds. If it is assumed
that detection takes 10 seconds, the recognition time takes 30 seconds, and the response
time takes anywhere from 60 seconds to 180 seconds, with a safety factor of 1.5, complete
evacuation could take about 13 minutes.
(4.88 min + 0.16 min + 0.5 min + 3 min) x 1.5 = 12.81 minutes
If an egress pathway(s) gets blocked by fire or smoke, that will cause the evacuation time
will go up as the occupants have to re-route to another exit. A maximum threshold of 1,350
ppm-min would provide occupants with 20 minutes for safe egress before incapacitation
would occur. That would give occupants enough time to re-route to another exit with
tenable conditions.
Heat Exposure
In the SFPE Handbook (4th edition), research from Dr. David Purser indicates that 250°F
(121°C) is the point where temperatures above will cause pain, blisters, and burns. To
create a safety margin, the maximum threshold for heat exposure for these simulations was
set at 212°F (100°C).
Research from Dr. Vyto Babrauskas in the SFPE Handbook (4th edition) indicates that the
maximum threshold for thermal radiation exposure is 2.5 kW/m2. At that level of thermal
radiation exposure, bare skin would feel pain but burns could be avoided if exposures were
short.
Table 20 below lists the various tenability thresholds for the computer fire modeling
scenarios.
Table 20: Tenability Criteria Values
Tenability Criterion
Threshold Limit
Visibility
Carbon Monoxide
Temperature
Thermal Radiation

26 feet (8m)
1,350 ppm
212°F (100°C)
2.5 kW/m2

These values will be monitored in the simulations at a height of 6 feet (1.8m) above each
floor level. If any of these values are exceeded, the conditions in the building will be
considered untenable thereby marking the end to the ASET.
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Scenarios
Each of the following scenarios were designed to be a worst-case scenario for the
room/area in which they were located. The computers models were originally designed
three-dimensionally using a program called SketchUp with data from an AutoCAD file and
measurements taken on-site. That 3D model was then transferred into a program called
Pyrosim where the rest of the details (fire, fire protection systems, surface properties, etc.)
were added. Pyrosim was used to run the models in Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS). Once
the calculations were complete, the simulations were viewed in a program called
Smokeview. The screen renderings that will be included below were taken from either
Pyrosim or Smokeview. As exact data wasn’t available regarding the surfaces, fuels,
sprinkler/detector responses, etc., estimates were made in each instance to try and best
replicate reality.

Scenario #1
The first scenario evaluated a fire that could occur on the counter in the cafeteria.
Stored on the counter are several small appliances including a cappuccino machine,
a coffee grinder, and two drip coffee makers. Directly above the small appliances are
wooden cabinets which extend to the acoustic tile drop-ceiling above. The north
wall is covered with countertop and cabinets, the west wall is covered with several
large vending machines, the south wall is made up of windows, and the east wall is
where a bulletin board and a couple trash cans are located. There are two rows of
rectangular tables with chairs on all sides in the center of the cafeteria.
The cafeteria is 35.5 feet wide (east/west) and 25 feet long (north/south). The main
entrance/exit is at a 45-degree-angle to the room in the southeast corner. This
doorway leads to the lobby and then to the exterior of the building. A secondary
entrance is located on the north wall at the northeast corner. This doorway leads to
a 35-foot-long hallway to the north that connects to the building’s main western
corridor.
The room has a 9-foot-tall acoustic tile drop ceiling, with gypsum walls and a tiled
floor. The hallway to the north has the same type of construction as the cafeteria
with 9-foot ceilings and a closed door at the north end. The lobby to the southeast
has a ceiling that is 23-foot-tall and such a large air volume, that this portion of the
model was left open.
There are six wet-pipe sprinkler heads in the cafeteria and three wet-pipe sprinkler
heads in the hallway to the north. The activation temperature for all the sprinklers
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was 74°C. For a more detailed description of the sprinkler heads, please refer to the
sprinkler section in this report. There are no smoke detectors in the cafeteria,
hallway to the north, or in the lobby.
The fire was theorized to start in the cappuccino machine due to an electrical failure.
The fire would spread to a coffee grinder, the wooden cabinets above, and
countertop nearby. As an exact Heat Release Rate (HRR) of a cappuccino machine
(and coffee grinder) was unavailable, an estimate HRR was needed. Figure 26.14
(see Figure 32 below) from the SFPE Handbook (5th Edition) shows the HRR of a
small air conditioner of similar size. The maximum HRR of that test was 300kW
which was reached in 250-300 seconds. For this scenario, a maximum HRR of
300kW was used but a medium-speed t-squared fire growth-rate curve was used
instead. A custom fire ramp was created to follow the t2 medium growth fire curve
and then diminish with time. The maximum HRR was reached 160 seconds after
ignition. The burner was placed on a plastic box on the counter top in the northern
portion of the cafeteria (see Figure 33 below). As the sprinklers were not directly
above the fire, the fire ramp was not adjusted to reflect the activation of the
sprinklers.

Figure #32: HRR of a small air conditioner (SFPE Handbook 5th Ed.)
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Figure #33: View of the cafeteria fire model in Smokeview. (The red square is the burner)

Figure #34: View of the cafeteria facing northwest from the exit door
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Scenario #2
The second scenario evaluated a fire that could occur in a copy machine located in a
dead-end hallway on the second floor. The hallway is located on the second floor at
the north end of the lobby. In the hallway are four doors, one to the Grand Jury, one
to the LAFCo offices, and the last two go to “named” conference rooms. The entrance
door to the hallway is a 36” wide door at the south end of the hallway. The Grand
Jury is located to the east, the LAFCo offices to the north, and the conference rooms
to the west. At the south end of the hallway is a small common area. To the west is a
large wooden table and three chairs, on the east side is a copy machine with a small
recycle container next to it, a metal desk with a chair, and then a 64-gallon plastic
recycle container behind the door.
The hallway has a 9-foot acoustic tile drop ceiling, with gypsum walls, and low-pile
carpet over cement floor. At the southeast of the common area is a photo electric
smoke detector. There are three Viking sprinkler heads in the common area and two
more in the hallway. These sprinkler heads have glass bulbs as opposed to the metal
fusible links the other sprinklers had. Their activation temperature is 68°C.
The fire was theorized to start in the area of the copy machine due to an electrical
failure. The fire could potentially spread to the nearby small recycle container next
to it, the foam and plastic desk chair, and then eventually the 64-gallon recycle
container behind the door. While this fire could potentially get quite large, there is
one sprinkler directly above the copy machine, and another within 6 feet. Therefore,
the fire ramp was designed to stop the growth of the burner and begin diminishing
the HRR when the second sprinkler activated.
An exact HRR value for a copy machine was not found, so an example HRR graph for
business-machine cabinets was used from the SFPE Handbook (5th Edition), Figure
26.36 (see Figure 35 below). The graph indicated the maximum HRR was 600
seconds, which was reached in 150 seconds. This value is in-between the medium
and fast t2 growth-rates (227 seconds and 114 seconds respectively). Since a worstcase scenario is assumed, the fast t2 growth-rate was chosen. Again, a custom fire
ramp was created to follow the the fast t2 growth-rate, but the growth was stopped
at 90 seconds (time of the second sprinkler’s original activation time). The burner
was placed on top of an inert box approximately the same size as the copier. The
36”-wide door at the south end of the hallway is held open with a magnet which
deactivates and closes the door upon activation of the fire alarm. To simulate this
behavior, the door closes one second after the smoke detector activates (to simulate
time for the door to close). The door to the Grand Jury room is kept closed, the door
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at the north end of the hallway to the LAFCo offices is propped open with a door
stop, and the conference room doors vary whether they’re open or closed. For the
simulation they were considered to be closed.
This fire scenario was designed to see if the occupants of the dead-end hallway
would be trapped by a fire in the common area at the south of the hallway. As the
fire would be in close proximity to the only exit, the question was if the conditions
would remain tenable long enough for them the occupants to escape into the second
floor lobby.

Figure #35: HRR of a small air conditioner (SFPE Handbook 5th Ed.)
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Figure #36: View of the 2nd Floor Hallway in Smokeview (facing east)

Figure #37: View of the copier, desk, and recycle containers in 2nd Floor Hall common area
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Figure #38: View facing north down the 2nd Floor Hall from the common area

Scenario #3
The third scenario evaluated a fire that could occur in a trash can located in the
western corridor on the first floor (see Figure 43 below). Located on the north side
of the corridor are three plastic recycle containers, a trash can, and two soda
vending machines. Two of the recycle containers are 64-gallon while the third is
significantly smaller. The 35-gallon trash can doesn’t have a lid, while the two larger
recycle containers both had lids (not locked). Stacks of loose cardboard boxes have
also been seen piled around these containers during different visits to the site.
In this portion of the corridor, the width (N/S) is 16 feet. The ceiling is a 9-foot
acoustic drop ceiling, the walls are gypsum, and the floor is tiled. To the southeast of
this area is the hallway that leads to the northeast corner of the cafeteria. Directly to
the northeast is the main northern exit corridor for the first floor. To the east at the
end of the corridor is the exit into the CDA waiting area (~65’ away). To the west at
the end of the corridor is the exit into the western stairwell (~135’ away).
The fire was theorized to start in one of the 64-gallon recycle containers due
ignition by open flame (arson). Inside of the container on several visits have been
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plastics, cardboard, and paper. The fire would spread to the 64-gallon recycle
container to the immediate west, the 35-gallon trash can to the immediate east,
followed by the smaller recycle container and the soda machines. To simulate the
fire spreading between the containers, three burners were used. The first burner
was horizontal (Z-plane) on top of the easternmost 64-gallon recycle container. The
second burner was located vertically (Y-plane) on the front of the westernmost 64gallon recycle container. The third burner was also located vertically (Y-plane) on
the front of the 35-gallon trash can. The vertical burners were used to simulate
ignition of the sides/front of the secondary fuels due to radiant heating from the
initial fire.
The fires’ HRR values and growth rates were modeled after tests done on HDPE
(high-density polyethylene) plastic trash/recycle containers at National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) and the Western Fire Center. The HRR for the first
burner was 2400kW (64-gallon can with combustibles inside) and grew slightly
slower than a t2 fast growth rate fire, reaching a maximum HRR at 250 seconds. As
the second container wasn’t as full of combustible materials, a maximum HRR of
2100kW was used with a time of 240 seconds. However, the second burner didn’t
ignite until 60 seconds after the first burner did, to simulate the object igniting from
the radiant heat. The third burner simulated a smaller 30-gallon trash can that was
only partially full. The maximum HRR was 800kW with a time of 150 seconds, also
delayed 60 seconds after the first burner ignited. Due to the large amount of fuel
present, it was hypothesized that the fire would overwhelm the sprinklers, so the
fire ramps were not adjusted to simulate the sprinklers having an effect.
There are a total of 20 sprinklers in the length of the western corridor, and one in
the portion of the northern corridor that was modeled. Of the 20 sprinklers, 4 were
in the same portion of the corridor as the fire, two at the north, and two at the south
end. The sprinklers have an activation temperature of 74°C. There are a total of 7
photo electric smoke detectors in the western corridor, the closest to the fire is
approximately 6 feet to the east of the easternmost recycle container.
All of the doors in the corridor are closed during normal operation, with the
exception of the door into the northern corridor. It is held open by a magnet that
disengages when the fire alarm goes off. To simulate this, the door would close one
second after the nearest smoke detector activated.
This fire was chosen to show the danger of having such a large amount of fuel stored
in an exit corridor, and adjacent to a second corridor’s entry. As this fire grows, the
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smoke will spread throughout the corridor slowing the egress of several
departments, and causing a few departments to choose an alternate egress pathway.

Figure #39: HRR of a 96 gal PE garbage can - Western Fire Center (SFPE Handbook 5th Ed.)

Figure #40: HRR of a 30 gal PE garbage can from NIST (SFPE Handbook 5th Ed.)
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Figure #41: HRR of a trash bag with
crumpled newspaper (SFPE Handbook 5th Ed.)

Figure #42: HRR of trash bags
(SFPE Handbook 5th Ed.)

Figure #43: The recycle containers, trash can, and vending machines in the west corridor
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Figure #44: Overview of 1st Floor West Corridor in Smokeview (facing north)

Figure #45: Close-up of the burners in the West Corridor in Smokeview (facing north)

Scenario #4
The fourth scenario evaluated a fire that could occur in a book fair in the lobby.
During one visit to the Rood Center, a book fair was set up throughout the lobby. In
total, 16 rectangular plastic folding tables were set up with cardboard boxes, books,
and loose paper both on top of, and below, the tables. The tables were primarily set
up at the south end of the lobby near the large two-story glass wall, but some were
placed up against the northern wall of the lobby (southern wall of the BOS
chambers). To the south of the tables, organizers had pushed four large wood/foam
chairs up against the glass wall. On either side of the glass wall are walls covered
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with wood siding (T-111 tongue and groove). The rest of the lobby walls are
covered with gypsum wall board. The ceiling of the lobby is the same T-111 tongue
and groove wood and has a peak in the center (with a N/S ridgeline), and a matching
ceiling on either side, which slopes from the south upwards to the north. At the
north end of the lobby the ceiling changes to a flat acoustic drop-ceiling, 9 feet above
the second floor walkway.
On either side of the glass wall at the front (south side) of the lobby are double 36”wide glass doors. To the northwest is the 36”-wide door into the cafeteria, to the
north are double 36”-wide doors into the CDA waiting area, and upstairs there are
single 36”-wide wooden doors to the east and west leading to the respective exit
corridors. The lobby is 72 feet wide (E/W) at the front, 84 feet long (N/S) on the
first floor and 104 feet long (N/S) on the second floor. The ceiling height in the front
of the lobby rises from 13 feet at the front on either side, to 23 feet at the rear, with
the central peak reaching a height of 33.5 feet. The flat ceiling is 23 feet above the
first floor, 9 feet above the second floor.
The fire was theorized to be started intentionally (arson) with an open flame in
cardboard boxes underneath tables at the western and eastern ends of the central
group of tables. The fires spread along boxes, books and paper underneath the table,
eventually spreading to the plastic table tops and additional boxes, books and paper
on top of the tables. Once the tables (and contents) are ignited, the fire spreads
south to the foam chairs, and then to the wood siding. Once the wood siding is
ignited, the fire would climb vertically until it began to spread across the wooden
ceiling.
Two burners were used, placed on top of cardboard boxes underneath plastic tables.
Both burners are ignited at the same time. Each burner had a maximum HRR of
80kW, which was reached at an ultra-fast t2 growth rate of 20 seconds. These values
were chosen to simulate that of a large wastebasket fire with paper inside (SFPE
Handbook, 5th Edition, Table 26.31).
In the front portion of the lobby are 13 dry-pipe sprinklers, four in the western
section, six in the center, and three in the eastern section. All of the sprinklers are at
varying heights as the western and eastern sections of the ceiling are sloped. After
several attempts at trying to determine what the dry-pipe system’s delay is, an
accurate value was not obtained. Therefore, a value was estimated for the computer
model of 60 seconds. Spread throughout the northern portion of the lobby (where
the flat ceiling is located) are 17 wet-pipe sprinklers. Two additional wet-pipe
sprinklers are located underneath the open-air walkway near the elevator. All of the
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sprinklers had an activation temperature of 74°C. The only smoke detector in the
entire lobby is a photoelectric detector on the second floor, ~6 feet from the
northernmost wall. As the three doors in the upstairs lobby are all held open by a
magnet which disengages when the fire alarm activates, all three doors closed one
second after the single smoke detector activated.

Figure #46: View of the book fair in the south end of the lobby

Figure #47: Overview of the book fair in the lobby facing southwest - Pyrosim
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Figure #48: The book fair in the northern portion of the lobby and the open air walkway

Figure #49: Overview of the book fair in the lobby facing north (south wall invisible) –
Pyrosim. At the right and top of the photo: the stairs, open air walkway, and the door to the
dead end hallway can be seen.
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To define the smoke and carbon monoxide production in these simulations, values of 0.02
(2%) were selected for both the CO yield and the soot yield. As exact data was not available
for any of the fuels, values were estimated and held constant through all four fire scenarios.
These values may be conservative for some scenarios, and not for others.

Results
Scenario #1
The fire in the cafeteria grew following a medium speed t2 fire growth curve. It reached a
maximum HRR of 300kW at 160 seconds into the simulation.
All six of the sprinklers in the cafeteria activated, and one of the three sprinklers in the
north hallway activated. The first two sprinklers in the cafeteria activated at 107.4 seconds
into the model. The first two sprinklers were the north-west and north-center sprinklers.
The last sprinkler in the cafeteria activated at 117.0 seconds. The only sprinkler in the
north hallway activated at 147.6 seconds. The simulation was stopped at 162.6 seconds
after the burner reached the maximum HRR.
Table #21: Cafeteria Sprinkler Activation Times and Locations
Sprinkler Name
Activation Time (s)
Location
Cafeteria #1
112.8
South-West
Cafeteria #2
111.6
South-Center
Cafeteria #3
116.4
South-East
Cafeteria #4
107.4
North-West
Cafeteria #5
107.4
North-Center
Cafeteria #6
117.0
North-East
North Hallway #1
147.6
Southern
North Hallway #2
N/A
Center
North Hallway #3
N/A
Northern
The maximum occupancy of the cafeteria is 60 people. According to the movement time
calculations in APPENDIX C, the time it would take the occupants of the cafeteria to escape
to safety was 122 seconds once they started their evacuation. The discovery time (td) in
this scenario had to be estimated because there is no smoke detector in the cafeteria or
northern hallway. The simulation was played in Smokeview and an estimate of 30 seconds
was chosen based on when the smoke had traveled south across the ceiling and reached
the southern wall of the cafeteria. By that time, everyone in the small cafeteria would be in
a position to see/smell the smoke and potentially see the flames. This value would likely be
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less than 30 seconds as there is usually an employee working behind the serving counter
who would be within a few feet of the ignition source. Once they discovered the fire, they’d
likely yell to everyone else warning them of the fire.
Once the occupants in the cafeteria are alerted to the fire, the pre-movement time (tpre)
portion of the evacuation begins. As the occupants in the cafeteria would be able to
see/smell the smoke and potentially see the fire, the recognition time (time it takes to
understand evacuation is needed) would be instantaneous. Occupants in the cafeteria
would likely be a mix of staff and the public. The staff would have a majority (if not all) of
their belongings at their desk and not with them in the cafeteria. The public might have a
few items with them but would likely keep those items close by. Therefore, the response
time (time it would take someone to start evacuating after they realized a need to do so)
was estimated at 10 seconds.
With a discovery time of 30 seconds, a pre-movement time of 10 seconds, and a movement
time of 122 seconds, the evacuation time would be 162 seconds. With a safety factor of 1.5,
the total RSET (Required Safe Egress Time) value is 243 seconds.
Because of the tall ceilings and large size of the lobby (~23 feet tall, 72 feet wide), once the
occupants passed through the doorway from the cafeteria into the lobby, they would be out
of the smoke layer and would be in tenable conditions for the remaining portion of the
evacuation. All 60 people would have passed through the door into the lobby by 126
seconds (not counting the safety factor).
As this is a simulation of a worst-case scenario, the maximum occupancy value of 60 people
was used. However, after several visits to the location, the normal day-to-day occupancy
would be less than 10 people. If that occupancy value was used, RSET would be 113
seconds, and the time it would take to reach the lobby would be 64 seconds. The RSET
would still be larger than the ASET, but occupants could reach the lobby before conditions
became untenable.
Slice files at Z=1.8m (6 feet) and detectors near the doorways into the lobby and north
hallway were used to determine when the conditions were no longer tenable (based on the
criteria mentioned above). Table 22 below lists when/if conditions became untenable
based on the four factors listed above.
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Table #22: Cafeteria Tenability Criteria Factor Times
Tenability Criteria Factor
Visibility Temperature Carbon Monoxide Radiant Heat Flux
Location
(< 8m)
(> 1,350 ppm-min)
(> 2.5kW/m2)
(> 100°C)
Exit to Lobby
102.0 sec
106.8 sec
N/A
154.8 sec
Exit to North Hallway 105.6 sec
111.0 sec
N/A
N/A
ASET Pass/Fail
Fail
Fail
Pass
Pass*
*The radiant heat flux exceeded the threshold only after the occupants had escaped the
cafeteria and were passing through the exterior doors of the lobby.
Based on the values in the table above, conditions became untenable due to visibility and
temperature before the first sprinklers activated (107.4 sec). Due to conditions becoming
untenable, thereby marking an end to the ASET, RSET (243 sec) values are greater than the
ASET values (102 sec).

Figure #50: Cafeteria Fire - Visibility slice file at Z=1.8 facing northwest in Smokeview (102s)
Tenability failure at southeast exit. Black indicates visibility threshold.
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Figure #51: Cafeteria Fire - Visibility slice file at east side of room facing east (102 sec)

Figure #52: Cafeteria Fire – Temperature slice file at Z=1.8 facing northwest (106.8 sec)
Tenability failure at southeast exit. Black indicates temperature threshold.
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Figure #53: Cafeteria Fire - Temperature slice file at east side of room facing east (107.4 sec)

Figure #54: Cafeteria Fire – Visible smoke/fire detection (30.0 sec)

Fire Protection & Life Safety Analysis – Eric W. Rood Administration Center

91

Figure #55: Cafeteria Fire – First sprinklers activate (107.4 sec)

Figure #56: Cafeteria Fire – Smoke & Fire when the first sprinklers activate (107.4 sec)
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Figure #57: Cafeteria Fire – Smoke & Fire when first sprinklers activate facing north (107.4s)
(South wall invisible)

Due to the fact that HRR, fire growth, soot yield, and CO yield values were estimated, actual
results may be slightly different. Examining the graph of Total HRR vs. Time below, the
HRR values did drop slightly when the sprinklers were activated. However, in the
simulation, the burner’s fire ramp was not modified to simulate activation of sprinklers.
These facts may extend the ASET value slightly, however it is unlikely that there will be
more time available for egress (ASET) than what is required (RSET).
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Figure #58: Cafeteria Fire - Total HRR v Time Graph

Fire Protection & Life Safety Analysis – Eric W. Rood Administration Center

93

Scenario #2
The fire in the second floor northern hallway grew following a fast speed t2 fire growth
curve. It was designed to reach a maximum HRR of 600kW at 114 seconds into the
simulation. However, due to the proximity of the sprinklers to the fire origin, the fire
growth was halted when the second sprinkler activated at 90.0 seconds.
All three of the sprinklers in the small common area at the south end of the hallway
activated. Neither of the two sprinklers in the northern portion of the hallway activated.
Unlike the other three scenarios, the sprinklers in the second floor northern hallway are a
different brand (Viking) and have a lower activation temperature of 68°C. The table below
lists activation times of the sprinklers. The simulation was stopped at 200.4 seconds when
the conditions in the hallway/office had plateaued.
Table #23: Second Floor Hallway Sprinkler Activation Times and Locations
Sprinkler Name
Activation Time (s)
Location
North Hall #1
76.2
Eastern Common Area
North Hall #2
90.0
Western Common Area
North Hall #3
97.8
Northern Common Area
North Hall #4
N/A
South in the Hallway
North Hall #5
N/A
North in the Hallway
The maximum occupancy of the second floor northern hallway is 102 people. According to
the movement time calculations in APPENDIX C, the time it would take the occupants of the
second floor hallway (“LAFCo, Grand Jury & Conference Rooms”) to escape to safety was
293 seconds once they started their evacuation. The discovery time (td) in this scenario
was the time it took the smoke detector in the hallway to activate. That time was 9.0
seconds. Once the smoke detector activates, it triggers the building’s fire alarm system
immediately notifying everyone in the building.
Once the occupants in the second floor hallway and adjoining rooms are alerted to the fire,
the pre-movement time (tpre) portion of the evacuation begins. Unlike the first scenario in
the cafeteria, most of the occupants in the area of the second floor north hallway would not
be able to see the smoke or fire by the time the fire alarm triggers. Therefore, the
recognition time would be higher as it would take people time to realize the alarms are
indicating there is a fire in the building. The department is composed primarily of staff, but
there would be people in the Grand Jury room and potentially the conference rooms who
are not familiar with the fire alarm system. Therefore, the recognition time was estimated
to be 30 seconds. The response time of the occupants could vary greatly though. For people
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in the conference rooms or LAFCo offices, it might take only 30 seconds for them to
respond, but for people in the Grand Jury room, it could take significantly longer if they try
to finish a portion of testimony before exiting or try to pack all their belongings before
leaving. Because of the large variance, two estimates will be used for the pre-movement
times (recognition time plus response time), 60 seconds and 240 seconds.
With a discovery time of 9 seconds, a pre-movement time of 60/240 seconds, and a
movement time of 293 seconds, the evacuation time would be 362/542 seconds. With a
safety factor of 1.5, the total RSET (Required Safe Egress Time) value is 543/813 seconds
which is equivalent to ~9/13.5 mins.
Because of the three sprinklers directly above the fire in the small common area, and the
large solid-core wooden door that closes automatically, once the occupants could reach the
second floor lobby, tenability conditions would drastically improve. Occupants could be
completely out of the north hallway and into the lobby by 262/442 seconds, 100 seconds
before they could exit the building. That does not take into account the opening of the door
while the occupants would be exiting.
Slice files at Z=1.8m (6 feet) above the floor and detectors near the LAFCo office, Grand
Jury, and the exit doorways were used to determine when the conditions were no longer
tenable (based on the criteria mentioned above). Table 24 below lists when/if conditions
became untenable based on the four factors listed above.
Table #24: 2nd Floor Hallway Tenability Criteria Factor Times
Tenability Criteria Factor
Visibility Temperature
Carbon Monoxide
Radiant Heat Flux
Location
(< 8m)
(> 1,350 ppm-min)
(> 2.5kW/m2)
(> 100°C)
LAFCo Door
79.2 sec
N/A
N/A
N/A
Grand Jury Door
74.4 sec
N/A
N/A
N/A
Exit Door to Lobby
76.2 sec
N/A
N/A
N/A
ASET Pass/Fail
Fail
Pass
Pass
Pass
*The simulation was stopped at 200.4 seconds when conditions began to plateau. Because the
egress times, were longer than 200 seconds, trends were analyzed to determine if any of the
thresholds (other than visibility) would be exceeded.
Based on the values in the table above, conditions became untenable due to visibility at
74.4 seconds in the center of the hallway. The first sprinklers didn’t activate till 76.2 sec.
Due to conditions becoming untenable, thereby marking an end to the ASET, RSET values
are greater than the ASET values.
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Figure #59: 2nd Floor Hall Fire - Visibility slice file at Z=1.8 facing east in Smokeview (74.4s)
Tenability failure at Grand Jury doorway. Black indicates visibility threshold.

Figure #60: 2nd Floor Hall Fire – Smoke & fire facing east in Smokeview (74.4 sec)
Fire Protection & Life Safety Analysis – Eric W. Rood Administration Center

96

Figure #61: 2nd Floor Hall Fire – Smoke & fire facing south into the hallway from the LAFCo
office doorway at the time of smoke detector activation (9.0 sec)

Figure #62: 2nd Floor Hall Fire – Smoke & fire facing south into the hallway from the LAFCo
office doorway at the time of visibility tenability failure at Grand Jury doorway (74.4 sec)
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Figure #63: 2nd Floor Hall Fire – Last sprinkler activation facing east (97.8 sec)

Figure #64: 2nd Floor Hall Fire – Smoke & fire facing southeast in the common area when the
last sprinkler activated (97.8 sec)
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Due to the fact that HRR, fire growth, soot yield, and CO yield values were estimated, actual
results may be slightly different. That may extend the ASET value slightly, however it is
unlikely that there will be more time available for egress (ASET) than what is required
(RSET) due to long egress times and the visibility conditions failing so early in the fire.
With the current configuration, if the occupants can’t exit the hallway in less than 74
seconds after detection, then they would be forced to either enter the hallway under
untenable conditions, or retreat to the rooms/offices they started in and wait for the fire
department to come rescue them. As there is no other way out of any of these rooms, the
occupants would be trapped. In the simulation, the sprinklers maintained tenable
conditions with the exception of visibility. If the other fuel packages would have ignited,
(two plastic recycle containers and a foam chair) it is possible that the sprinklers could
have been overwhelmed if the fire grew quickly in the early stages prior to the activation of
the sprinklers. If that occurs, then the occupants would in danger of smoke leaking into the
rooms and the fire spreading above them while they wait for the fire department to arrive.
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Figure #65: 2nd Floor Hallway Fire - Total HRR v Time Graph
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Scenario #3
There are three fires (burners) in the first floor western corridor scenario. All three grew at
a pace slightly slower a fast speed t2 fire growth curve. The growth rates were based upon
test data from burns of HDPE (high-density polyethylene) plastic at NIST and Western Fire
Center. The first burner reached a maximum HRR of 2400kW at 250 seconds. The second
burner didn’t ignite until 60 seconds into the scenario but reached a maximum HRR of
2100kW in 240 seconds. The third burner also didn’t ignite until 60 seconds into the
scenario but reached a maximum HRR of 800kW in 150 seconds. Due to the large amount
of fuel present, it was hypothesized that the fire would overwhelm the sprinklers, so the
fire ramps were not adjusted to simulate the sprinklers having an effect.
17 of the 20 sprinklers in the western corridor activated, and the one in the portion of the
northern corridor that was modeled did not activate. Of the three sprinklers that did not
activate, one was at the easternmost end of the corridor, and the other two were at the
westernmost end of the corridor. All of the sprinklers have an activation temperature of
74°C. The table below lists activation times of the sprinklers. The simulation was stopped
at 240.0 seconds when the conditions in the corridor had plateaued.
Table #25: First Floor Hallway Sprinkler Activation Times
Sprinkler Name
Activation Time (s)
West Hall #1 *
N/A
West Hall #2
154.8
West Hall #3
138.0
West Hall #4
105.6
West Hall #5
55.8
West Hall #6
40.2
West Hall #7
76.8
West Hall #8
56.4
West Hall #9
72.0
West Hall #10
96.6
West Hall #11
88.2
West Hall #12
97.2
West Hall #13
111.6
West Hall #14
117.0
West Hall #15
126.0
West Hall #16
135.6
West Hall #17
133.2
West Hall #18
156.6
West Hall #19
N/A
West Hall #20 **
N/A
North Hall #1
N/A
* Easternmost Sprinkler
** Westernmost Sprinkler
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As the location of this fire was in a corridor, there was no maximum occupancy associated
with the space. However, two departments have to enter the first floor western corridor to
exit the building (in different directions) so the occupancies of both departments will be
discussed separately.
The first department required to enter the western corridor is the Child Support Services
(CSS). Their primary evacuation route would take them from the east end of the corridor
westward, and then north into the northern corridor. This fire scenario will change their
evacuation route, but they’ll still need to enter the western corridor before heading east
into the CDA waiting area and out the front of the building.
The maximum occupancy of the CSS department is 38 people. According to the movement
time calculations in APPENDIX C, the time it would take the occupants to escape to safety
via their secondary evacuation route was 152 seconds once they started their evacuation.
The discovery time (td) in this scenario was the time it took a smoke detector in the hallway
to activate. That time was 6.0 seconds. Once the smoke detector activates, it triggers the
building’s fire alarm system immediately notifying everyone in the building.
Once the occupants in the CSS department are alerted to the fire, the pre-movement time
(tpre) portion of the evacuation begins. The occupants would not be able to see the smoke or
fire by the time the fire alarm triggers, therefore, there would be a recognition time as
people realize they need to evacuate. The recognition time was estimated to be 15 seconds
as the department is composed entirely of staff who are trained to recognize the alarm.
Once alerted to the fire, the response time would be fairly low as everyone is trained to
evacuate. The response time was estimated to be 15 seconds for the same reasons just
mentioned.
With a discovery time of 6 seconds, a pre-movement time of 30 seconds, and a movement
time of 152 seconds, the evacuation time would be 188 seconds. With a safety factor of 1.5,
the total RSET (Required Safe Egress Time) value is 282 seconds.
Like previous scenarios, once out of the corridor where the fire is located, the occupants
would reach an area where tenability conditions would drastically improve and they would
no longer be in immediate danger. Occupants could exit the western corridor via the
eastern door into the CDA waiting area within 137 seconds; 53 seconds before exiting the
building. At that time, both visibility and temperature levels would have been considered
untenable.
The second department required to enter the western corridor is the Information &
General Services (IGS). Their primary evacuation route would take them from the west end
of the corridor westward to the western stairwell. This fire scenario will not change their
evacuation route as there is not another option, but the occupants will be exposed to the
smoke and heat from the fire
The maximum occupancy of the IGS department is 107 people. According to the movement
time calculations in APPENDIX C, the time it would take the occupants to escape to safety
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via their primary evacuation route was 204 seconds once they started their evacuation. The
discovery time (td) in this scenario was the same as above, 6.0 seconds. Once the smoke
detector activates, it triggers the building’s fire alarm system immediately notifying
everyone in the building.
Once the occupants in the IGS department are alerted to the fire, the pre-movement time
(tpre) portion of the evacuation begins. For the same reasons as the CSS department, the
recognition time and the response time were estimated to be 15 seconds each
With a discovery time of 6 seconds, a pre-movement time of 30 seconds, and a movement
time of 204 seconds, the evacuation time would be 240 seconds. With a safety factor of 1.5,
the total RSET (Required Safe Egress Time) value is 360 seconds.
Slice files at Z=1.8m (6 feet) above the floor were used to determine when the conditions
were no longer tenable (based on the criteria mentioned above). Table 26 below lists
when/if conditions became untenable based on the four factors listed above.
Table #26: 1st Floor Corridor Tenability Criteria Factor Times
Tenability Criteria Factor
Visibility Temperature
Carbon Monoxide
Radiant Heat Flux
Location
(< 8m)
(> 1,350 ppm-min)
(> 2.5kW/m2)
(> 100°C)
Western End
118.2 sec
135.6 sec
N/A
N/A
Central/Origin
70.2 sec
87.6 sec
N/A
72.0 sec
Eastern End
94.8 sec
128.4 sec
N/A
N/A
ASET Pass/Fail
Fail
Fail
Pass
Fail
*The simulation was stopped at 240.0 seconds when conditions began to plateau. Because the
RSET value is larger than 240 seconds, trends were analyzed to determine if the carbon
monoxide threshold would be exceeded.
Based on the values in the table above, conditions first became untenable due to visibility
at 70.2 seconds in the center of the hallway. The first sprinklers activated at 40.2 sec. By the
time conditions became untenable three sprinklers had already activated. Due to
conditions becoming untenable, thereby marking an end to the ASET, RSET values are
greater than the ASET values.
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Figure #66: 1st Floor Hall Fire - Visibility slice file at Z=1.8 facing north in Smokeview (70.2s)
Tenability failure at the origin. Black indicates visibility threshold.

Figure #67: 1st Floor Hall Fire – Smoke/fire at the origin when visibility fails (70.2 sec)
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Figure #68: 1st Floor Hall Fire - Visibility slice file at Z=1.8. (94.8 sec)
Tenability failure at east end of hallway. Black indicates visibility threshold.

Figure #69: 1st Floor Hall Fire - Smoke/fire overview when visibility fails at the east end of the
hallway (94.8 sec)
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Figure #70: 1st Floor Hall Fire - Smoke/fire interior view from the east end of the hallway
looking west towards the origin just after the smoke detector activated. (7.2 sec)

Figure #71: 1st Floor Hall Fire - Smoke/fire interior view from the east end of the hallway
looking west towards the origin when tenability fails. (94.8 sec)
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Figure #72: 1st Floor Hall Fire - Visibility slice file at Z=1.8. (118.2 sec)
Tenability failure at west end of hallway (and throughout)

Figure #73: 1st Floor Hall Fire - Smoke/fire overview when visibility fails at the west end of the
hallway (118.2 sec)
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Figure #74: 1st Floor Hall Fire - Temperature slice file at Z=1.8. (127.8 sec)
Tenability failure at east end of hallway. Black indicates temperature threshold.

Figure #75: 1st Floor Hall Fire - Temperature slice file at Z=1.8. (135.6 sec)
Tenability failure at west end of hallway
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Figure #76: 1st Floor Hall Fire – Smoke/fire at the origin when 1st sprinkler activates (40.2s)

Figure #77: 1st Floor Hall Fire – First sprinkler activation (at the origin) (40.2 sec)
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Figure #78: 1st Floor Hall Fire – Temp slice (looking east) through the first burner when the
first sprinkler activates (40.2 sec). Vertical rise at ceiling level is through an HVAC vent.

Figure #79: 1st Floor Hall Fire – Boundary Heat Flux looking east at the origin threshold is
reached (72.0 sec). Black indicates the threshold value.
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Due to the fact that HRR, fire growth, soot yield, and CO yield values were estimated, actual
results may be slightly different. That may extend the ASET value slightly, however it is
unlikely that there will be more time available for egress (ASET) than what is required
(RSET) due to long egress times and the visibility conditions failing so early in the fire.
With the current configuration of the recycle/trash containers in the exit corridors, this fire
scenario blocks one exit forcing three departments to use secondary exit routes, and two
departments to be exposed to the effects of the fire, and untenable conditions for a portion
of their evacuation. This setup contained three recycle containers, one trash can, and two
soda vending machines. During one visit, as many as nine recycle containers and two trash
cans were arranged next to each other in the exit corridors. This amount of fuel can
overwhelm the sprinkler systems. In the fire models, the ceilings were modeled as gypsum
wall board, but in reality, they’re constructed of acoustic ceiling tiles on a metal T-bar
frame. As seen in the HRR graph below, the total HRR from this fire exceeded 9,000kW
which could potentially cause the ceiling to collapse above the fire, allowing the fire to
spread into other areas.
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Figure #80: 1st Floor Hallway Fire - Total HRR v Time Graph
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Scenario #4
There are two fires (burners) in the lobby fire scenario. Both grew following an ultra-fast
speed t2 fire growth curve. Both burners ignited at the same time and reached a maximum
HRR of 80kW each at 20 seconds. Due to the large amount of fuel present, and the presence
of dry-pipe sprinklers above the fire, the fire ramps were not adjusted to simulate the
sprinklers having an effect on the fire.
All 13 of the dry-pipe sprinklers in the lobby activated, along with all 17 of the wet-pipe
sprinklers on the second floor ceiling, and the two underneath the open air walkway. Both
the wet-pipe and the dry-pipe sprinkler heads had an activation temperature of 74°C. One
sprinkler was placed in the second floor north hallway as a comparison. That sprinkler was
a Viking brand with an activation temperature of 68°C, and it never activated. The table
below lists activation times of the sprinklers. The simulation was stopped at 270 seconds
when the conditions in the lobby had plateaued.
Table #27: Lobby Sprinkler Activation Times
Sprinkler Name
Activation Time (s)
Dry Pipe East Lobby #1
93.0
Dry Pipe East Lobby #2
91.8
Dry Pipe East Lobby #3
99.6
Dry Pipe West Lobby #1
94.2
Dry Pipe West Lobby #2
93.0
Dry Pipe West Lobby #3
100.8
Dry Pipe West Lobby #4
96.0
Dry Pipe Center Lobby #1
82.8
Dry Pipe Center Lobby #2
84.6
Dry Pipe Center Lobby #3
78.6
Dry Pipe Center Lobby #4
81.0
Dry Pipe Center Lobby #5
79.8
Dry Pipe Center Lobby #6
84.6
Second Floor Lobby #1
109.2
Second Floor Lobby #2
112.8
Second Floor Lobby #3
101.4
Second Floor Lobby #4
104.4
Second Floor Lobby #5
97.8
Second Floor Lobby #6
101.4
Second Floor Lobby #7
94.8
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Second Floor Lobby #8
Second Floor Lobby #9
Second Floor Lobby #10
Second Floor Lobby #11
Second Floor Lobby #12
Second Floor Lobby #13
Second Floor Lobby #14
Second Floor Lobby #15
Second Floor Lobby #16
Second Floor Lobby #17
Under Open Air Walkway #1
Under Open Air Walkway #2
Viking Second Floor Hall #1

95.4
111.0
92.4
92.4
90.6
94.2
92.4
92.4
93.0
116.4
106.8
106.8
N/A

The maximum occupancy of the lobby is 25 people. According to the movement time
calculations in APPENDIX C, the time it would take the occupants of the lobby to escape to
safety was a maximum of 34 seconds once they started their evacuation. Like the first
scenario, discovery time (td) in this scenario had to be estimated because the only smoke
detector was approximately 90 feet away from the fire. With this scenario, there is a book
fair in the lobby which would have an attendant present at all times. If the fires were
ignited, an attendant would realize fairly quickly. That person would likely yell out and
alert others in the lobby, but they might not activate a pull station (located on the west side
of the lobby near the cafeteria door entrance) because either they don’t know where one is,
or they choose to just yell out, evacuate, and call 911. If the BOS Chambers were occupied,
then it is likely that someone in the lobby (possibly the book fair attendant) would know
people were in the room and bang on the glass walls that separate the BOS Chambers from
the lobby alerting the occupants to the fire. Therefore, the discovery time for the lobby and
BOS Chambers will be estimated at 30 seconds. The discovery time for the rest of the
building will be when the smoke detector at the north end of the lobby activates.
The recognition time for the occupants of the lobby would be near instantaneous, for the
BOS Chambers it would be a bit longer, and for the rest of the building, even longer (once
the alarm was triggered). Therefore, the recognition time for the lobby is estimated at 0
seconds, the BOS Chambers at 15 seconds, and the rest of the building at 30 seconds.
Once the occupants in the lobby and BOS Chambers are alerted to the fire, the premovement time (tpre) portion of the evacuation begins. Similar to the first scenario in the
cafeteria, most of the occupants in the area of the lobby would be able to see the smoke or
fire. As the occupants of the lobby would likely be passing through, or browsing the book
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fair, they would already have their items on their person. Therefore, the response time for
the lobby was estimated at 10 seconds. If the BOS Chambers are occupied, then their
response time would be longer as they could have belongings around their chairs that they
would have to gather, therefore their response time is estimated at 30 seconds.

Location
Lobby
BOS Chambers
Rest of
Building

Table #28: Lobby Scenario Pre-Movement Times
Pre-Movement Time
Discovery Time
Recognition
Response Time
Time
30 sec
0 sec
10 sec
30 sec
15 sec
30 sec
Activation of
30 sec
30 sec
Detector
(72 sec)

Total Time
40 sec
75 sec
132 sec

The movement times for both the lobby and the BOS Chambers utilize the two exits at the
front of the lobby. The movement time for the lobby is 34 seconds and for the BOS
Chambers is 62 seconds. If those values are added to those in the table above, and
multiplied by a safety factor of 1.5, the RSET for the lobby is 111 seconds, and the RSET for
the BOS Chambers is 206 seconds.
Slice files at Z=1.8m and Z=6.2m (6 feet above the first and second floors) and detectors at
the BOS Chambers south exit, BOS Chambers east exit, under the Open Air Walkway, at the
top of the stairwell, and at the northern portion of the second floor were used to determine
when the conditions were no longer tenable (based on the criteria mentioned above).
Table 29 below lists when/if conditions became untenable based on the four factors listed
above.
Table #29: Lobby Tenability Criteria Factor Times
Tenability Criteria Factor
Visibility Temperature
Carbon Monoxide
Radiant Heat Flux
Location
(< 8m)
(> 1,350 ppm-min)
(> 2.5kW/m2)
(> 100°C)
South BOS Chambers Exit 84.6 sec
93.6 sec
N/A
99.0 sec
East BOS Chambers Exit
94.8 sec
100.2 sec
N/A
115.2 sec
Under Open Air Walkway 94.2 sec
100.2 sec
N/A
N/A
Top of Stairwell
77.4 sec
84.6 sec
N/A
91.8 sec
nd
North of 2 Floor Lobby
87.6 sec
96.0 sec
N/A
N/A
ASET Pass/Fail
Fail
Fail
Pass
Fail
*The simulation was stopped at 270 seconds when conditions began to plateau.
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Based on the values in the table above, conditions became untenable due to visibility at
77.4 seconds on the second floor at the top of the stairwell, and at 84.6 seconds on the first
floor near the BOS Chambers southern exit. The first dry-pipe sprinklers activated at 79.2
sec but due to a 60 second delay, didn’t flow water until 139.2 sec. The first wet-pipe
sprinklers (located on the second floor ceiling) activated at 90.6 seconds.
Without the safety factors included, the evacuation times for the lobby were below the
ASET times. Therefore, it is possible that everyone in the lobby would be able to get out of
the building using the front exit. More than likely though, some of the occupants would
retreat away from the fire to the north and try to find another exit. In that case, the lobby
occupants would have a similar evacuation time to the north of ~70 seconds before they
enter the CDA Waiting Area which would have tenable conditions.
The BOS Chambers have an evacuation time of 137 seconds without the safety factor, so it
is possible that some quick reacting people could get out through the front doors of the
lobby. The rest of the occupants would have to exit to the east out of the chambers, then to
the north out of the lobby. Assuming that 20% of the occupants were able to make it out of
the lobby, that would leave an occupancy of 108 people remaining. For 108 people exiting
out of one set of double doors at the east end of the BOS Chambers, then progressing north
through the lobby through another set of double doors and into the CDA Waiting area,
would take ~74 seconds of movement time. Add that to the pre-movement and detection
time of 75 seconds, and the egress time would be 149 seconds till they reached tenable
conditions in another portion of the building. (With a 1.5 safety factor, that value increases
to 224 seconds.) The visibility conditions for the first floor becomes untenable in the
northern portion of the lobby (in the BOS Chambers occupant’s egress pathway) at 93.0
seconds; before they all could make it into the CDA Waiting Area. The temperature
conditions become untenable in the same location at approximately 95.4 seconds. Heat flux
conditions would become untenable in the same location at approximately 100.8 seconds.
For a total egress and RSET value from the building, the occupants would have to travel
west out of the CDA Waiting Area into the western corridor, then north through the
northern corridor. That would add 171 seconds to the egress time for a total egress time of
320 seconds, or an RSET value (with safety factor) of 480 seconds.
Another issue would be the smoke generation due to the height of the lobby ceiling. The
smoke reaches the north end of the second floor lobby and activates the smoke detector at
72.6 seconds. Immediately the fire alarm system activates and one second later, the three
doors in the second floor lobby close. The occupants in the east and west corridors on the
second floor would most likely proceed with their normal evacuation routes and try and
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enter the second floor lobby. When they saw the smoke, they would turn around and exit
the stairwells on either side of the building. The occupants in the dead end hallway where
the LAFCo offices and the Grand Jury room are located, would open the door to the second
floor lobby and discover the smoke, but be unable to turn around and find another egress
route. Those occupants would have to travel into the second floor lobby, and then into
either the western or eastern corridors.
At a maximum occupancy of 102 people, it would take them between 266 and 446 seconds
to completely evacuate into either the west or east corridor where conditions would be
tenable. The difference would be based upon whether the pre-movement time was 60
seconds, or 240 seconds as mentioned in Scenario #2. The visibility and temperature
conditions become untenable at the second floor lobby within 87.6 and 96.0 seconds
respectively. The occupants of the dead end hallway could not reach the door to the second
floor lobby by that time. They would be trapped and forced to retreat and wait for fire
department personnel.

Figure #81: Lobby Fire - Visibility slice file at Z=6.2 looking down from above (77.4 sec)
Tenability failure at the top of the stairs. Black indicates visibility threshold.
Top of the image is north
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Figure #82: Lobby Fire - Visibility slice file at Z=1.8 looking down from above (84.6 sec)
Tenability failure at the south of BOS Chambers. Black indicates visibility threshold.

Figure #83: Lobby Fire - Temperature slice file at Z=6.2 (84.6 sec)
Tenability failure at the top of the stairs. Black indicates visibility threshold.
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Figure #84: Lobby Fire - Temperature slice file at Z=1.8 (93.6 sec)
Tenability failure at the south BOS Chambers. Black indicates visibility threshold.

Figure #85: Lobby Fire – Smoke/Fire looking north (27.0 sec)
Approximate fire discovery time
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Figure #86: Lobby Fire – Smoke/Fire looking south inside the lobby (30.0 sec)
Approximate fire discovery time

Figure #87: Lobby Fire – Smoke/Fire looking north (72.6sec)
Activation time of the smoke detector
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Figure #88: Lobby Fire – Smoke/Fire looking down from above (72.6sec)
Activation time of the smoke detector

Figure #89: Lobby Fire – Fire only looking north (79.2 sec)
Activation time of the first dry-pipe sprinkler
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Figure #90: Lobby Fire – Activation of the first dry-pipe sprinklers looking north. (139.8 sec)

Figure #91: Lobby Fire – Fire only looking north (90.6 sec). Activation time of the first wetpipe sprinkler. Fire has climbed the wall and spread across the ceiling
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Figure #92: Lobby Fire – Activation of the first wet-pipe sprinkler. (91.8 sec)

Figure #93: Lobby Fire – Activation of the closest wet-pipe sprinklers to the origin (94.8 sec)
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Figure #94: Lobby Fire – Smoke only – 2nd Floor looking south from dead end hallway (27.0s)
Visible fire detection in the lobby

Figure #95: Lobby Fire – Smoke only – 2nd Floor looking south from dead end hallway (72.6s)
Activation of the smoke detector directly above this location

Figure #96: Lobby Fire – Smoke only – 2nd Floor looking south from dead end hallway (87.6s)
Visibility tenability failed in second floor lobby (15 seconds after detection)
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Figure #97: Lobby Fire – Visibility Slice at Z=1.8 looking top down 10 sec before the people
can exit out the front doors without the safety factor (62.4 sec)

Figure #98: Lobby Fire – Smoke/Fire looking south inside the lobby 10 sec before the people
can exit out the front doors without the safety factor (62.4 sec)
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Figure #99: Lobby Fire – Visibility Slice at Z=1.8 looking northwest toward the east exit door
from the BOS Chambers. Visibility tenability in the north lobby fails (93.0 sec)
(East wall of the north lobby invisible)
Due to the fact that HRR, fire growth, soot yield, and CO yield values were estimated, actual
results may be slightly different. That may extend the ASET value slightly, however it is
unlikely that there will be more time available for egress (ASET) than what is required
(RSET) due to conditions becoming untenable so early in the fire.
Below is a graph of the Total HRR v. Time for the Lobby Fire showing a peak HRR close to
90,000kW around 100 seconds as the fire spread up the wooden walls of the lobby and
across the wooden ceiling.
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Lobby Fire - Total HRR v. Time
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Figure #100: Lobby Fire - Total HRR v Time Graph

ASET v. RSET
The performance based analyses were conducted to determine if the building’s fire
protection system could provide the occupants enough time to evacuate to safety in four
different fire scenarios. The original RSET values were calculated for the departments
affected by the fire scenarios. If the occupants in a department had to alter their evacuation
route, a modified RSET value was calculated. The fire models were analyzed and the ASET
values were determined when conditions either first became untenable, or when all the
occupants had exited the building; whichever came first. The following table shows the
RSET values compared with the ASET values. Every fire scenario that was designed caused
conditions to become untenable before people could evacuate the building. In some
situations, conditions became untenable several minutes before evacuations were
complete.
The last column in the table is present to act strictly as a comparison to show how quickly
the conditions become untenable. The data shows the time it would take the occupants
affected to evacuate into another room/corridor/area where conditions would be tenable
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and they could then proceed with their evacuation. Escaping into another room with
tenable conditions does not signal an evacuation or that ASET is complete. These values did
not include the safety factor of 1.5 that the RSET values did. None the less, there was only
one scenario where the occupants of a department were able to get out of the building
before conditions became untenable.
The occupants in the lobby had the advantage of quick discovery and pre-movement times,
low occupancy, and large exit discharge capabilities. As the occupants would have to exit on
either side of a rapidly growing fire, it is possible that some of the occupants in that
department would have retreated and found another exit.
Table #30: ASET v. RSET Comparison
Scenario

Location

1

Cafeteria Fire

243 sec

N/A

2

Second Floor North
Hallway Fire

543/813 sec

N/A

CSS Dept.

309 sec

282 sec

IGS Dept.

360 sec

N/A

118.2 sec

Fail

Lobby

111 sec

N/A

84.6 sec

Fail

BOS

206 sec

480 sec

93.0 sec

Fail

2nd Floor
North Hall

543/813 sec

N/A

87.6 sec

Fail

3

4

First Floor
West
Corridor
Fire

Lobby Fire

Modified
RSET

Evacuate to
ASET
Pass/Fail
Tenable
Conditions*
126 sec
102.0 sec
Fail
Fail
262/442 sec
74.4 sec
Fail
Fail
137 sec
94.8 sec
Fail
Fail

Original
RSET

N/A
62 sec
PASS
149 sec
Fail
266/446 sec
Fail

*Without safety margin of 1.5
While none of the scenarios had an ASET value that surpassed RSET values, these are
representations of worst-case scenarios. Normal day-to-day operations could result in
different outcomes, but the fire protection system needs to be judged based off of the worst
that could happen. These results are indications that improvements need to be made.
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Figure #101: ASET & RSET breakdown (SFPE Handbook 4th Ed.)

Comments & Recommendations
The prescriptive and performance-based analyses of the Rood Center identified various
issues that might affect the occupant’s life safety. The four computer fire model scenarios
discussed above show that even with an automatic sprinkler system, maximum occupancy
loads will not have enough time to evacuate the building with tenable conditions intact.
The comments and recommendations discussed below could potentially decrease the
Required Safe Egress Times (RSET) and increase the Available Safe Egress Times (ASET),
allowing occupants more time to escape. Some of these are simple fixes, while others could
require significant alterations.

Alarm System
According to sections from the California Building Code and the Life Safety Code (NFPA
101), at minimum, a manual fire alarm system is required in the Rood Center. The fire
alarm system is required to notify occupants in the building to the existence of a fire both
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audibly, and visually. Because audible and visible notification is required, the installation,
location, placement, spacing, inspection, testing, and maintenance of the notification
appliances must follow the requirements put forth in NFPA 72.
The system that is currently in place in the Rood Center is lacking in both detection and
notification capabilities. According to NFPA 72, the CBC, and the LSC, the only smoke
detector required in building would need to be in the same room as the Main FACP; the rest
of the building is not required to have smoke detectors. While the code is vague, it is
interpreted in this report that if smoke detectors are installed in the building, then they
need to be installed in accordance with NFPA 72 requirements. If that is the case, then the
number of smoke detectors would need to be greatly increased throughout the building.
As mentioned above in the prescriptive based alarm section, there are currently 16 smoke
detectors on the first floor, and 23 on the second floor. Smoke detectors are not to exceed a
nominal spacing of 30 feet from one-another, and all points on the ceiling shall have a
detector within 21 feet. Based on the square footage of each floor, and each detector limited
to no more than a 900 ft2 coverage area, the first floor would require a minimum of 56
smoke detectors and the second floor would require a minimum of 58 smoke detectors. An
analysis would need to be done for each floor to determine if that number of smoke
detectors would satisfy the requirement of having a detector within 21 feet of every point
on the ceiling.
With an adequate number of detectors, the detection time of fires would greatly decrease.
In the cafeteria and lobby fires (scenarios #1 & #4), detection took 107 seconds and 73
seconds respectively. When compared with the other two scenarios, detection only took 9
seconds and 5 seconds. That additional time could be crucial to being able to evacuate
everyone safely with tenable conditions.
An analysis of the building’s notification system revealed that the current system is
substantially lacking. A quick glance through the list of notification appliances in the
building determined that there were appliances still in use that are not compatible with the
Fire Alarm Control Panel (FACP). The appliances that are compatible with the panel are
often installed in odd locations in the building, installed at the wrong heights, and are not in
enough quantities to properly notify all the building’s occupants.
When an alarm system technician from Gray Electric (who was conducting the semi-annual
test) was asked if they ever test/verify the audible (dBA) and visible (cd) levels from the
notification appliances, he stated that they don’t. He explained that they (Gray Electric)
don’t have the money, the equipment, or the training to do such tests. Further questions
were asked regarding whether or not the voltages at various notification appliances are
tested, and again the response was that they don’t do those types of tests. He stated that the
type of FACP that is installed can tell when a connected device isn’t working, and will send
out a trouble alarm. In reality, the FACP can tell when there is a connection error to a
device, but it can’t tell if a device is receiving enough power, if it is out of sync, or if it is
operating appropriately.
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During the same semi-annual test of the system, the testing procedures of the alarm
technician were witnessed and documented. The testing methods that were witnessed
were not up to the requirements set forth in NFPA 72. The technician began the test with a
can of smoke and a ~2-foot metal pipe (~1/2” diameter) in his hand. With someone ready
to press the silence button on the Main FACP, the technician walked through to the
planning department on the east end of the building. The technician walked underneath the
detector and sprayed the can of smoke up through the metal pipe aimed at the opening in
the detector. The technician then waited to see if the detector would activate, but it never
did. He tried spraying the can of smoke through the pipe a second time, and still no
activation. Instead of trying to determine why the detector wasn’t activating, he moved on
to try a pull station. After activating the pull station, the technician proceeded to test
another smoke detector in the same manner and this time it activated immediately. The
technician continued on testing pull stations and detectors.
On the first floor, the technician tested a total of 3 smoke detectors on the east end of the
building (only 1 activated), and 3 pull stations (all functioned properly). On the second
floor the technician tested only 1 smoke detector in the western corridor (no activation),
then 2 pull stations near the entrances to each stairwell (all functioned properly.
After the test was completed, the technician cleared the alarms from the panel, put it back
into the normal operating mode, and left the building. It is possible, but the technician
didn’t appear to document or notify anyone of the three smoke detectors that didn’t
activate. Overall the testing methods and procedures didn’t follow those listed in NFPA 72.
In NFPA 72 (2013), section 14.2.3.6 lists the qualifications and experience that service
personnel should have.
14.2.3.6* Service Personnel Qualifications and Experience. Service personnel
shall be qualified and experienced in accordance with the requirements of 10.5.3.
A.14.2.3.6 Service personnel should be able to do the following:
(1) Understand the requirements contained in NFPA 72, National Fire Alarm
and Signaling Code, and the fire alarm requirements contained in NFPA 70,
National Electrical Code
(2) Understand basic job site safety laws and requirements
(3) Apply troubleshooting techniques, and determine the cause of fire alarm
system trouble conditions
(4) Understand equipment specific requirements, such as programming,
application, and compatibility
(5) Read and interpret fire alarm system design documentation and
manufacturer’s inspection, testing, and maintenance guidelines
(6) Properly use tools and test equipment required for testing and
maintenance of fire alarm systems and their components
(7) Properly apply the test methods required by NFPA 72, National Fire
Alarm and Signaling Code
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In this case, it is highly recommended to have a qualified alarm service professional do a
thorough and proper analysis of the fire alarm system and all of the components connected
to it to verify any potential issues. Once that analysis is complete, and those issues have
been addressed, then the location, spacing, and placement of the notification appliances
and detectors should be reevaluated and compared with requirements set forth in NFPA
72. Lastly, the notification appliances and detectors should be updated to required
standards. If Gray Electric cannot inspect, monitor, maintain, and update the system to
industry standards, then another company who can should be contracted to do the work.
Sentinel Fire Equipment Company already services the secondary alarm system and
appears familiar with industry standards and requirements as they have met all of them
with regards to their work on the secondary system. It is unknown if they would be able to
handle the task of analyzing the entire building, or would want to, but they may be a good
option to start with.
While the fire alarm system and its components need to be tested and updated, and the
inspection, testing, maintenance and record keeping procedures need to be revised, the
Authority Having Jurisdiction (Nevada City Fire Department) needs to get involved in the
process and make sure everything is done according to the code and consequences are in
place for when those codes are not met and followed.
A fire alarm system intended for life safety should alert the building’s occupants and notify
emergency personnel as quickly as possible. Without a properly designed/tested fire alarm
system, early detection of a fire and notification of the occupants would be hindered and
would not be guaranteed. The performance based analysis has shown how important early
detection is for getting people safely out of the building.
While the number of pull stations in the building is sufficient, additional pull stations in
public areas (or better labeling of the current locations), especially the lobby, could also
help decrease detection times.

Suppression System
Analysis of the sprinkler system determined that it met the prescriptive requirements set
forth in NFPA 13. However, as the fourth fire scenario showed, with dry-pipe sprinklers
protecting the front portion of the lobby, the inherent delay could potentially lead to large
and catastrophic fire growth. As the two primary exits of the building are located at the
front of the lobby, maintaining tenable conditions in that area is very important. If the drypipe sprinklers in the lobby were converted to a wet-pipe system, it could provide water
suppression much earlier in the fire, thereby helping to control the fire and maintain
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tenable conditions for longer periods of time. Estimates are that the current fire pump
could handle the load of the additional sprinklers.
Another option could help would be to limit the types of events and furnishings that are
allowed in the lobby. If an event is allowed to take place, like the book fair for example,
then an attendant could be required who was trained on how to use fire extinguishers and
would have one on hand at all times. This could be done by listing these items as potential
fire hazards and requirements in the building’s Fire Safety Management Plan (Section
404.3.2 of the 2013 California Fire Code).

Structural Fire Protection
As mentioned above, there were batts of insulation installed in the second floor attic with
the Kraft paper side exposed. To remedy this, the batts of insulation could simply be turned
over so the fiberglass insulation side was exposed. Or it could be protected from fire by
covering it with gypsum wall board or something similar.
Another issue that needs to be addressed is the paper art projects and quilts hung in the
exit corridors. It is recommended to remove the flammable interior wall decorations from
the exit corridors or place them inside some sort of fire resistant display case.
The trash and recycle containers located throughout the building’s exit corridors are
convenient, but can be dangerous. As seen in scenario #3, a majority of these items have
very large Heat Release Rate (HRR) values. If ignited, these items would block the main exit
pathways. In some instances, people in the departments would be forced to enter the same
corridor where the fire was in order to exit. This would expose the occupants to the smoke,
toxic gases, and heat from the fire, potentially making conditions untenable. With enough of
these stacked together, the fire could become so large that it could overwhelm the
sprinklers and spread throughout the interstitial areas above the ceilings. A simple remedy
would be to take these items out of the exit corridors and place them in locations where the
occupants do not need to path during an evacuation. For example, one large trash and
recycle container could be placed in each department in the building. That wouldn’t change
the fuel load dangers, but they would be out of the reach of the public (arson concerns), and
if they were ignited, people could escape the department and into the corridor as designed.
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Egress
The biggest egress issue in the building is the dead end hallway. While the length of the
hallway is 48 feet, and would be acceptable for a Group B occupancy, it is unclear if the AHJ
approved it for a Mixed Occupancy building or what their reasoning would have been.
Without the AHJ’s approval, Section 1018.4 of the CBC states that the hallway’s length
would be limited to 20 feet.
Whichever length is appropriate, the fact that there is only one way out of that hallway, yet
multiple ways for occupants to be trapped, creates an issue where people could potentially
get hurt or even die. In the second and fourth scenario, two situations were presented
where fires could trap the occupants in the dead end hallway, long before they would be
able to egress.
With the second scenario, a copier, a small desk, and a chair are located in the common
area to provide easy access to the items for all departments in the hallway. For further
convenience, small and large recycle containers are placed on either side of the copier and
the desk. While the location and arrangement of these items may be convenient, they are
potentially hazardous. The copier and the power cord are potential ignition sources, while
the recycle containers and chair are large sources of fuel. In the fire model, the recycle
containers never ignited, but if they did, the fire might have been able to break through the
drop ceiling and gain access to the second floor attic. Once in the attic the fire would be able
to spread across exposed insulation and lumber.
The fourth scenario is a little rarer as it requires an event to be occurring in the lobby, and
a fire to be set intentionally. While the book fair may be a rare event, something similar
could also happen around Christmas time with a large tree in the lobby. The tree would be
positioned just in front of the large glass wall between the wooden walls. If that caught fire
(intentionally or accidentally), the radiant heat could ignite the wood siding on the walls
and the flames could spread up and reach the ceiling. With dry-pipe sprinklers as the only
form of water suppression, the delay in water delivery would render the sprinklers to be of
no help controlling the fire. With the large height of the lobby, smoke production levels are
quite high. The arrangement of the lobby and the second floor walkway allow the smoke to
travel back towards the entrance to the dead end hallway. When the smoke hits the wall
just outside the dead end hallway, the momentum of the ceiling jet will carry that smoke to
the floor very quickly. In the fire model, there were ~13 seconds between when the smoke
detector indicated there was smoke just outside the dead end hallway, and when visibility
conditions in that location were no longer tenable.
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The addition of more smoke detectors in the lobby would decrease the detection time
substantially, and if a fire in the lobby could be controlled, either by an attendant with a fire
extinguisher, or by wet-pipe sprinklers in place of the dry-pipe system, the ASET value
could be extended for the occupants of the dead end hallway. While not a permanent
solution, one option that would help the people in the dead end hallway the most would be
to put a door in one of the offices or conference rooms. That could allow a second option for
an emergency evacuation route for the occupants to escape via a neighboring department
in case they get trapped.

References
•

CBC, 2013. 2013 California Building Code: California Code of Regulations Title 24,
Volume 1 of Part 2. California Building Standards Commission.

•

CFC, 2013. 2013 California Fire Code: California Code of Regulations Title 24, Part 9.
California Building Standards Commission.

•

NFPA 101, 2012. Life Safety Code. National Fire Protection Association, an
International Codes and Standards Organization. Quincy, MA.

•

NFPA 72, 2013. National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code. National Fire Protection
Association, an International Codes and Standards Organization. Quincy, MA.

•

NFPA 13, 2013. Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems and therefore.
National Fire Protection Association, an International Codes and Standards
Organization. Quincy, MA.

•

NFPA 2001, 2015. Standard on Clean Agent Fire Extinguishing Systems. National
Fire Protection Association, an International Codes and Standards Organization.
Quincy, MA.

•

SFPE Handbook, 2008. Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, 4th Edition, SFPE
and NFPA. 2008.

•

SFPE Handbook, 2016. Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, 5th Edition, SFPE
and NFPA. 2008.

• Handbook of Smoke Control Engineering, 2012. International Code Council, National
Fire Protection Association, and Society of Fire Protection Engineers, ASHRAE.
Atlanta, GA.

Fire Protection & Life Safety Analysis – Eric W. Rood Administration Center

133

APPENDIX A
Building Floorplan
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APPENDIX B
Occupancy Load Spreadsheets
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First Floor – 2013 CBC
Space/Room

Suite

Type of Occupancy

Area

OLF
(sq.ft./person)

Exact
Occ #

Rounded
Occ #

Social Services

120

Business

8,516

100

85.16

85

Child Support Services

140

Business

3,765

100

37.65

38

Public Works

170

Business

2,609

100

26.09

26

Planning

170

Business

2,892

100

28.92

29

Environmental Health
Community
Development Agency
Building
Information & General
Services
Sheriff's Office

170

Business

2,445

100

24.45

24

170

Business

4,099

100

40.99

41

170

Business

2,214

100

22.14

22

130

Business

8,455

100

84.55

85

--

Business

688

100

6.88

7

Lobby Area

--

1,970

100

19.70

20

Main Lobby Seating

--

Business
Business

298

100

2.98

3

Side Lobby Seating

--

Business

150

100

1.50

2

CDA Seating

170

Business

1,197

100

11.97

12

Mail Room

--

Business

510

100

5.10

5

285

15

19.00

19

231

15

15.40

15

302

15

20.13

20

332

15

22.13

22

207

15

13.80

14

70

5

14.00

14

121

1

121.00

121

Malakoff Room

145

Telegraph Room

148

Coyote Room

160

Reward Room

130A

Omega Room

170

BOS Chambers

100

Assembly (A-3) Unconcentrated
Assembly (A-3) Unconcentrated
Assembly (A-3) Unconcentrated
Assembly (A-3) Unconcentrated
Assembly (A-3) Unconcentrated
Assembly (A-3) Standing Space
Fixed Seating

Cafeteria

150

Assembly (A-2) Unconcentrated

903

15

60.20

60

Janitors Closet (West)

--

Storage (S-1)

131

300

0.44

1

"Vault Storage"

140

Storage (S-1)

96

300

0.32

1

"File Storage" (PW)

170

Storage (S-1)

184

300

0.61

1

"IS Storage" (East)

--

Storage (S-1)

109

300

0.36

1

"File Storage" (CDA)
Unmarked Storage
(CDA)
Secondary Unmarked
Storage (CDA)
"IS Storage" (Center)

170

Storage (S-1)

567

300

1.89

2

170

Storage (S-1)

142

300

0.47

1

170

Storage (S-1)

94

300

0.31

1

--

Storage (S-1)

159

300

0.53

1
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Cafeteria South

--

Storage (S-1)

48

300

0.16

1

Cafeteria North

--

Storage (S-1)

94

300

0.31

1

Exterior Storage

--

Storage (S-1)

68

300

0.23

1

"Transformer Room"

--

Utility

92

300

0.31

1

Fire Riser Room
"Integen Fire System
for IS"
"Fire Alarm" Closet

--

Utility

95

300

0.32

1

--

Utility

25

300

0.08

0

--

Utility

31

300

0.10

0

Rest Rooms (x2) DSS

--

Utility

110

300

0.37

2

Rest Rooms (x2) West
Rest Rooms (x2)
Center
Rest Rooms (x2) East

--

Utility

381

300

1.27

2

--

Utility

409

300

1.36

2

--

Utility

377

300

1.26

2

Total:

706
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First Floor – 2012 LSC
Space/Room

Suite

Type of Occupancy

Area

OLF
(sq.ft./person)

Exact
Occ #

Rounded
Occ #

Social Services

120

Business

8,516

100

85.16

85

Child Support Services

140

Business

3,765

100

37.65

38

Public Works

170

Business

2,609

100

26.09

26

Planning

170

Business

2,892

100

28.92

29

Environmental Health
Community Development
Agency
Building
Information & General
Services
Sheriff's Office

170

Business

2,445

100

24.45

24

170

Business

4,099

100

40.99

41

170

Business

2,214

100

22.14

22

130

Business

8,455

100

84.55

85

--

688

100

6.88

7

Lobby Area

--

Business
Business

1,970

100

19.70

20

--

Business

298

100

2.98

3

--

Business

150

100

1.50

2

CDA Seating

170

Business

1,197

100

11.97

12

Mail Room

--

Business

510

100

5.1

5

Malakoff Room

145

285

15

19.00

19

Telegraph Room

148

231

15

15.40

15

Coyote Room

160

302

15

20.13

20

Reward Room

130A

332

15

22.13

22

Omega Room

170

207

15

13.80

14

BOS Chambers

100

70

7

10

10

121

1

121

121

Main Lobby Seating
Side Lobby Seating

Assembly (A-3) - Less
concentrated
Assembly (A-3) - Less
concentrated
Assembly (A-3) - Less
concentrated
Assembly (A-3) - Less
concentrated
Assembly (A-3) - Less
concentrated
Assembly (A-3) Concentrated
Fixed Seating

Cafeteria

150

Assembly (A-2) - Less
concentrated

903

15

60.2

60

Janitors Closet (West)

--

Storage (S-1)

131

500

0.26

1

"Vault Storage"

140

Storage (S-1)

96

500

0.19

1

"File Storage" (PW)

170

Storage (S-1)

184

500

0.37

1

"IS Storage" (East)

--

Storage (S-1)

109

500

0.22

1

"File Storage" (CDA)

170

Storage (S-1)

567

500

1.13

1

Unmarked Storage (CDA)
Secondary Unmarked Storage
(CDA)

170

Storage (S-1)

142

500

0.28

1

170

Storage (S-1)

94

500

0.19

1
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"IS Storage" (Center)

--

Storage (S-1)

159

500

0.32

1

Cafeteria South

--

Storage (S-1)

48

500

0.10

1

Cafeteria North

--

Storage (S-1)

94

500

0.19

1

Exterior Storage

--

Storage (S-1)

68

500

0.14

1

"Transformer Room"

--

Industrial

92

100

0.92

1

Fire Riser Room

--

Industrial

95

100

0.95

1

"Integren Fire System for IS"

--

Industrial

25

100

0.25

0

"Fire Alarm" Closet

--

Industrial

31

100

0.31

0

Rest Rooms (x2) DSS

--

Industrial

110

100

1.10

2

Rest Rooms (x2) West

--

Industrial

381

100

3.81

4

Rest Rooms (x2) Center

--

Industrial

409

100

4.09

4

Rest Rooms (x2) East

--

Industrial

377

100

3.77

4

Total:

707
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Second Floor – 2013 CBC
Assessor

290

Business

3,704

OLF
(sq.ft./person)
100

Auditor-Controller

230

Business

2,603

100

26.03

26

Board of Supervisors

200

Business

3,008

100

30.08

30

Clerk Recorder
County Executive
Officer
County Counsel

210

Business

2,655

100

26.55

27

220

Business

3,369

100

33.69

34

240

Business

3,157

100

31.57

32

Human Resources

260

Business

2,157

100

21.57

22

LAFCo

270

Business

653

100

6.53

7

Sheriffs
Tax Collector Treasurer
Office of Emergency
Services
Elections

280

Business

8,196

100

81.96

82

290

Business

2108

100

21.08

21

--

Business

635

100

6.35

6

250

2,511

100

25.11

25

Gold Hill Room

250A

413

15

27.53

28

Northstar Room

240

387

15

25.80

26

Providence A

270A

355

15

23.67

24

Providence B

270B

544

15

36.27

36

Mountaineer Room

290A

382

15

25.47

25

Diamond Creek Room

260A

461

15

30.73

31

Empire Room

278

963

15

64.20

64

Grand Jury

270

Business
Assembly (A-3) Unconcentrated
Assembly (A-3) Unconcentrated
Assembly (A-3) Unconcentrated
Assembly (A-3) Unconcentrated
Assembly (A-3) Unconcentrated
Assembly (A-3) Unconcentrated
Assembly (A-3) Unconcentrated
Assembly (A-3) Unconcentrated

523

15

34.87

35

280

Locker Rooms

963

50

19.26

19

--

Storage (S-1)

28

300

0.09

1

--

Storage (S-1)

49

300

0.16

1

--

Storage (S-1)

136

300

0.45

1

Facilities Maintenance

--

Storage (S-1)

137

300

0.46

1

Elections South Storage

--

Storage (S-1)

47

300

0.16

1

Space/Room

Suite

Type of Occupancy

Area

Locker Room/Rest
Rooms Sheriff
Storage East Hall (TaxTreasury)
Second story landing
closet
Janitors Closet (West)

Exact
Occ #
37.04

Rounded
Occ #
37

Admin Storage (OES)

--

Storage (S-1)

51

300

0.17

1

File Storage (Assessor)

--

Storage (S-1)

251

300

0.84

1

Storage West Hall (HR)

--

Storage (S-1)

42

300

0.14

1

IS Storage (East)

--

Storage (S-1)

29

300

0.10

1
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Central Closet/Roof
Access
Electrical Room East

--

Storage (S-1)

109

300

0.36

1

--

Utility

70

300

0.23

1

Utility Room West

--

Utility

71

300

0.24

1

Rest Rooms (x2) West

--

Utility

365

300

1.22

2

Rest Rooms (x2) Center

--

Utility

447

300

1.49

2

Total:

651

Grand
Total:

1,357
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Second Floor – 2012 LSC
Assessor

290

Business

3,704

OLF
(sq.ft./person
)
100

37.04

37

Auditor-Controller

230

Business

2,603

100

26.03

26

Board of Supervisors

200

Business

3,008

100

30.08

30

Clerk Recorder

210

Business

2,655

100

26.55

27

County Executive Officer

220

Business

3,369

100

33.69

34

County Counsel

240

Business

3,157

100

31.57

32

Human Resources

260

Business

2,157

100

21.57

22

LAFCo

270

Business

653

100

6.53

7

Space/Room

Suite

Type of Occupancy

Area

Exact
Occ #

Rounded
Occ #

Sheriffs

280

Business

8,196

100

81.96

82

Tax Collector - Treasurer
Office of Emergency
Services
Elections

290

Business

2,108

100

21.08

21

--

Business

635

100

6.35

6

250

2,511

100

25.11

25

Gold Hill Room

250A

413

15

27.53

28

Northstar Room

240

387

15

25.80

26

Providence A

270A

355

15

23.67

24

Providence B

270B

544

15

36.27

36

Mountaineer Room

290A

382

15

25.47

25

Diamond Creek Room

260A

461

15

30.73

31

Empire Room

278

963

15

64.20

64

Grand Jury

270

Business
Assembly (A-3) Less
Concentrated
Assembly (A-3) Less
Concentrated
Assembly (A-3) Less
Concentrated
Assembly (A-3) Less
Concentrated
Assembly (A-3) Less
Concentrated
Assembly (A-3) Less
Concentrated
Assembly (A-3) Less
Concentrated
Assembly (A-3) Less
Concentrated

523

15

34.87

35

280

Locker Rooms

963

50

19.26

19

--

Storage (S-1)

28

500

0.06

1

--

Storage (S-1)

49

500

0.10

1

Locker Room/Rest Rooms
Sheriff
Storage East Hall (TaxTreasury)
Second story landing
closet
Janitors Closet (West)

--

Storage (S-1)

136

500

0.27

1

Facilities Maintenance

--

Storage (S-1)

137

500

0.27

1

Elections South Storage

--

Storage (S-1)

47

500

0.09

1

Admin Storage (OES)

--

Storage (S-1)

51

500

0.10

1

File Storage (Assessor)

--

Storage (S-1)

251

500

0.50

1

Storage West Hall (HR)

--

Storage (S-1)

42

500

0.08

1

IS Storage (East)

--

Storage (S-1)

29

500

0.06

1

Central Closet/Roof Access

--

Storage (S-1)

109

500

0.22

1
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Electrical Room East

--

Industrial

70

100

0.70

1

Utility Room West

--

Industrial

71

100

0.71

1

Rest Rooms (x2) West

--

Industrial

365

100

3.65

4

Rest Rooms (x2) Center

--

Industrial

447

100

4.47

5

Total:

656

Grand
Total:

1,363
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APPENDIX C
Department Movement Time Calculations
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These calculations are done by hand, and will be completed for each space in the building.
Occupant load numbers can vary for a space depending if the CBC or the LSC are used.
Therefore, whichever number is higher will be used to aid in a more conservative analysis.
These values are only representative of the movement times from each department. As
only one department’s egress at a time is calculated, actual movement times would be
longer due to multiple departments evacuating through the same pathways.
First Floor Spaces
Main Lobby:
The Main Lobby discharges through two exits with glass double-doors to the exterior of the
building. The maximum occupancy of the lobby is 25 people. Since everyone is in visual
distance of the glass front doors and could be spread out throughout the lobby, the limiting
factors of egress would be people reaching the front doors.
Assuming people are spread throughout the lobby and will need to reach the front doors,
the longest distance of travel one would need to take would be ~105 feet. From Table 313.4 from the SFPE Handbook (4th Edition), the maximum unimpeded exit speed across a
flat surface is 235 feet/minute. At that rate, it would take someone:
(105 feet) / (235 ft./min) = ~27 seconds
The interior width of the doors is 72 inches. The effective width = 72”-12” = 60” or 5’. From
Table 3-13.5 in the SFPE Handbook (4th Edition), the maximum specific flow (FSM) through a
doorway is 24.0 people/min/foot of effective width.
FSM = (24 people/min/foot e.w.) X (5 feet e.w.) = 120 people/minute PER EXIT
Since there are two exits, that means:
The FSM of the whole lobby is 240 people/minute
That means that it would take 25 people, at a rate of 240 people/minute a total of
~7 seconds to exit the building.
Total egress time from the lobby:
27 + 7 = 34 seconds.
BOS Chambers:
The BOS Chambers discharges through two exits at the south and east sides of the room
with double-doors that feed into the lobby. The doorways are each 72”-wide leaving an
effective width of 60” per exit.
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The layout of the seating in the chambers is 107 fixed seats in rows. Each row has an aisle
down the middle dividing each row into two sections. There are 5 rows divided in half,
which equals 10 sections. There is 18 inches in-between the seat backs and the front of the
seats behind. It is assumed that the occupants in each section will divide evenly with half
going to the exterior exit, and the other half going to the interior aisle exit. With that
assumption, the furthest someone would have to travel to the section would be ~15 feet.
In front of these fixed seats are 4 more seats (desk chairs) at desks. These occupants exit
down either side of the fixed seats.
At the front of the room are 10 more seats (desk chairs) for the supervisors. They will get
out of their chairs and travel behind the other chairs along the exterior of the room till they
reach the exit doorways.
For the people in the fixed seats, the farthest someone would theoretically have to travel is
52 feet to reach the nearest double-door exit. At 235 feet/min that equals:
(52 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 13 seconds
For the people in the two desks, they’ll need to walk 54 feet to reach the exits. That works
out to:
(54 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 14 seconds
For the supervisors, if they choose the two main exits at the front of the building, they
would need to travel ~52 feet to reach the exits.
(52 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 13 seconds
There are also people standing at the back of the room, they’ll travel approximately 27 feet
to the exits which will take:
(27 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 7 seconds
As calculated in the previous section, two sets of 72”-wide double-doors have a maximum
specific flow of 240 people/minute. At a maximum capacity of 135 people, that would take:
(135 people) / (240 people/min) = 34 seconds to completely evacuate the BOS Chambers.
Since it takes people a minimum of 7 seconds and a maximum of 14 seconds (assuming
nobody else blocks their direct path) to reach the exits, and 34 seconds for everyone to exit
through the doorways, any queue that may form at either exit that would clear rather
quickly.
Once outside the BOS chambers, the occupants would need to travel to the discharge exits
at the front of the building. The distance from the south BOS Chambers exit to the west
discharge exit is 16 feet. The distance from the east BOS Chambers exit to the east
discharge exit is 54 feet.
(16 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 4 seconds
(54 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 14 seconds
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As these doors have a discharge capacity of 120 people/minute each, and people have to
travel to them after exiting through exits of the same capacity, no queue is expected to
form.
Since half of the people will be going to each exit, the people exiting out of the southern BOS
chambers exit and then out of the western discharge exit would have a maximum egress
time of:
14 seconds to reach the BOS exit, 34 seconds to clear the BOS Chambers, 4 seconds to reach
the discharge exits at the front of the building and pass through:
14 + 34 + 4 = 52 seconds
The other half of the occupants would be exiting out of the eastern BOS chambers exit and
then out of the eastern discharge exit. The maximum egress time would be:
14 seconds to reach the BOS exit, 34 seconds to clear the BOS Chambers, 14 seconds to
reach the discharge exits at the front of the building and pass through:
14 + 34 + 14 = 62 seconds
Cafeteria:
The occupants in the cafeteria would exit through a single 36”-wide doorway at the
southeast corner of the cafeteria into the lobby, and then out of the western discharge exit
made up of double glass doors 72”-wide. Another 36”-wide doorway is located at the
northeast corner of the cafeteria leads to a hallway and then into the western corridor, but
it is NOT marked as an exit. Unless a staff member attempts to go back to their offices to
grab personal effects, it is not likely that anyone would use this hallway as a primary exit as
the travel distance is almost three times as long.
The maximum occupancy of the cafeteria is 60 people. The effective width of the exit
doorway is:
36” – 12” = 24” or 2’.
(24.0 people/min/foot of effective width) X (2 feet of effective width) = 48 people/min
The people would have to travel 43 feet to the exit into the lobby. At a rate of 235 feet/min,
that would take:
(43 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 11 seconds
The 60 people in the cafeteria could exit through that doorway in:
(60 people) / (48 people/min) = 75 seconds
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The people would then have to travel 25 feet to the main discharge exit which is a doubledoor. At a rate of 235 feet/min, that would take:
(25 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 6 seconds
The two 36”-wide doorways can discharge 120 people/minute. For everyone to pass
through the exit, that would take:
(60 people) / (120 people/min) = 30 seconds
Total egress time from the cafeteria would take:
11 + 75 + 6 + 30 = 122 seconds
Waiting area (CDA):
The maximum occupancy for the waiting area is 12 people. There are two exits from this
space, the eastern stairwell and the main lobby. As the occupants of this space would be the
general public, they would be most likely try to exit out of the front of the building even
though the eastern stairwell is closer. Assuming the occupants exit through the front of the
building, the longest travel distance to the double-door (72”-wide) exit at the front of the
waiting area would be 70 feet. That would take:
(70 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 18 seconds
Like the main exit discharge rates calculated above, the maximum specific flow through
these doors is 120 people/min. For all 12 people to pass through the doors, that would
take:
(12 people) / (120 people/min) = ~6 seconds
Once in the lobby, people would have to travel the 105 feet to the front exit doors. Like
calculated above, that would take 27 seconds.
Total egress time from the CDA Waiting Area would take:
18 seconds + 6 seconds + 27 seconds = 51 seconds
Public Works:
The maximum occupancy for the public works department is 26 people. Adding in the
occupancy for the Coyote Room, that makes 46 people. Considering that most of the people
work in the building and are familiar with exit procedures, The the most likely exit would
be the main lobby. That would take the occupants through two 36”-wide doorways out of
public works and into the waiting area (previously mentioned). The maximum distance
someone would have to travel to reach the exit doorways out of public works would be 70
feet. That would take:
(70 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 18 seconds
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The two 36”-wide doorways can discharge 96 people/minute. To clear the department, that
would take:
(46 people) / (96 people/min) = ~29 seconds
At that point, people would be in the same location as the people calculated in the previous
example. It would take the occupants 18 seconds to reach the double doors. Then the 46
people could exit through the double doors in:
(46 people) / (120 people/min) = 23 seconds
It would then take an additional 27 seconds to reach and pass through the front exits. So in
total the egress time would be:
18 + 29 + 18 + 23 + 27 = 115 seconds
Planning:
The planning department has a maximum occupancy of 29 people. Their most likely path of
exit would be through a 36” door leading to the 8-foot wide, 36-foot long eastern corridor.
At the end of the corridor, they’d have to pass through another 36”-wide door, before
traveling another 7 feet in the base of the stairwell, then exiting through the 36”-wide
discharge door. The longest path of travel to reach the entrance of the corridor would be
114 feet. Both 36” doors have an FSM of 48 people/min.
Therefore, the calculations would be as follows:
(114 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 29 seconds to reach the corridor entrance
(29 people) / (48 people/min) = 36 seconds to pass through the door into the corridor
(36 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 9 seconds to travel through the corridor to the stairwell
entrance
(29 people) / (48 people/min) = 36 seconds to pass through the door into the stairwell
(7 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 2 seconds to reach the discharge door
(29 people) / (48 people/min) = 36 seconds to pass through the discharge door
So in total the egress time for the planning department would be:
29 + 36 + 9 + 36 + 2 + 36 = 148 seconds
Environmental Health:
The maximum occupancy of the Environmental Health offices is 24 people. Add that to the
occupancy of the Omega Room and that is a total of 38 people. The shortest path of travel
for them would be to exit through either the break room or Omega conference room (which
are side by side) and then into the eastern corridor and out of the stairwell. All of the doors
are 36” wide. The length they’d have to travel to reach the break room/Omega room is 60
feet. Then another 12 feet to pass through those rooms. Then 19 feet through the corridor
and into the stairwell. The calculations would be:
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For those people already in the Omega room:
(12 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 3 seconds to reach the door into the corridor
(14 people) / (48 people/min) = 18 seconds to pass through the door into the corridor
(19 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 5 seconds to reach the stairwell exit door
(14 people) / (48 people/min) = 18 seconds to pass through the door into the stairwell
(7 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 2 seconds to reach the discharge door
(14 people) / (48 people/min) = 18 seconds to pass through the discharge door
For Environmental Health employees who aren’t in the Omega room:
(60 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 15 seconds to reach the break room/Omega room entrances
(24 people) / (48 people/min) = 30 seconds to pass through the door into the room
**At this point, the occupants from the Omega room are already in the stairwell and not
creating additional queuing for EH employees. Therefore, the following calculations assume
only EH employees and no additional delays.
(12 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 3 seconds to reach the door into the corridor
(24 people) / (48 people/min) = 30 seconds to pass through the door into the corridor
(19 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 5 seconds to reach the stairwell exit door
(24 people) / (48 people/min) = 30 seconds to pass through the door into the stairwell
(7 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 2 seconds to reach the discharge door
(24 people) / (48 people/min) = 30 seconds to pass through the discharge door
So in total, the longest egress time for the Environmental Health department would be:
15 + 30 + 3 + 30 + 5 + 30 + 2 + 30 = 145 seconds
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Community Development Agency:
The maximum occupancy for the CDA is 41 people. There are two exits which could be
equally beneficial. One option would be to enter the eastern corridor and exit through the
stairwell. The other option would be to travel through the building department, out into the
north end of the main lobby, and out through the front doors. For these calculations, it is
assumed that half the population exits using the stairwell and the other half uses the doors
in the main lobby.
Eastern Stairwell:
(99 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 25 seconds to reach the corridor entrance
(20.5 people) / (48 people/min) = 26 seconds to pass through the door into the corridor
(36 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 9 seconds to reach the stairwell entrance
(20.5people) / (48 people/min) = 26 seconds to pass through the door into the stairwell
(7 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 2 seconds to reach the discharge door
(20.5 people) / (48 people/min) = 26 seconds to pass through the discharge door
The egress time for half of the planning department occupancy through the eastern
stairwell would be:
25 + 26 + 9 + 26 + 2 + 26 = 114 seconds
Main Doors:
(101 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 26 seconds to reach the door into the main lobby
(20.5 people) / (48 people/min) = 26 seconds to pass through the door into the lobby
(105 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 27 seconds to reach the front doors
(20.5 people) / (240 people/min) = 5 seconds to pass through the front doors
The egress time for half of the planning department occupancy through the lobby would be:
26 + 26 + 27 + 5 = 84 seconds
Building:
The maximum occupancy of the building department is 22 people. The primary exit path
would be out the single 36”-wide door at the west end of their department into the main
lobby and out of the front doors. The calculation for their egress time is as follows:
(77 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 20 seconds to reach the door into the main lobby
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(22 people) / (48 people/min) = 27.5 seconds to pass through the door into the lobby
(105 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 27 seconds to reach the front doors
(22 people) / (240 people/min) = 5.5 seconds to pass through the front doors
20 + 27.5 + 27 + 5.5 = 80 seconds
Child Support Services:
The maximum occupancy of the CSS is 38 people. The CSS department has two exits at the
south end of the department which open into the eastern end of the western corridor. After
seeing their fire drill plan, the primary exit path is to exit into the western corridor, travel
west till they reach the entrance to the northern corridor, then exit through the discharge
door at the end of the north corridor. The calculation would be as follows:
Time to reach the exit doors at the south end of the department:
(91.5 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 23 seconds
Time to pass through the two 36”-wide doors:
(38 people) / (96 people/min) = 24 seconds
Time to reach the door to the north corridor:
(40 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 11 seconds
Time to pass through the 36”-wide door into the corridor:
(38 people) / (48 people/min) = 48 seconds
Time to travel through the north corridor and reach the discharge door:
(66 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 17 seconds
Time to pass through the 36”-wide discharge door:
(38 people) / (48 people/min) = 48 seconds
23 + 24 + 11 + 48 + 17 + 48 = 171 seconds
If a secondary exit path is required (as in Scenario #3 in the performance based analysis),
the occupants would exit south out of the department into the western corridor, then east
into the CDA waiting area, then out through the lobby. The secondary path calculation
would be as follows:
Time to reach the exit doors at the south end of the department:
(91.5 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 23 seconds
Time to pass through the two 36”-wide doors:
(38 people) / (96 people/min) = 24 seconds
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Time to reach the east door to the CDA waiting area:
(24 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 6 seconds
Time to pass through the 36”-wide door into the waiting area:
(38 people) / (48 people/min) = 48 seconds
Time to reach the double doors at the south end of the CDA waiting area:
(20 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 5 seconds
Like the main exit discharge rates calculated above, the maximum specific flow through
these double doors is 120 people/min.
(38 people) / (120 people/min) = 19 seconds
Once in the lobby, people would have to travel the 105 feet to the front exit doors. Like
calculated above, that would take 27 seconds.
Total secondary egress time from the CSS would take:
23 + 24 +6 + 48 + 5 + 19 + 27 = 152 seconds
In reality, this secondary path would also be shared with people exiting the CDA waiting
area, Public Works, the Building Department, and possibly the BOS Chambers thereby
increasing the egress time. The primary path is shared with significantly less people and
uses an exit primarily accessed by staff only.
Social Services:
The department of Social Services is quite wide and is pretty even between three exits
therefore, it is assumed that the people will split evenly to the three exits. The maximum
occupancy is 85 people. One exit is out through the DSS Lobby to the exterior door on the
west side of the building. The other is out through the door into the western corridor, then
traveling east to the north corridor and out of the north side of the building. The third is out
through a second door into the western corridor, then travel west to the stairwell and exit
out from the stairwell. The three calculations are as follows:
Western Corridor to North Corridor:
Time to reach the exit door:
(64 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 16 seconds
Time to pass through the 36”-wide door:
(28 people) / (48 people/min) = 35 seconds
Time to reach the door to the north corridor:
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(33 feet) / (235 feet/min) = ~9 seconds
Time to pass through the 36”-wide door into the corridor:
(28 people) / (48 people/min) = 35 seconds
Time to travel through the north corridor and reach the discharge door:
(66 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 17 seconds
Time to pass through the 36”-wide discharge door:
(28 people) / (48 people/min) = 35 seconds
19 + 35 + 9 + 35 + 17 + 35 = 147 seconds
Out through the DSS Lobby:
Time to reach the exit door into the DSS lobby:
(60 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 15 seconds
Time to pass through the 36”-wide door:
(28 people) / (48 people/min) = 35 seconds
Time to reach the doors to the discharge door:
(29 feet) / (235 feet/min) = ~8 seconds
Time to pass through the 36”-wide discharge door:
(28 people) / (48 people/min) = 35 seconds
15 + 35 + 8 + 35 = 93 seconds
Western corridor to the western stairwell:
Time to reach the exit door into the west corridor:
(36 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 9 seconds
Time to pass through the 36”-wide door:
(28 people) / (48 people/min) = 35 seconds
Time to reach the stairwell door:
(56 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 14 seconds
Time to pass through the 36”-wide door into the stairwell:
(28 people) / (48 people/min) = 35 seconds
Time to reach the stairwell discharge door:
(7 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 2 seconds

Fire Protection & Life Safety Analysis – Eric W. Rood Administration Center

158

Time to pass through the 36”-wide discharge door:
(28 people) / (48 people/min) = 35 seconds
9 + 35 + 14 + 35 + 2 + 35 = 130 seconds
Information & General Services:
Information and General Services has a maximum occupancy of 85 people. With the
Reward room that makes 107 people. There are three main exits (36”-wide doorways)
from the department into the western corridor, and a fourth from the Reward room. From
there people would travel west into the stairwell and out through the discharge door. The
calculation is as follows:
Time to reach the exit door into the western corridor:
(91 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 23 seconds
Time to pass through the four 36”-wide doors:
(107 people) / (192 people/min) = 33 seconds
Time to reach the stairwell door:
(47 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 12 seconds
Time to pass through the 36”-wide door into the stairwell:
(107 people) / (48 people/min) = 134 seconds
Time to reach the stairwell discharge door:
(7 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 2 seconds
As the discharge door is the same size as the previous door, a queue would not be expected
to form:
23 + 33 + 12 + 134 + 2 = 204 seconds
Sheriff’s Office:
The Sheriff’s offices on the first floor have a maximum occupancy of 7 people. There is one
exit from the office space (36”-wide door) which leads into the western corridor, then
northeast towards the northern corridor, and then out through the north side of the
building. The time for evacuation is:
Time to reach the exit door into the west corridor:
(29 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 8 seconds
Time to pass through the 36”-wide door:
(7 people) / (48 people/min) = 9 seconds
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Time to reach the door to the northern corridor:
(29 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 8 seconds
Time to pass through the 36”-wide door:
(7 people) / (48 people/min) = 9 seconds
Time to travel through the north corridor and reach the discharge door:
(66 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 17 seconds
Time to pass through the 36”-wide discharge door:
(7 people) / (48 people/min) = 9 seconds
8 + 9 + 8 + 9 + 17 + 9 = 60 seconds
Mail Room & Adjacent Rooms in the Northern Corridor:
These three rooms have a total occupancy of 39 people. Their path of exit would be to enter
the northern corridor then exit through the north side of the building. The calculation is as
follows assuming the longest path of travel:
Time to reach the door to the northern corridor:
(24 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 6 seconds
Time to pass through the three 36”-wide doors:
(39 people) / (144 people/min) = 16 seconds
Time to travel through the north corridor and reach the discharge door:
(66 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 17 seconds
Time to pass through the 36”-wide discharge door:
(39 people) / (48 people/min) = 49 seconds
6 + 16 + 17 + 49 = 88 seconds
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Second Floor Spaces
There are only three exits from the second floor, and only two different types of exits (as
both the East and West stairwell exits are identical). Therefore, the time it takes to go down
the stairs and reach the exit door will be calculated for each type of stairwell, then that
value will be used in each occupancy’s egress time calculation.
For the East or West exit stairwells:
This stairway has a 36”-wide door at the top and the bottom of the stairs. The stairway is
42”-wide and 12’ tall.
Doorways:
The doorways are 36 inches wide which gives an effective width of:
36 inches – 12 inches = 24 inches (2 feet)
The Maximum Specific Flow through each doorway is:
FSM = (2 feet) x (24.0 persons/min/feet)
FSM = 48 persons/min
Stairway:
The stairways are 42 inches wide which gives an effective width of:
42 inches – 12 inches = 30 inches (2.5 feet)
The Maximum Specific Flow through each stairway is:
FSM = (2.5 feet) x (18.5 persons/min/feet)
FSM = 46 persons/min
The portion of the egress system that would limit the evacuation time would be the
stairway. The stairway could allow a maximum of 46 people/min to pass through the
stairway system and exit. So to find out how quickly people can exit, their speed down the
stairways needs to be calculated. That value is represented by the formula:
S = k – akD
S = Speed along the line of travel
D = Population density (persons/ft2)
*Assuming a value of D=0.175 for ideal flow, from Figure 3-13.8 from
the SFPE Handbook (4th Edition)
a = Constant = 2.86 feet/minute
k = Constant as shown in Table 3-13.2 for “7/11” stairs = 212
Speed on the stairs = (212) – [(2.86) x (212) x (0.175)]
Speed on the stairs = 106 feet/minute
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Table 3-13.3 from the SFPE Handbook (4th Edition) shows conversion factors for relating
line of travel distance to vertical travel for various stair configurations. For a “7/11” stair,
the conversion factor=1.85.
*Using a stairway height of 12 feet from floor-to-floor*
Distance traveled = 12 feet x 1.85 = 22.2 feet on the stairs
Distance traveled on the landings = 4 feet x 3 landings = 12 feet total
*(over estimation)
The distance traveled at the base of the stairs to the doorway = 10.5 feet
*I’m assuming this distance will be traversed at the stairway speed of 106 ft. /min rather than
the 235 ft. /min on flat ground because of a hand-rail that protrudes out beyond the stairs.
The total distance traveled from floor-to-floor on the stairs is:
22.2 feet + 12 feet +10.5 feet = 44.7 feet
At a speed of 106 feet/minute, and a distance of 44.7 feet, it would take:
Time to travel floor-to-floor = (44.7 feet) / (106 feet/minute) = ~25 seconds
For the Main Stairwell and exit through the Lobby:
For this stairway, there is no door hindering entrance onto the stairwell. The stairway is in
two main sections with a landing in between. The centerline of travel on the landing is 10.5
feet. The top set of stairs are 67”-wide (effective width of 55”), then below the landing the
stairs are only 60”-wide (48” e.w.), then widen to 72”-wide (60” e.w.), then widen even
further but have a handrail down the center. The handrail in the center essentially creates a
pinch point on the stairs and the clearance from it to the edge of the stairs is only 35” (23”
e.w.). Since that creates two stairwells, the total effective width would be 46”, which is still
the narrowest point on the stairs. Once at the bottom of the stairs, one would need to travel
approximately 31 feet to reach one of the two exits (glass double-doors) that are 72”-wide
(60” e.w.)
Doorways:
The doorways at the base are 72 inches wide which gives an effective width of:
72 inches – 12 inches = 60 inches (5 feet)
The Maximum Specific Flow through each doorway is:
FSM = (5 feet) x (24.0 persons/min/feet)
FSM = 120 persons/min
Stairway:
The stairway’s narrowest point is 35 inches wide which gives an effective width of:
35 inches – 12 inches = 23 inches (1.92 feet)
The Maximum Specific Flow through each stairway is:
FSM = (1.92 feet) x (18.5 persons/min/feet)
FSM = 35 persons/min
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With “two stairwells”, the maximum total flow would be 70 persons/min.
The area that would limit the egress time would be the stairway. The stairway could allow
a maximum of 70 people/min to pass down the stairway system and exit. So to find out
how quickly people can exit, we have to calculate their speed down the stairways. That
value is represented by the formula:
S = k – akD
S = Speed along the line of travel
D = Population density (persons/ft2)
*I’m going to use a value of D=0.175 for ideal flow, from Figure 3-13.8
from the SFPE Handbook (4th Edition)
a = Constant = 2.86 feet/minute
k = Constant as shown in Table 3-13.2
Stairway (“7/11” stairs)
= 212
Speed on the stairs = (212) – [(2.86) x (212) x (0.175)]
Speed on the stairs = 106 feet/minute
Table 3-13.3 from the SFPE Handbook (4th Edition) shows conversion factors for relating
line of travel distance to vertical travel for various stair configurations. For a “7/11” stair,
the conversion factor=1.85.
*Using a stairway height of 14 feet from floor-to-floor*
Distance traveled = 14 feet x 1.85 = 25.9 feet on the stairs
The centerline distance traveled on the landing is 10.5 feet
The total distance traveled from floor-to-floor on the stairs is:
25.9 feet + 10.5 feet = 35.9 feet
At a speed of 106 feet/minute, and a distance of 35.9 feet, it would take:
Time to travel floor-to-floor = (35.9 feet) / (106 feet/minute) = 20.3 seconds
From the base of the stairs, it would be another 31 feet to reach the doorways. The
maximum speed on flat ground is 235 feet/min.
(31 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 7.9 seconds
So in total, the travel time from the top of the stairs to the exit doorways in the lobby is:
20.3 seconds + 7.9 seconds = 28 seconds
Board of Supervisors Offices:
The maximum occupancy of the BOS offices is 30 people. Their path of travel would be
south into the west corridor, then west into the stairwell. The maximum distance traveled
in the office is 89 feet.
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Time to reach the office door to the west corridor:
(89 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 23 seconds
Time to pass through the 36”-wide door:
(30 people) / (48 people/min) = 37.5 seconds
Time to travel in the west corridor and reach the door to the stairway:
(39 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 10 seconds
Time to exit the west stairwell = 25.3 seconds
It would take people 25.3 seconds to travel down the stairs between floors and exit.
Assuming everyone in the office was trying to leave at one time, and 30 people can’t fit in a
single floor’s stairwell, a backup or queue would start at the entrance doorway to the
stairway. That queue would be the total number of people traveling into that exit, minus
how many people are already in the stairwell. So in the time it takes people to get to the
bottom of the stairway and exit:
(0.42 minutes) X (FSM=46.25 people/min) = 20 people would be in the stairwell.
With 30 people exiting, and 20 people in the stairwell, that leaves 10 people waiting in
the queue at the top of the stairs.
It would take the 10 people in the queue, at a maximum specific flow of 48
people/minute, 12.5 seconds to enter the top of the stairwell.
23 + 37.5 + 10 + 25.3 + 12.5 = ~109 seconds
County Executive Officer Offices plus the Northstar Room:
The maximum occupancy of the CEO offices is 34 people. If the Northstar room is included,
the total occupancy is 50 people. Their path of travel would be south into the west corridor,
then west into the stairwell. The maximum distance traveled in the office is 107 feet.
Time to reach the office door to the west corridor:
(107 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 27 seconds
Time to pass through the two 36”-wide doors:
(50 people) / (96 people/min) = 31 seconds
Time to travel in the west corridor and reach the door to the stairway:
(100 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 25.5 seconds
Time to exit the west stairwell = 25.3 seconds
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It would take people 25.3 seconds to travel down the stairs between floors and exit.
Assuming everyone in the office was trying to leave at one time, and 50 people can’t fit in a
single floor’s stairwell, a backup or queue would start at the entrance doorway to the
stairway. That queue would be the total number of people traveling into that exit, minus
how many people are already in the stairwell. So in the time it takes people to get to the
bottom of the stairway and exit:
(0.42 minutes) X (FSM=46.25 people/min) = 20 people would be in the stairwell.
With 50 people exiting, and 20 people in the stairwell, that leaves 30 people waiting in
the queue at the top of the stairs.
It would take the 30 people in the queue, at a maximum specific flow of 48
people/minute, 37.5 seconds to enter the top of the stairwell.
27 + 31 + 25.5 + 25.3 + 37.5 = ~146 seconds

Clerk Recorder Offices:
The maximum occupancy of the Clerk Recorder’s offices is 27 people. Their path of travel
would be north into the west corridor, then west into the stairwell. The maximum distance
traveled in the office is 66 feet.
Time to reach the office door to the west corridor:
(66 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 17 seconds
Time to pass through two 36”-wide doors:
(27 people) / (96 people/min) = 17 seconds
Time to travel in the west corridor and reach the door to the stairwell:
(29 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 7 seconds
Time to exit the west stairwell = 25.3 seconds
It would take people 25.3 seconds to travel down the stairs between floors and exit.
Assuming everyone in the office was trying to leave at one time, and 27 people can’t fit in a
single floor’s stairwell, a backup or queue would start at the entrance doorway to the
stairway. That queue would be the total number of people traveling into that exit, minus
how many people are already in the stairwell. So in the time it takes people to get to the
bottom of the stairway and exit:
(0.42minutes) X (FSM=46.25 people/min) = 20 people would be in the stairwell.
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With 27 people exiting, and 20 people in the stairwell, that leaves 7 people waiting in the
queue at the top of the stairs.
It would take the 7 people in the queue, at a maximum specific flow of 48
people/minute, 8.75 seconds to enter the top of the stairwell.
17 + 17 +7 + 25.3 + 8.75 = ~69 seconds
Auditor-Controller Offices:
The maximum occupancy of the Auditor-Controller’s offices is 26 people. Their path of
travel would be north into the west corridor through two exits, then west into the stairwell.
The maximum distance traveled in the office is 80 feet.
Time to reach the office door to the west corridor:
(80 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 20.4 seconds
Time to pass through the two 36”-wide doors:
(26 people) / (96 people/min) = 16.3 seconds
Time to travel in the west corridor and reach the door to the stairway:
(75 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 19.1 seconds
Time to exit the west stairwell = 25.3 seconds
It would take people 25.3 seconds to travel down the stairs between floors and exit.
Assuming everyone in the office was trying to leave at one time, and 26 people can’t fit in a
single floor’s stairwell, a backup or queue would start at the entrance doorway to the
stairway. That queue would be the total number of people traveling into that exit, minus
how many people are already in the stairwell. So in the time it takes people to get to the
bottom of the stairway and exit:
(0.42 minutes) X (FSM=46.25 people/min) = 20 people would be in the stairwell.
With 26 people exiting, and 20 people in the stairwell, that leaves 6 people waiting in the
queue at the top of the stairs.
It would take the 6 people in the queue, at a maximum specific flow of 48
people/minute, 7.5 seconds to enter the top of the stairwell.
20.4 + 16.3 + 19.1 + 25.3 + 7.5 = 89 seconds
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Elections Offices & Gold Hill Room:
The maximum occupancy of the Elections offices is 25 people. If the Gold Hill room is
included, the total occupancy is 53 people. Their path of travel would be north into the
west corridor through two doorways, then east into the open-air walkway. From there,
they’d travel south to the main stairwell and out the front doors. The maximum distance
traveled in the office is 63.5 feet.
Time to reach the office door to the west corridor:
(63.5 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 16.2 seconds
Time to pass through the two 36”-wide doors:
(53 people) / (96 people/min) = 33.2 seconds
Time to travel in the west corridor and reach the door to the second floor lobby:
(72 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 18.4 seconds
Time to pass through the 36”-wide door into the second floor lobby:
(53 people) / (48 people/min) = 66 seconds
Time to travel south along the open-air walkway and reach the main stairwell:
(51 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 13 seconds
Time to exit the main stairwell = 28 seconds
It would take people 28 seconds to travel down the stairs between floors and exit.
Assuming everyone in the office was trying to leave at one time, and 53 people can’t fit in a
single floor’s stairwell, a backup or queue would start at the entrance doorway to the
stairway. That queue would be the total number of people traveling into that exit, minus
how many people are already in the stairwell. So in the time it takes people to get to the
bottom of the stairway and exit:
(0.47 minutes) X (FSM=70 people/min) = 33 people would be in the stairwell.
With 53 people exiting, and 33 people in the stairwell, that leaves 20 people waiting in
the queue at the top of the stairs.
It would take the 20 people in the queue, at a maximum specific flow of 71
people/minute, 17 seconds to enter the top of the stairwell.
16.2 + 33.2 + 18.4 + 66 + 13 + 28 + 17 = 192 seconds
Human Resources Offices and Diamond Creek Room:
The maximum occupancy of the HR offices is 22 people. If the Diamond Creek room is
included, the total occupancy is 53 people. Their path of travel would be south into the
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west corridor through three doorways, then east into the open-air walkway. From there,
they’d travel south to the main stairwell and out the front doors. The maximum distance
traveled in the office is 80 feet.
Time to reach the office door to the west corridor:
(80 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 20 seconds
Time to pass through the three 36”-wide doors:
(53 people) / (144 people/min) = 22 seconds
Time to travel in the west corridor and reach the door to the second floor lobby:
(32 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 8 seconds
Time to pass through the 36”-wide door into the second floor lobby:
(53 people) / (48 people/min) = 66 seconds
Time to travel south along the open-air walkway and reach the main stairwell:
(51 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 13 seconds
Time to exit the main stairwell = 28 seconds
It would take people 28 seconds to travel down the stairs between floors and exit.
Assuming everyone in the office was trying to leave at one time, and 53 people can’t fit in a
single floor’s stairwell, a backup or queue would start at the entrance doorway to the
stairway. That queue would be the total number of people traveling into that exit, minus
how many people are already in the stairwell. So in the time it takes people to get to the
bottom of the stairway and exit:
(0.47 minutes) X (FSM=70 people/min) = 33 people would be in the stairwell.
With 53 people exiting, and 33 people in the stairwell, that leaves 20 people waiting in
the queue at the top of the stairs.
It would take the 20 people in the queue, at a maximum specific flow of 71
people/minute, 17 seconds to enter the top of the stairwell.
20 + 22 + 8 + 66 + 13 + 28 + 17 = 174 seconds
County Counsel Offices:
The maximum occupancy of the County Counsel offices is 32 people. Their path of travel
would be south into the west corridor through two doorways, then east into the open-air
walkway. From there, they’d travel south to the main stairwell and out the front doors. The
maximum distance traveled in the office is 75 feet.
Time to reach the office door to the west corridor:
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(75 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 19 seconds
Time to pass through the two 36”-wide doors:
(32 people) / (96 people/min) = 20 seconds
Time to travel in the west corridor and reach the door to the second floor lobby:
(66 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 17 seconds
Time to pass through the 36”-wide door into the second floor lobby:
(32 people) / (48 people/min) = 40 seconds
Time to travel south along the open-air walkway and reach the main stairwell:
(51 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 13 seconds
Time to exit the main stairwell = 28 seconds
It would take people 28 seconds to travel down the stairs between floors and exit.
Assuming everyone in the office was trying to leave at one time, and 32 people can’t fit in a
single floor’s stairwell, a backup or queue would start at the entrance doorway to the
stairway. That queue would be the total number of people traveling into that exit, minus
how many people are already in the stairwell. So in the time it takes people to get to the
bottom of the stairway and exit:
(0.47 minutes) X (FSM=70 people/min) = 33 people could be in the stairwell.
Therefore, there would be no queue at the top of the stairs.
19 + 20 + 17 + 40 + 13 + 28 = 137 seconds
LAFCo Offices, the Grand Jury and the nearby Conference Rooms:
The maximum occupancy of these offices is 102 people. Their path of travel would be into
the dead end corridor through four doorways, then south into the open-air walkway. From
there, they’d travel south to the main stairwell and out the front doors. The maximum
distance traveled in the office is 77 feet.
Time to reach the office door to the dead end corridor:
(77 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 20 seconds
Time to pass through the four 36”-wide doors:
(102 people) / (192 people/min) = 32 seconds
Time to reach the door to the second floor lobby:
(48 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 13 seconds
Time to pass through the 36”-wide door:
(102 people) / (48 people/min) = 128 seconds
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Time to travel south along the open-air walkway and reach the main stairwell:
(51 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 13 seconds
Time to exit the main stairwell = 28 seconds
It would take people 28 seconds to travel down the stairs between floors and exit.
Assuming everyone in the office was trying to leave at one time, and 102 people can’t fit in
a single floor’s stairwell, a backup or queue would start at the entrance to the stairway.
That queue would be the total number of people traveling into that exit, minus how many
people are already in the stairwell. So in the time it takes people to get to the bottom of the
stairway and exit:
(0.47 minutes) X (FSM=70 people/min) = 33 people would be in the stairwell.
With 102 people exiting, and 33 people in the stairwell, that leaves 69 people waiting in
the queue at the top of the stairs.
It would take the 69 people in the queue, at a maximum specific flow of 70
people/minute, 59 seconds to enter the top of the stairwell.
20 + 32 + 13 + 128 + 13 + 28 + 59 = 293 seconds
Office of Emergency Services and the Empire Room:
The maximum occupancy of the OES offices is 6 people. If the Empire room is included, the
total occupancy is 70 people. Their path of travel would be north into the east corridor
through one doorway, then west into the open-air walkway. From there, they’d travel south
to the main stairwell and out the front doors. The maximum distance traveled in the office
is 75 feet.
Time to reach the office door to the east corridor:
(75 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 19 seconds
Time to pass through the one 36”-wide door:
(70 people) / (48 people/min) = 87.5 seconds
Time to travel in the east corridor and reach the door to the second floor lobby:
(15 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 4 seconds
Time to pass through the one 36”-wide door into the second floor lobby:
(70 people) / (48 people/min) = 87.5 seconds
Time to travel south along the open-air walkway and reach the main stairwell:
(51 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 13 seconds
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Time to exit the main stairwell = 28 seconds
It would take people 28 seconds to travel down the stairs between floors and exit.
Assuming everyone in the office was trying to leave at one time, and 70 people can’t fit in a
single floor’s stairwell, a backup or queue would start at the entrance doorway to the
stairway. That queue would be the total number of people traveling into that exit, minus
how many people are already in the stairwell. So in the time it takes people to get to the
bottom of the stairway and exit:
(0.47 minutes) X (FSM=70 people/min) = 33 people would be in the stairwell.
With 70 people exiting, and 33 people in the stairwell, that leaves 37 people waiting in
the queue at the top of the stairs.
It would take the 37 people in the queue, at a maximum specific flow of 71
people/minute, 32 seconds to enter the top of the stairwell.
19 + 87.5 + 4 + 87.5 + 13 + 28 + 32 = 271 seconds
Tax Collector-Treasurer’s Offices and Mountaineer Room:
The maximum occupancy of the Tax Collector & Treasurer’s offices is 21 people. If the
Empire room is included, the total occupancy is 46 people. Their path of travel would be
north into the east corridor through two doorways, then west into the open-air walkway.
From there, they’d travel south to the main stairwell and out the front doors. The maximum
distance traveled in the office is 66 feet.
Time to reach the office door to the east corridor:
(66 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 17 seconds
Time to pass through the two 36”-wide doors:
(46 people) / (96 people/min) = 29 seconds
Time to travel in the east corridor and reach the door to the second floor-lobby:
(50 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 13 seconds
Time to pass through the one 36”-wide door into the second floor lobby:
(46 people) / (48 people/min) = 58 seconds
Time to travel south along the open-air walkway and reach the main stairwell:
(51 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 13 seconds
Time to exit the main stairwell = 28 seconds
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It would take people 28 seconds to travel down the stairs between floors and exit.
Assuming everyone in the office was trying to leave at one time, and 46 people can’t fit in a
single floor’s stairwell, a backup or queue would start at the entrance doorway to the
stairway. That queue would be the total number of people traveling into that exit, minus
how many people are already in the stairwell. So in the time it takes people to get to the
bottom of the stairway and exit:
(0.47 minutes) X (FSM=70 people/min) = 33 people would be in the stairwell.
With 46 people exiting, and 33 people in the stairwell, that leaves 13 people waiting in
the queue at the top of the stairs.
It would take the 13 people in the queue, at a maximum specific flow of 71
people/minute, 11 seconds to enter the top of the stairwell.
17 + 29 + 13 + 58 + 13 + 28 + 11 = 169 seconds
Sheriff’s Office:
The maximum occupancy of the Sheriff’s offices is 101 people. They would have two paths
of travel as the office space is so wide. The first would be south into the east corridor, then
west into the second floor lobby. From there, they’d travel south to the main stairwell and
out the front doors. The other option would be to head south into the east corridor, then
east into the eastern stairwell. It is assumed that the number of people split between the
exits.
Exit via the Main Stairwell:
Time to reach the office door to the east corridor:
(102 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 26 seconds
Time to pass through the two 36”-wide doors:
(50.5 people) / (96 people/min) = 32 seconds
Time to travel in the east corridor and reach the door to the second floor lobby:
(17 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 4 seconds
Time to pass through the one 36”-wide door into the second floor lobby:
(50.5 people) / (48 people/min) = 64 seconds
Time to travel south along the open-air walkway and reach the main stairwell:
(51 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 13 seconds
Time to exit the main stairwell = 28 seconds
It would take people 28 seconds to travel down the stairs between floors and exit.
Assuming everyone in the office was trying to leave at one time, and 51 people can’t fit in a
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single floor’s stairwell, a backup or queue would start at the entrance doorway to the
stairway. That queue would be the total number of people traveling into that exit, minus
how many people are already in the stairwell. So in the time it takes people to get to the
bottom of the stairway and exit:
(0.47 minutes) X (FSM=70 people/min) = 33 people would be in the stairwell.
With 51 people exiting, and 33 people in the stairwell, that leaves 18 people waiting in
the queue at the top of the stairs.
It would take the 18 people in the queue, at a maximum specific flow of 71
people/minute, 15 seconds to enter the top of the stairwell.
26 + 32 + 4 + 64 + 13 + 28 + 15 = 182 seconds
Exit via the East Stairwell:
Time to reach the office door to the east corridor:
(102 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 26 seconds
Time to pass through the one 36”-wide door into the east corridor:
(50.5 people) / (48 people/min) = 64 seconds
Time to travel in the east corridor and reach the door to the eastern stairwell:
(5 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 1 seconds
Time to exit the west stairwell = 25.3 seconds
It would take people 25.3 seconds to travel down the stairs between floors and exit.
Assuming everyone in the office was trying to leave at one time, and 50 people can’t fit in a
single floor’s stairwell, a backup or queue would start at the entrance doorway to the
stairway. That queue would be the total number of people traveling into that exit, minus
how many people are already in the stairwell. So in the time it takes people to get to the
bottom of the stairway and exit:
(0.42 minutes) X (FSM=46.25 people/min) = 20 people would be in the stairwell.
With 50 people exiting, and 20 people in the stairwell, that leaves 30 people waiting in
the queue at the top of the stairs.
It would take the 30 people in the queue, at a maximum specific flow of 48
people/minute, 37.5 seconds to enter the top of the stairwell.
26 + 64 + 1 + 25.3 + 37.5 = ~154 seconds
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Assessor’s Offices:
The maximum occupancy of the Assessor’s offices is 37 people. Their path of travel would
be north into the east corridor through two doorways, then east into the eastern stairwell.
The maximum distance traveled in the office is 63 feet.
Time to reach the office door to the east corridor:
(63 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 16 seconds
Time to pass through the one 36”-wide door into the east corridor:
(63 people) / (96 people/min) = 39 seconds
Time to travel in the east corridor and reach the door to the eastern stairwell:
(9 feet) / (235 feet/min) = 2 seconds
Time to exit the west stairwell = 25.3 seconds
It would take people 25.3 seconds to travel down the stairs between floors and exit.
Assuming everyone in the office was trying to leave at one time, and 63 people can’t fit in a
single floor’s stairwell, a backup or queue would start at the entrance doorway to the
stairway. That queue would be the total number of people traveling into that exit, minus
how many people are already in the stairwell. So in the time it takes people to get to the
bottom of the stairway and exit:
(0.42 minutes) X (FSM=46.25 people/min) = 20 people would be in the stairwell.
With 63 people exiting, and 20 people in the stairwell, that leaves 43 people waiting in
the queue at the top of the stairs.
It would take the 43 people in the queue, at a maximum specific flow of 48
people/minute, 54 seconds to enter the top of the stairwell.
16 + 39 + 2 + 25.3 + 54 = ~137 seconds
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APPENDIX D
Fire Alarm System Layouts
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APPENDIX E
Secondary Alarm System Install Documents
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Close-Up – Floor Plan (Above the Floor)
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Close-Up – Floor Plan (Below the Floor)
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Symbol List
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APPENDIX F
DETACT Model Calculations
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Medium Growth
INPUT PARAMETERS
Height above fire (H)
Radial distance (R)
Ambient temperature (To)
Actuation temperature (Td)
Response time index (RTI)
Fire growth power (n)
Fire growth coefficient (α)
Time step (dt)

1.68
4.57
25
32.2
2
2
0.012
2

m
m
C
C
(m-s)1/2
kW/s^n
s

CALCULATED PARAMETERS
R/H
dT(cj)/dT(pl)
u(cj)/u(pl)
Rep. t2 coeff.
Slow
Medium
Fast
Ultrafast

Calculation time (s)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24

HRR
0.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.7
2.4
3.1
3.9
4.8
5.8
6.9

Gas temp
20.0
25.1
25.4
25.6
25.9
26.2
26.6
26.9
27.3
27.7
28.1
28.5
29.0

Gas velocity
0.00
0.03
0.04
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
0.10
0.11
0.11
0.12
0.13
0.14

Det temp
20.00
20.00
20.84
21.77
22.67
23.51
24.27
24.96
25.57
26.14
26.67
27.18
27.67

dT/dt
0.00
0.42
0.46
0.45
0.42
0.38
0.34
0.31
0.28
0.27
0.25
0.25
0.24

26

8.1

29.4

0.15

28.16

0.24

28

9.4

29.9

0.15

28.64

0.24

30

10.8

30.4

0.16

29.13

0.25

32

12.3

30.8

0.17

29.62

0.25

34

13.9

31.3

0.18

30.12

0.25

36

15.6

31.8

0.18

30.63

0.26

38

17.3

32.3

0.19

31.14

0.26

40

19.2

32.9

0.20

31.66

0.26
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0.15
0.09
k
0.003
0.012
0.047
0.400
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Fast Growth
INPUT PARAMETERS
Height above fire (H)
Radial distance (R)
Ambient temperature (To)
Actuation temperature (Td)
Response time index (RTI)
Fire growth power (n)
Fire growth coefficient (α)
Time step (dt)

1.68
4.57
25
32.2
2
2
0.047
2

m
m
C
C
(m-s)1/2
kW/s^n
s

CALCULATED PARAMETERS
R/H
dT(cj)/dT(pl)
u(cj)/u(pl)
Rep. t2 coeff.
Slow
Medium
Fast
Ultrafast

Calculation time (s)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24

HRR
0.0
0.2
0.8
1.7
3.0
4.7
6.8
9.2
12.0
15.2
18.8
22.7
27.1

Gas temp
20.0
25.4
25.9
26.6
27.3
28.1
28.9
29.8
30.8
31.7
32.7
33.8
34.9

Gas velocity
0.00
0.04
0.07
0.09
0.11
0.12
0.14
0.15
0.17
0.18
0.19
0.21
0.22

Det temp
20.00
20.00
21.10
22.34
23.58
24.78
25.94
27.05
28.13
29.20
30.28
31.37
32.47

dT/dt
0.00
0.55
0.62
0.62
0.60
0.58
0.56
0.54
0.54
0.54
0.54
0.55
0.56

26

31.8

36.0

0.23

33.60

0.58

28

36.8

37.1

0.24

34.75

0.59

30

42.3

38.3

0.25

35.93

0.60

32

48.1

39.5

0.27

37.13

0.61

34

54.3

40.7

0.28

38.35

0.62

36

60.9

42.0

0.29

39.60

0.63

38

67.9

43.2

0.30

40.87

0.65

40

75.2

44.5

0.31

42.16

0.66
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0.15
0.09
k
0.003
0.012
0.047
0.400

201

Fire Protection & Life Safety Analysis – Eric W. Rood Administration Center

202

APPENDIX G
Alarm Zones List
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APPENDIX H
Alarm System Component Data Sheets
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APPENDIX I
Underground Water Supply Drawing
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APPENDIX J
Sprinkler System Drawings
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Rood Center – 1st Floor East (1 of 5)
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Rood Center – 1st Floor West (2 of 5)
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Rood Center – 2st Floor East (3 of 5)
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Rood Center – 2st Floor West (4 of 5)
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Rood Center – Mansard (5 of 5)
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Rood Center – Mansard (Close-Up)
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Rood Center – 2nd Floor Combined Overview with water path highlighted
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Rood Center – 2nd Floor Combined Close-Up with water path highlighted
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APPENDIX K
Pump Room Layout
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APPENDIX L
Sprinkler System Component Data Sheets
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APPENDIX M
Manual Hydraulic Calculations
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APPENDIX N
Original Hydraulic Calculations
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Original Calculations – 1st Floor
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Original Calculations – 1st Floor
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Original Calculations – 1st Floor
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Original Calculations – 1st Floor
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Original Calculations – 1st Floor
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Original Calculations – 1st Floor
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Original Calculations – 1st Floor
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Original Calculations – 1st Floor
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Original Calculations – 1st Floor
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Original Calculations – 1st Floor
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Original Calculations – 1st Floor
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Original Calculations – 1st Floor – Page 12
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Original Calculations – 2nd Floor
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Original Calculations – 2nd Floor
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Original Calculations – 2nd Floor
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Original Calculations – 2nd Floor
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Original Calculations – 2nd Floor – Page 5
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Original Calculations – Mansard
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Original Calculations – Mansard
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Original Calculations – Mansard
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Original Calculations – Mansard
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Original Calculations – Mansard
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Original Calculations – Mansard – Page 6
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APPENDIX O
Sprinkler System Inspection, Testing and Maintenance
Schedule
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Major Sprinkler
System
Components
Fire Department
Connections

Backflow
Prevention

Pressure Reducing
Valve

Inspections, Testing and
Maintenance
Connection visible and
accessible

Quarterly

NFPA 25
(2014)
Reference
13.7.1

Couplings checked for damage

Quarterly

13.7.1

Plugs, Caps, Couplings gaskets
in place/undamaged

Quarterly

13.7.1

ID signs in place

Quarterly

13.7.1

Verify ball drip valve is free of
leaks

Quarterly

13.7.1

Interior is inspected for
obstructions

Quarterly

13.7.1

Piping from the FDC to the FD
Check Valve hydrostatically
tested at 150 psi for 2 hours

Every 5 years

13.7.4

Check valve – internal moves
freely, in good condition

Every 5 years
(maintained
as necessary)
Weekly
(Monthly if
locked)

13.4.2.1

Inspected internally to verify all
components operate correctly,
move freely and are in good
condition

Every 5 years

13..1.4

Forward flow test (or internal
inspection during water
rationing)
In the open position/not leaking

Annually

13.6.2.1

Quarterly

13.5.1.1

Quarterly

13.5.1.1

Check that the Isolation valves
and double check detector
assemblies are open

Maintaining downstream
pressure

Frequency
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In good condition

Riser

Control Valves

Supervisory
Switches
Waterflow Alarm
Device

Quarterly

13.5.1.1

Full flow test conducted on each
valve
Inspect gauges

Every 5 years

13.5.1.2

Quarterly

5.2.4.1

Gauges tested or replaced

Every 5 years

5.3.2.1

Nameplate attached

Annually

5.2.6

Seismic bracing checked

Annually

5.2.3

Main drain test
Wrenches/hand wheel available

Annually
Monthly

13.3.3.4
13.3.2.2

Operated/Lubricated

Annually

13.3.3.1

Valve is free of damage and
leaks

Weekly
(Monthly if
locked)

13.3.2.1

Control Valve supervisory
alarm devices

Quarterly

13.3.2.1.2

In the correct (open or closed)
position

Monthly

13.3.2.2

Sealed, locked, or supervised

Monthly

13.3.2.2

Accessible

Monthly

13.3.2.2

Has proper signage

Monthly

13.3.2.2

Every time
the valve is
closed
SemiAnnually
Quarterly

13.3.3.2

Post Indicator Valves opened
until spring or torsion is felt in
the rod
Valve supervisory switches
shall be tested
Inspect to verify system is free
of damage

13.3.3.5.1
5.2.5

Waterflow alarm test

Quarterly

5.3.3.1, 13.2.6

Vane-type and pressure switchtype Waterflow alarm devices

SemiAnnually

5.3.3.2/13.2.6/2
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Alarm Valves

Sprinklers

Test the audible alarm and
visual signals activate within 90
seconds.

Annually

13.2.6

Free of damage

Monthly

13.4.1

Accessible

Monthly

13.4.1

Retard chamber/alarm drains,
not leaking

Monthly

13.4.1

Interior checked (strainers,
filters and restriction orifice)
No damage or leaks

Every 5 years

13.4.1.2

Annually

5.2.1.1.1

Free of corrosion, foreign
materials, paint and damage

Annually

5.2.1.1.1

Installed in proper orientation

Annually

5.2.1.1.1

Distance from ceilings and to
storage below

Annually

5.2.1.2

If fast-response sprinklers are
20 years old

Check at 20
years, and
every 10
years
thereafter

5.3.1.1.1.5

If sprinklers are 50 years old

Check at 50
years and
every 10
years
thereafter

5.3.1.1.1

If sprinklers are 75 years old

Check at 75
years and
every 5 years
thereafter

5.3.1.1.1.5

High temperature sprinklers

Every 5 years

5.3.1.1.1.4

Annually

5.2.3

Check hangers and seismic
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Fittings & Supports

bracing are installed and
undamaged
At least 6 spare sprinklers –
proper number and type.
Complete with wrench?
Free of leaks, corrosion and
mechanical damage

Annually

5.2.1.4, 5.4.1.5

Annually

5.2.2.1

Verify proper alignment and
free of external loads

Annually

5.2

Hose racks inspected per NFPA
1962

Annually

13.5.3.1

Every 5 years

13.5.3.2

Annually

13.3.4.1

Full flow test on each device
OS&Y Valves shall be lubricated
annually

Additional Requirements and Frequency data should follow Table 5.1.1.2, Table 6.1.12,
and Table 13.1.1.2 from NFPA 25 (2014) seen below.
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